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ABSTRACT
VEGAN FOOD FOR THOUGHT: MORAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF ANIMALS
SEPTEMBER 2021
RYAN TURNER, B.A., UNIVERISITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERISITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERISITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Zussman
This dissertation examines how humans make moral sense of and with animals. Each
substantive chapter is devoted to one of three topics: animal selfhood, veganism, and animal
rights. In chapter two, I examine animal selfhood and its moral implications. I argue that animal
selves, particularly in an elemental Meadian sense, are potentially real, but in most cases are
unobservable or unverifiable phenomena. I also argue that any moral theory of animal rights
based on animal selfhood is limited by the empirical and epistemological limitations of
substantiating animal selves. In chapter three, I present the interactional strategies ethical vegans
employ when presenting their moral beliefs to non-vegans. Using in-depth interviews and
observations of vegan gatherings, I find that most vegans, those who use what I call “strategic
individualism,” think of veganism as a general moral imperative—that humans ought to be vegan
as a matter of social justice for animals—yet they frequently individualized their positions when
interacting with nonvegans to avoid interpersonal conflict and thereby engage nonvegans. The
difference in their private morals and their public presentation demonstrates that individualism
may be better understood less as a fundamental orientation, which is the dominant approach in
cultural sociology, so much as an interactional strategy to achieve particular goals. Lastly, in
chapter four, I use interviews and observations to examine how animal welfarists and animal
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abolitionists complicate Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of responsibility and the
ethics of conviction. While Weber argued that ethical conduct is guided by two opposing and
irreconcilable ethics—responsibility and ultimate ends—I argue that both the welfarists and
abolitionists exhibit non-negotiable moral convictions while also demonstrating concerns about
the consequences of their activism. Overall, this dissertation contributes to sociological
understandings of animal selfhood, individualism, and ethics of responsibility and conviction.
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CHAPTER 1
ANIMALS, MORALS, AND MANNERS

In 2007, National Football League star quarterback Michael Vick was charged by the
Federal government for sponsoring illegal dog fighting, gambling on dog fighting, and hosting
animal cruelty on his property. Vick pleaded guilty to these charges and spent twenty-one
months in prison (ESPN). Public reaction to Vick was negative. He lost sponsors, including Nike
and Reebok (Francione 2007). The animal rights organization, People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals, condemned his actions claiming that “Dogfighting is unacceptable. Hurting animals
for human pleasure or gain is despicable. Cruelty is just plain wrong” (Farmer 2007). A Gallup
Poll showed that 88% of NFL fans believed that Vick should face some jail time, and 58% of
NFL fans thought that he should not be able to return to the NFL (Jones 2007). Yet, by 2009,
Michael Vick had indeed returned to the NFL, signing with the Philadelphia Eagles. The moral
discourse shifted from condemnation of his dog fighting to the plausibility of redemption. Dave
Stanley (2010) of the Bleacher Report wrote,
“We all love an inspiring comeback story; a vindicating tale of redemption is
‘Must See TV’. Perhaps it is because it gives us hope for overcoming our own
shortcomings. The sight of an athlete reclaiming glory against all odds in some
ways allows us to live vicariously through him.”
Vick also believed he was warranted a second chance based on his evolved moral character,
claiming, "’I think as long as you're willing to come back and do it the right way and do the right
things that makes you committed, then I think you deserve it,’ Vick said. ‘But you only get one
shot at a second chance’" (Jackson 2009). A local Philadelphia news article highlighted that
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tension over Vick’s return from the perspective of NFL fans. One the one hand, some fans used
the language of redemption, claiming that Vick and people more generally deserve second
chances. On the other hand, some fans believed Vick should not return because he had harmed
animals (Jackson 2009).
There are two dominant moral narratives about Vick and his treatment of animals, both
of which are simultaneously intertwined and in conflict. One involves narratives of
condemnation, specifically disapproval of his treatment of animals. The foundation of this
narrative is the moral evaluation of Vick’s actions, e.g., dog fighting is wrong. The second
narrative is of redemption, as some have conceded that Vick committed wrongdoing, yet they
argue that he made up for it by doing his time. Therefore, he is entitled to a second chance
(Stanley 2010). In addition, Vick might be a recipient of forgiveness because he went from
participating in dog fighting to supporting legislation that would help save animals, mostly dogs,
from hot cars (Diaz 2015) The foundation of this narrative is Vick’s improved moral character;
he has learned his lesson through punishment and has changed his actions for the better. He has
reformed himself morally. Morality permeates both narratives, informing both the disapproval of
Vick’s actions and the forgiveness of his transgressions.
Vick’s case highlights how important morality is for thinking about animals, specifically
how the moral construction of animals is multivocal and contested. While many Americans find
dogfighting reprehensible, some, like former NBA star Stephon Marbury, have classified it as a
sport, like hunting (Chung 2007). Part of what is at issue here are distinctions among species, as
deer hunting is legally and culturally permissible while dog fighting is not. But even these
distinctions are not straightforward conclusions as many condemn hunting (Einwohner 1999)
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and some justifying dog fighting. The constant, however, is the centrality of moral judgment in
our thinking about animals.
Vick’s case also demonstrates the contradictions in the way individuals think about the
morality of animals. For example, while many individuals condemned Vick’s actions, perhaps
they are just as guilty of animal abuse in their own lives. Indeed, animal rights philosopher Gary
Francione (2007) argues that humans have “moral schizophrenia” about animals, meaning that
we do not think clearly about our moral obligations to animals. Francione makes the point that it
is morally inconsistent to condemn Vick for dog fighting if you eat, wear, or use animals as any
means to an end. He argues:
“There is something bizarre about condemning Michael Vick for using dogs in a
hideous form of entertainment when 99 percent of us also use animals that are
every bit as sentient as dogs in another hideous form of entertainment that is no
more justifiable than fighting dogs: eating animals and animal products” (2007).
Francione concludes that “we are all Michael Vick” because the actions of eating animals and
making dogs fight are moral equivalents, both done out of pleasure, and therefore morally
wrong.
While in my view Francione makes a strong argument, it is not so much his moral
reasoning as his empirical claims that are the starting point for a sociological perspective on
animals (more on this below). His argument that humans have confused or at the very least
inconsistent thinking and behavior about the moral status of animals in society emphasizes that
animals are ideal sites for examining morality more generally. Specifically, because humans can
attribute various moral meanings to animals, animals are a good cultural location for making
sense of the social construction of morality more generally. For example, humans place animals
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into various categories, all of which carry moral significance and thus shape how we think and
act toward animals in those categories (Arluke and Sanders 1996). Humans also use animals to
make moral claims about other humans. When individuals call someone “an animal,” their intent
is, quite literally, to dehumanize or otherize the object of their scorn. In such a case, drawing
boundaries explicitly or implicitly calls into question a person’s moral worth. Lastly, individuals
can intentionally or unintentionally elevate their own status or promote group cohesion through
moral claims about animals, such as animal rights activists who discuss with each other their
moral awakenings to the sins of animal abuse (Jasper and Nelkin 1992).
My focus in this dissertation is how individuals make moral sense of animals, and the
larger sociological implications of such sensemaking. To this aim, there are three substantive
chapters that address this issue, each from a different direction. In Chapter two, I examine how
sociologists have examined animal selfhood, largely relying on interactionist ideas of the self.
Far from old interactionist thought, which denied animal’s selves, some sociologists who have
studied animal-human relations argue that animals are, in important senses, self-aware. I
distinguish five criteria of the self to evaluate their arguments, ultimately concluding that animal
selves may be real, but that the evidence is insufficient. Though my main focus is on evaluating
arguments of animal selfhood, I also analyze how sociologists, inspired by moral philosophers,
have used animal selfhood to make claims about animal welfare and rights.
In the following chapters, I more explicitly address everyday moral constructions of
animals by examining the moral claims of vegans and animal rights activists. In doing so, my
aim is to address how my research connects to larger sociological theory. In chapter three, I
interviewed vegans about how they address the moral status of animals when they interact with
nonvegans. While many of these vegans privately believe that humans have a moral obligation
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not to harm animals, they also publicly presented their moral beliefs about animals as individual
beliefs rather than collective obligations. In other words, they reformulate their moral beliefs,
accommodating to specific situations, using American individualism as a strategic resource to
avoid conflict. In chapter four, I empirically examine Max Weber’s (1946) ethical distinction
between an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of ultimate ends by interviewing two different
groups of animal activists. The first group, the welfarists, largely believe in small scale cultural
and legal reform regarding animal use. They seemingly practice an ethic of responsibility as they
are concerned about the consequences of their activism. Thus, they believe that they should make
small demands on the public to change their treatment of animals to not alienate them. The
second group, the abolitionists, believe in abolishing all animal use because it is morally
unjustifiable. They seemingly practice an ethic of ultimate ends, advocating for the abolition of
animal use without a concern for how it affects the larger public. Yet I find both groups
complicate Weber’s ethical distinction, as both groups practice, to various degrees, ethics of
responsibility and conviction.
Overall, my goal in this dissertation is to examine how the moral construction of animals
has larger sociological implications, including sociological understandings of individualism and
ethics.
Animals and Morality
Since I examine animals and morality in this dissertation, I now review some of the
literature on this topic. The sociological literature that examines animals and morality has
produced a few key findings. The first important theme focuses on how humans categorize
animals and thus give them moral meaning. According to Arluke and Sanders (1996), humans
categorize animals similarly to how they categorize themselves. There are both “good” and
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“bad” people and animals. We rank animals based on how well they fit into our society or how
well they play the roles they are expected to enact. “Good animals” have high status because
they willingly accept their subordinate status in society. These animals are highly visible, part of
human lives. In contrast, “bad animals” have a low moral status as humans enforce their
subordinate position in society. Each construction relies on the opposite construction to gain
meaning.
Arluke and Sanders (1996) argue that humans categorize “pets” and “tools” as good
animals. Americans often treat pets, such as dogs and cats, as humans, thinking of pets as friends
and companions. These animals, then, have high moral worth. For example, many Americans are
troubled by the Lychee and Dog Meat Festival, an annual celebration held in Yulin, Guangxi,
China, because they believe that humans should not eat dogs because they are companions, a
moral category incompatible with violence. Farm and lab animals are not pets but they are
usually thought of as tools. Humans do not treat them as humanlike because they often believe
that such animals have limited cognitive abilities (Arluke and Sanders 1996). Both pets and tools
benefit humans and therefore humans view them favorably. In contrast, Americans view “bad”
animals, like pests and vermin, negatively. Society ignores, marginalizes, segregates, or kills
these animals. These animals do not have a clear place in the moral order because they are of
little use for humans. These animals are demonized, and are often equated with aggrieved social
groups (Arluke and Sanders 1996).
Animals, especially “bad animals,” can be categorized as social problems or moral
concerns. City dwellers have long viewed pigeons as social problems in US cities. For example,
starting in the 1930s and intensifying in the 1960s, New York City officials viewed pigeons as a
health menace. The birds were linked to a form of meningitis that could kill humans (Jerolmack
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2008). While pigeons were blamed for the deaths of two people, there was no evidence of
transmissions of diseases from pigeons to people. In contrast, Colin Jerolmack (2008) argues that
pigeons were social problems because New Yorkers viewed the pigeons as out of place; the birds
violated the boundary between nature and human civilization. In other words, pigeons as animals
did not belong in human spaces. Combined with the fact that American cities were attempting to
present themselves as orderly clean spaces during the 1960s, New Yorkers thought of pigeons
not only as outsiders but disorderly outsiders, unclean animals akin to the homeless and other
unwanted beings. Pigeons represented disorder and impurity and their removal signaled the
restoration of moral order.
Animal categorizations are not monolithic; different groups and institutions within a
society may give different moral meanings to animals. For instance, Arnold Arluke’s (from
Arluke and Sanders 1996) research in primate labs illustrated how lab workers attributed
different moral values to primates. In one lab, workers viewed primates as sources of work. The
boundary between the primates and humans was prominent as many of the workers
depersonalized the monkeys, treating them as objects. The culture of the lab even encouraged
cruel treatment of the primates; those who could wrestle and beat up large monkeys were
awarded social honor. The workers thought that the monkeys would be unhappy at the lab, so
there was no use in exercising the monkeys or creating stimulating environments for them.
Another primate lab, on the other hand, morally elevated the monkeys. The workers nurtured the
monkeys and treated them like companions. Workers thought that bargaining with the monkeys
was a better idea than overpowering them. In addition, many of the workers felt that they got
something back from the primates such as love and affection. Therefore, most of the workers
found it difficult to draw a line between humans and primates.
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According to Arluke, the different meaning systems constructed by the workers of the
two labs can be partially explained by the labs’ managerial structures. Key individuals who had
authority in the lab reinforced different moral constructions of the primates. In the first lab, the
director hired people who saw the work “as just a job,” and had no special interest in animals or
science (Arluke and Sanders 1996: 124). In contrast, the head veterinarian of the other lab
wanted to hire people who cared about the primates’ well-being. In addition to managerial
structures, the workers also created norms that facilitated treatment of the primates as discussed
above. In sum, the creation of these two meaning systems illustrates the human ability to create
or dissolve boundaries among humans and animals, therefore constructing or deconstructing
animal categorization systems.
In general, animal categorizations affect how humans treat, view, and think about
animals. Like human categorizations, animal categorizations are not value free; they involve
hierarchies with pets at the top and “demons” and “vermin” at the bottom (Arluke and Sanders
1996). How humans socially and morally construct animals is based on the human uses that
animals can provide. Importantly, animals of the same species will not always be categorized the
same way. Dogs that are pets are considered “good animals” but dogs that race are considered
“tools.” These categorizations thus affect the interactions between humans and animals, and how
humans think of and treat animals. For instance, greyhound racers and trainers have very few
friendly interactions; the relationship is framed as strictly professional (Arluke and Sanders
1996). In contrast, a caretaker and his or her pet dog are likely and are expected to have warm
interactions. These relationships affect how humans treat animals. Most pet dogs are treated as or
are considered members of the family. On the other hand, when greyhound racers retire, the
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trainers have no use for them. Ultimately, these dogs end up being euthanized shortly after they
retire. Thus, categorizations affect how we view the world and the moral worth of its inhabitants.
Another key theme in the sociological literature of animals and morality shows how
dominant groups use the moral meanings of animals to facilitate the marginalization and
stigmatization of subordinate groups, such as immigrants, depicting such groups as subhuman,
uncivilized, and backward. The process is recursive: the characteristics of devalued human
groups are attributed to animals and those animals are then used as metaphors to further devalue
humans. For example, during the 1850s, English sparrows were imported into the US to help
control insect pests, particularly the drop worm (Fine and Christoforides 1991). However, some
Americans, including some politicians and ornithologists, viewed these sparrows with hostility.
Their objection to the sparrow was that the birds ate more grain than insects, an economic
problem. However, there was no data to support this. Instead, Fine and Christoforides (1991)
argue that the moral qualities humans attributed to the sparrows facilitated the hatred of the birds.
The English sparrows were maligned because they were “immigrants.” Some Americans
viewed the birds as “alien” and un-American.” The English sparrow as an immigrant metaphor
went in both directions as many immigrants were referred to as a “swarm of foreigners” and
“motley herd” (Fine and Christoforides 1991). In addition, sparrows harmed decent American
birds. One politician during this time argued, “These sparrows do molest, harass, drive off, and
otherwise maltreat and forcibly eject and attempt to destroy various kinds of native birds, which
are thereby deprived of certain inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”
(Fine and Christoforides 1991: 17). This rhetoric is very similar to human immigrants taking jobs
and housing away from American workers, thereby depriving them of rights.
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The English sparrow was also immoral and dirty. For example, one critic claimed,
“Sparrows crowded cities; they were filthy, homely, noisy, and lascivious. Even crows (blacks)
were superior. Their diet was disgusting. They were ungrateful to America, and did not fulfill
their obligations as contract laborers” (Fine and Christoforides 1991: 17). In other words, they
did not eat the drop worms. The sparrows were even denigrated in children’s books. In the book
Citizen Bird, Elliot Coues depicts sparrows as bad citizens and criminals that were condemned
by everyone (Fine and Christoforides 1991). The loathing of the sparrows was so severe that by
the 1880s the federal government wanted to exterminate all English sparrows. Some states even
made it illegal to feed them (Fine and Christoforides 1991). In sum, the sparrows represented the
“immigration problem” in America. Both sparrows and immigrants were a perceived threat to the
moral order of society. Fascinatingly, the sparrows were socially constructed as immoral birds to
make moral claims about immigrants, both human and animal, thus justifying their exploitation
and maltreatment.
Dominant groups can also stigmatize subordinate groups by labeling their animal
practices as immoral. For instance, one American community became enraged when a Hmong
immigrant killed his dog with a baseball bat in order to appease an evil spirit that he believed had
plagued his wife with diabetes. The reason for killing the dog was illegitimate in the US
dominant culture. The Hmong man killed a “pet” through noninstitutionalized means, using an
illegitimate method and motive, upsetting many community members (Elder et al 2009). The
immigrant was thus seen as a deviant killer because his animal practices were neither legitimate
nor institutionalized in the US. This event spurred conflict between the white and Hmong
populations. Because the Hmong man violated a place specific animal-human boundary, Hmong
immigrants were seen as savage-like. Importantly, policing the human-animal boundary through
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the regulation of animal practices is necessary to sustain the legitimacy of animal practices of the
dominant group. By scrutinizing immigrant animal practices, dominant groups in the US
construct immigrants as uncivilized, irrational, or beastly, and their own actions as civilized,
rational, and humane (Elder et al 2009).
Other examples in the literature show how moral meanings attributed to animals reinforce
hierarchies between dominant and subordinate groups. For example, Arluke and Sanders (1996)
show how Nazis used animals to reaffirm symbolic boundaries between Germans and Jews. The
Nazis morally elevated animals, thereby blurring the boundary between humans and animals.
The Nazi government created animal protection laws such as anti-cruelty and anti-hunting acts
(Arluke and Sanders 1996). Nature and animals were regarded as sacred. At the same time, the
Nazis animalized humans and stressed human biological distinctions. They wanted to treat all
humans, including themselves and Germans more broadly, like animals, specifically through
selective breeding as an ideal means to purify bloodlines. They regarded Germans as livestock
who should breed the purest biological forms, and regarded Jews as pests that could contaminate
racial purity (Arluke and Sanders 1996). By animalizing human life, moral distinctions between
people and animals were eradicated, “making it possible to treat animals as considerably as
humans and humans as poorly as animals” (Arluke and Sanders 1996: 158). The Nazis argued
that the Jews were genetically contaminating the Aryan race and were thus treated like animals
with beastly or wild instincts. The Nazis thought of Jews and foreign workers as “lower
animals,” such as rodents, reptiles, insects, and even germs (Arluke and Sanders 1996). The
Nazis’ labeling of Jews as lower animals was a tactic to lower their moral worth—their
humanity—to facilitate experimentation on Jews and their attempted extermination.
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Examples of individuals animalizing humans in order to lower their moral status abound.
When the Jews were mass migrating to the US during the late nineteenth century, the print media
described Jews as “The Wolves of New York,” which depicted Jews as animal-like in their greed
(Arluke and Sanders 2008). Other publications from this period often characterized Jews as
weasels, hedgehogs, vampires, bats, or rats (Arluke and Sanders 2008). Moreover, groups of
humans can be stigmatized through animal images if majority groups consider them a threat to
the status quo. For example, during the controversy of black voting rights in 1867, a pamphlet
argued that blacks were not descendants of Adam and Eve but had entered Noah’s ark with the
beasts (Craige 1992). Typical representations of blacks during this period pictured them as
gorillas dressed like men.
Lastly, there is also sociological literature on animal rights that explores various issues
including how animal activist groups vary by beliefs and practices (Jasper and Nelkin 1992),
gender demographics and animal rights (Peek et al 1996. Jerolmack 2003), how broad strategies
of animal activists vary (Galvin and Herzog 1998, Schnurer 2002), how activists draw moral
boundaries between themselves and their targets (Arluke and Groves 1998), how animal activism
functions as a religion (Jamison et al 2000), among others. Consistent with this dissertation, the
literature also explores how activists use morality as a cultural resource (Swidler 1986) to
construct their identity or present their message to others. For example, many animal activists
feel motivated by their ethical principles and emotions, which propels them into animal rights
ideologies and organizations (Jasper 1997). In addition, activists use morality to “frame” their
message to the public (Snow 1986, Bedford and Snow 1992). They often frame their ideas in
ways that the public will receive positively (Freeman 2010). Activists do not only use morality
instrumentally. They are also constrained by structures of morality, as established social ideals
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and norms limit their moral reflexivity, or their reconciliation of their ideals with societal norms
(Jacobsson and Lindblom 2016). Furthermore, Einwohner (1999) argues that activists are also
constrained by the political opportunities associated with specific problems and subsequent
moral transformations. For example, animal activists have protested animal experimentation and
animal circuses with uneven outcomes in success. Animal researchers view animal
experimentation as necessary and central to their own social well-being. Such unwillingness for
change made it difficult for animal activists to abolish experimentation on moral grounds. In
contrast, animal activists have had more success with limiting circus attendance and
transforming the use of animals in circuses because the circus, compared to experimentation, is
less tied to identity, group membership, and daily work. Overall, the perceived necessity of a
practice is a central structural roadblock to moral change. I go into more detail covering animal
rights literature in chapters three and four.
My goal in this dissertation is consistent with much of the literature above. I want to
demonstrate the divergent ways sociologists, vegans, and animal activists morally construct
animals. However, different from some of the literature above, I also want to examine how these
moral constructions are socially enforced or transformed during the framing process, and how
vegans and activists in particular make sense of this. That is, while individuals may have
entrenched moral beliefs, these beliefs do not always transcend each situation in which
individuals are located. Morality is not only a static thing that defines personal belief or
facilitates group membership. It is also a strategy that individuals utilize differently depending on
the situation and perceived common stocks of meaning that situation will permit. Morality is not
simply a form of evaluation or what is right or wrong. It is also a strategy, especially for those
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seeking moral transformation, in response to the cultural and moral constraints placed on
individuals.
The Sociology of Morality
This dissertation is situated within the sociology of morality, so it is worth examining
some issues within this field and how they relate to my dissertation. Very few sociologists today
consider themselves sociologists of morality. Yet, many sociologists are engaged with morality,
whether they less commonly study morality explicitly or more commonly make moral claims
about the structure of society as a form of analysis. A preoccupation with morality was also at
the core of sociology’s origins as a discipline. Perhaps the best starting points for thinking about
sociology and morality are Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. They had very different
conceptions of morality, specifically over how sociologists can determine moral truths (Abend
2008). Weber saw morality as a social construction, as its meaning varies over time and across
place. Durkheim, on the other hand, viewed morality as an objective truth. Even though
Durkheim argues that different societies have different moralities, each society objectively
defines what is right or wrong in that society.
Weber argued that there is no moral truth since morality is a subjective judgement.
Weber was a descriptive relativist, meaning that he took the position that morals are relative, and
that people have different moral beliefs based on their location in a social context (Tavory 2011).
Thus, nothing is inherently right or wrong; morality is not “out there” or “real” or “objective”
like gravity. In other words, moral beliefs are “socially constructed.” A common example of the
descriptive relativist approach, arguably the foundation of constructionist thought, compares how
societies differently create and interpret social phenomena, including morality. For example,
Romans thought differently about morals than we do today. Most sociologists use this to
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demonstrate that there is nothing inherent about morals (Abend 2008). Instead, they are subject
to social definition. Even if people feel they are objectively right about an issue—if they feel
their judgments are true—it is an illusion because moral beliefs are created.
Weber (1978) also believed that morality was an important factor in explaining social
action, or subjectively meaningful behavior. The best example of this is Weber’s (1958) classic
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Here he argued that morality was a means of
motivating individuals, independent of interests. Weber argued that Protestants felt a calling
from God to fulfil their duty in worldly affairs or economic activities. According to Luther, a
calling is the highest form of moral activity an individual could assume (Weber 1958: 40). This
calling not only honored God, but also benefited the individual and community. Likewise, the
Calvinists believed that labor was designed by God to serve the utility of the human race.
Calvinists believed in predestination; part of humanity was saved to heaven, and the rest was
damned to hell. Not knowing who was saved or damned, the Calvinists more or less convinced
themselves that they were saved by accumulating capital, thereby promoting the glory of God.
Calvinists had to prove their faith in worldly activity, or in other words, through their calling.
Weber views morality as a guiding social force (e.g., a calling), experienced in the individuals as
motivation (prove one’s worth to God) promoting specific conduct (working for capital).
Morality motivates conduct.
Like Weber, Durkheim also argued that morality influenced behavior, though he
conceptualizes morality more as a constraint than motivation. Durkheim (1961), thought of
morality as central to group formation and trust through two components. First, morality consists
of norms of obligation that permit and forbid certain behaviors enforced through social sanctions.
Thus, individuals have obligations to others, like family member obligations, which constrain
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relations between them while also bringing them together. More generally, in The Division of
Labor in Society (1997), Durkheim argued that cooperation between individuals is not simply
secured through common (economic) interests but a common morality that binds individuals.
Second, morality consists of ideals, or ideas about what is sacred in a society and notions of how
societies ought to function. In Moral Education (1961), Durkheim argues that one of the central
functions of education is to instill common norms and ideals in students to produce social order.
Morality is thus both external and internal. It is externally imposed on individuals through
norms, and is internally accepted by individuals experienced as ideals. Norms and ideals give
society its moral order (Jacobsson and Lindblom 2016). In general, Durkheim argues that
morality operates as a social fact, a coercive power external to and independent of the individual,
which thereby produces social togetherness. Moral obligations and subsequent social cohesion
are defined from without rather than within.
While Weber and Durkheim agree that morality influences social action, they disagree
about other aspects of morality. In contrast to Weber, Durkheim argues that moral truth exists,
but that it varies from one society to the next. Durkheim claims that changes in ideas about
morality coincide with changes in the social structure. Thus, Romans may have different
conceptions of morals because they lived in a different social structure than we do today. Certain
structures create certain moralities (Abend 2008). For Durkheim, there are many moralities.
However, moralities are not simply social constructions, as Weber had it. Within each type of
society, questions about moral rightness can be answered objectively. In other words, there is a
true morality for each society. What is right within a society is what that society defines as right.
Morality, then, objectively exists as a definable order of fact, which sociologists can measure.
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While Durkheim agrees that morals are constructed, he does not conclude from that there
is not a right way to live. Durkheim takes the position that some moralities for a given society
are better than others. In The Division of Labor in Society (1997), he argued that science can
shed light on the direction our conduct ought to go, assisting us to an ideal. According to
Durkheim, science can determine what is right based on the concepts of the normal and the
pathological. Normal or “healthy” societies have alignment between their structure and morality.
This is good and virtuous. Pathological or “unhealthy” societies have a misalignment between
their structure and morality. This is akin to disease, which is bad and vicious. What is healthy
and what is sick is not subjective, because it depends upon “an objective criterion, inherent in the
facts themselves” (Durkheim 2014: 51). As long as sociologists understand the structure of a
society, they could propose ways to improve that society’s morality, removing its imperfections.
Given Durkheim’s arguments about morality, he is best categorized as a normative
relativist because he believes that different societies have different conceptions of the good,
which is right for those societies (Abend 2008). Morals that produce a healthy society are the
morals that society should possess. Science, presumably sociology, can help societies pinpoint
which type of morality is best suited for a particular society’s structure. For example, using
Durkheim’s (1997) distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, those living under
mechanical solidarity should follow their peers and perform similar tasks. Those living under
organic solidarity should perform specific tasks in the larger division of labor, playing their part
like an organ in the body. Both social structures require a specific morality to produce cohesion
among individuals. If individuals in these structures produce the correct morality, then that
society is healthily functioning. Furthermore, Durkheim argued that society’s social problems
often indicate a lack of “moral solidarity.” For example, Durkheim (1951: 300) viewed high
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levels of suicide as abnormal in societies, and that the way to address it was “a profound change
in our social structure.” For societies to thrive, there must be a proper moral order holding each
together.
There is a long tradition of sociologists who have taken a position similar to Durkheim’s.
They argue or imply there is moral truth, and that some moral orders are better than others. To
use Durkheim’s language, these sociologists have, more or less, argued that societies are
“abnormal” if their moral orders produce undesirable results. For example, Durkheim’s
contemporary, Ferdinand Tönnies (2013) did not think that the change from gemeinschaft to
gesellschaft, or intimate community to impersonal association, was desirable because in the
former individuals were bound by common values, norms, and kinship whereas in the latter
individuals cared less about the common good and more about private advantage through
economic and political ties. Tönnies was worried about the loss of community, as gesellschaft
organizations meant “the doom of culture (2013: 22) and self-interest run amok. In other words,
Tönnies argued that gesellschaft produced undesirable moral practices, including abandonment
of community.
Concern about the lack of community in the US is a perennial issue among sociologists,
who often make the claim that such an outcome is harmful to society’s operation. Perhaps the
most notable example is Robert Bellah et al’s Habits of the Heart. Bellah certainly takes a
Durkheimian approach as he believes in moral truth and believes that sociology can pinpoint
structural/moral failings. Indeed, he (1985: 302) argues that the sociologist is a “public
philosopher” and consequently cannot be “value free.” Bellah’s central claim is that American
culture has suffered a shift from a good mixture of community and individualism to rampant
individualism. Thus, Americans share a common moral vocabulary of individualism, their first
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language. Americans primarily speak of our individual goals, preferences, desires, and happiness
over that of community obligations. Bellah believes that such a cultural change results in
objectively bad outcomes because it prevents Americans from making sense of their lives,
especially how they are entrenched in community. More generally, individualism may prohibit
Americans from feeling a sense of togetherness and collective obligation, which is correlated
with a lack of political involvement (Eliasoph 1998) and the construction of collective problems
as individual troubles (Mills 1959). It also results in the “misrecognition” or our misfortunes as
personal troubles rather than societal failures (Lewis 1983; Silva 2011), perpetuating a broken
system in need of repair, according to Bellah. For Bellah, there is something wrong with
American’s vocabulary of individualism and thus it needs to be reformed by communitarian
biblical and republican traditions.
Other sociologists, in the spirit of Durkheim, have argued against moral relativism and
instead have argued that sociologists can identify moral truth. For example, Selznick (1992)
argues that moral universals exist, like the ideal of human life, prohibiting murder, reciprocity,
hospitality to name a few. Moreover, Etzioni (1996) argues that moral truth manifests as
intuition. We all agree, Etzioni maintains, that we have higher obligations to our own children
than the children of others. No explanation is necessary; such moral truths as obvious. According
to Etzioni there are moral truths because some ideas seem morally compelling whereas others do
not.
I take a Weberian approach to morality in this dissertation. I focus on how my informants
construct and present morality. For example, vegans and activists have different
conceptualizations of veganism as a morality, and furthermore, they have different ideas about
the morality of presenting their views to others, e.g., ‘veganism should be relayed to the public
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using method A over B.’ In my view, morality is a subjective co-creation and sociologists are
best suited to examine various manifestations of morality without making assumptions about
their ontological status. Moreover, sociologists certainly can question why someone holds a
certain moral position and the various consequences of that moral position. The simplest and
most grounded way for sociologists to examine morality is to analyze how people within a social
context define morality.
Like all of us, I have moral convictions. Yet, contrary to the Durkheimian position, I do
not assume, as a sociologist, that moral truth exists, nor am I confident that sociologists have the
tools to make such conclusions. The biggest problem with the Durkheimian approach is the
epistemological and ontological leaps of faith it requires. How can we assume, as did Durkheim,
that morality is basic to the smooth operation of social relations (Tavory 2011)? How do
sociologists recognize what is moral from immoral and, more intricately, how could they identify
how morality in one society could be immorality in another? The notion that social science could
identify moral truth and then suggest proper societal changes suffers from “ethical naturalism”
(Hall 1993), which assumes that one can make conclusions about what “ought to be” from what
“is,” divorced from a philosophical understanding of morality1. In other words, while science can
help sociologists make conclusions about what is morally right, science cannot tell sociologists
what is morally right. Values, belief, ideologies give us a sense of what is right. I do not assume,
then, that the vegans and activists in my dissertation are bearers of moral truth. I do not argue
that some of my informants have got it right while others do not, as Bellah et al (1985) did. I
treat my informants’ morals as accounts.

1

Selznick (1992) and Etzioni (1996) try to implement philosophical understandings of morality in making sense of
what is best for society. However, they rely on rather simplistic understandings, such as intuition. Sociologists have
long critiqued common sense as a method of knowledge production (Abend 2008).
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In short, there are too many epistemological and ontological issues with the certainty of
moral truth that are better left to moral philosophers who are trained to tackle these issues.
Sociologists are better off making parsimonious explanations of morality, specifically by
focusing on different interpretations of morality. As Abend (2008) argues, it is better for
sociologists to assume that something is not true and it turns out to be true, than assuming
something is true and it turns out to be false. This means we should not assume moral truth exists
given that we cannot empirically verify it to be “true,” at least not very convincingly. However,
we can empirically verify that individuals think moral truth is real.
Conclusion
Putting everything together, for matters of morality, animals are good to think with
because humans varyingly construct moral meanings through animals. For example, Franklin
(1999) argues that there are three ideal types to categorize human attitudes toward animals. First,
is the animal rights outlook. Franklin argues that those who support animal rights believe
animals should be liberated from humans. They feel everyone should be vegan and avoid animal
products and entertainment. They do not keep pets because it demeans animals and denies them
freedom. Next is the sentimental outlook, specifically the “Sentimental Welfarist” attitude. They
claim to love animals and might have a pet or two. They believe in the humane treatment of
animals. They believe it is okay to eat animals, support limited animal experimentation, and
enjoy human animal entertainment. Lastly are the Neo-Darwinians who hold an “Instrumental
Welfarist” attitude. They do not have sentimental attitudes towards animals, but are selfexpressed nature lovers. They feel they have a natural relation with animals. They are concerned
about habitat conservation. They prefer outdoor hunting trips to watching animal entertainment,
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such as zoos. Each ideal type involves a different moral outlook on human obligations to
animals.
Franklin’s divergent moralities are also applicable to the animals humans eat, though the
moralities often overlap. For instance, at one end of the spectrum are ethical vegans and animal
rights activists who argue it is wrong not only to eat animals but to use them. Yet, within this
group, there are other voices, like philosopher Peter Singer, who argue that in some cases
humans can justify eating animals, as long as the animals’ suffering is minimalized. And as I will
explore, there are also differences within this group about how to present animal ethics to the
larger public. In the large American majority are those who eat animals. Again, even within the
same category, there is variation. Some individuals eat animals but will only eat “humanely
raised animals” out of a concern for animal welfare. It is not the killing of animals that is a
problem, but the treatment of animals. These individuals are “compassionate consumers.” Then
there are those who eat animal products without giving much thought to how the food gets to
their table, and perhaps are uninterested in how animals become food. Still within this category
are hunters, who may kill animals because they deplore factory farming or value a “natural way
of life.” Lastly, there are those who participate in overt animal abuse for a variety of reasons, like
pleasure (Francione 2000) or demonstrating their adult status (Arluke 2006). These individuals
seemingly disregard the value of animal life.
Such a wide spectrum of morality seems distinctive to human views of animals. Though
there are variations between societies and most certainly over time, humans do not split each
other up into these moral categories in other realms of life. In other words, humans today rarely
have debates about the legitimacy of violently harming humans as they do about animals. This, I
contend, makes animals good sociological sites of morality. To this end, this dissertation
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generally examines how individuals make moral sense of animals. Additionally, chapters three
and four on vegans and animal activists respectively explores how each group presents their
moral beliefs about animals to others, and how they interpret their situational deployment of
morality. Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates how the moral construction of animals has larger
sociological significance.
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CHAPTER 2
DO ANIMALS HAVE SELVES? 2
Historically, the discipline of sociology has demarcated humans and animals. As far back
as Karl Marx, sociologists have differentiated the abilities of animals from humans to view and
assess their existential being, with reference to the self. For example, Marx (1992: 328) argued
that a human’s “species being,” the capacity for creativity and production, separated humans
from animals. Marx wrote, “Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man from animal life
activity.” Max Weber, while acknowledging animals may have subjective minds, (1978: 16)
claimed in Economy and Society, “We either do not have any reliable means of determining the
subjective state of mind of an animal or what we have at best is very unsatisfactory.” In the
context of American and pragmatic social psychology, George Herbert Mead (1934) asserted
frankly, “The animal does not think” (1934: 73) and “We put personalities onto animals, but they
do not belong to them” (1934: 183). In short, classical sociological thinkers denied or questioned
animals’ social and cognitive abilities commonly associated with selfhood.
Yet, by the 1980s, sociologists started taking animals more seriously, particularly in the
context of animal-human relations. Clifton Bryant (1979: 399), a sociologist who wrote a
manifesto on the sociology of human-animal relationships, argued, “(Sociologists) have tended
not to recognize, to overlook, to ignore, to neglect, (some critics might say deservedly so) the
influence of animals, or their import for, our social behavior, our relationships with other
humans, and the directions which our social enterprise often takes.” Bryant explored how
animals affect human social life, including American language, media, entertainment, and even
social problems. By the 1990s, symbolic interactionists Clinton Sanders and Arnold Arluke
2

A version of this article was previously published. Ryan Turner. 2013. “Do Animals Have Selves?” Studies in
Symbolic Interaction 40: 425-460
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(1993) responded to Bryant’s call, but instead of focusing on how animals affect human social
formations, they argued that sociologists should examine animal interactions to understand the
inner lives of animals, including animal selves. Contrary to classical sociologists, Sanders and
Arluke argued that not only are animals thinking beings, but they are also self-aware and even
self-presenting actors.
Currently, the literature on animal-human relations in sociology is growing. There are
two basic and contrasting themes in the literature: animals as symbolic resources and animals as
symbolic actors. In line with Bryant’s mandate, sociologists who research animals as symbolic
resources focus on how humans use animals to construct identity and community. For example,
humans use animals to evaluate their self-worth (Furst 2007), make sense of ethnicity (Jerolmack
2007), manage the disorder and insecurity of a postmodern era (Franklin 1999), enforce racial
hierarchies (Elder, Wolch, and Emel 1998; Fine and Christoforides 1991), define social problems
(Jerolmack 2008), construct gender (Ramirez 2006), and even position themselves to defend or
refute the instrumental use of animals (Groves 1997). In contrast, sociologists who research
animals as symbolic actors treat animals as agents. Sociologists in this literature (i.e. Alger and
Alger 2003; Irvine 2004; Sanders 1999), argue that animals have selves, which allow animals to
interact symbolically with fellow animals and humans through defining situations, taking the role
of the other, and understanding the subjective viewpoint of co-interactants. For the purposes of
this paper, I focus on the sociologists who treat animals as symbolic actors. In particular, I am
interested in their claims of animal selves.
Animal selfhood is a provocative idea. But what does animal selfhood look like? How do
sociologists know that animals have selves? To answer these questions, I will construct various
criteria of human selfhood, based on the works of prominent symbolic interactionists, and
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examine how these criteria apply to animals. In laying out these criteria, my goal is not simply to
think about animal selves but also about “the self.” This piece, then, concerns both the sociology
of animals and the sociology of the self. In particular, it uses a discussion of animal selfhood to
think through what sociologists mean by the self when applied to humans.
Throughout this piece, I take a qualified position on animal selfhood. I do not draw a line
in the sand and argue that “All animals have selves” or “No animals have selves.” My main
argument proceeds in several steps. As a starting point, I argue that animal selfhood may be a
meaningful concept as applied to some animals, but that it is unobservable and unverifiable. In
addition to this claim, I make four specific arguments. The first two are central to this paper.
First, whether animals have selves depends on what is meant by “self.” Certain animals may
have a self in one sense, but not in another. Second, the evidence presented by the animal
interaction sociologists of animal selfhood is problematic. I argue that there are epistemological
and empirical issues regarding animal selfhood, the most challenging of which is the empirical
difficulty of knowing the animal other. Consequently, I urge sociologists of animal-human
relations to research animals as symbolic resources. Arguments three and four are less central to
this paper, but are important issues in the sociology of animals. Third, animals might have
selves, but this varies among different animals. While various primates plausibly have selves,
insects probably do not. There are many species of animals, some more socially and cognitively
sophisticated than others, which makes the claim that “animals have selves” problematic. My
fourth argument is that the objective of the sociology of animal-human relations, like any
subjectivist sociological pursuit, is to make analytical generalizations that transcend animalhuman relations in order to contribute to future sociological investigations.
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Animal selfhood is not only important in and of itself, but also in terms of its
consequences. For example, humans often deny animals rights because animals seemingly do not
have sophisticated subjective states like humans, such as self-awareness (Steiner 2005). Yet,
there are a handful of sociologists and philosophers who try to demonstrate how animals are selfaware, seemingly to prove this common sentiment wrong. These scholars do not take a value
neutral approach to animal selfhood; they argue that if animals have selves, then they also have
moral value and therefore humans should not harm them. In other words, they argue that animals
have rights in part because they have selves. This makes some sense; if beings are aware of
themselves, they likely have an interest in life, and therefore value continued existence over its
termination. Rights are a way to protect this interest (Francione 2000). Yet, while animal rights
based on self-awareness makes theoretical sense, I contend that it does not make as much
empirical sense. That is, the premise of their argument—animal selfhood—is not strong enough
to support their conclusion of animal rights. If it is unclear that animals possess selves, then it
does not follow that animals have rights based on something they may not possess.
The layout of this paper has five parts. First, I will explore the basic assumptions and
arguments of the symbolic interaction literature on animal-human relations. Second, I will
unpack the concept of the social self, especially as it has been articulated within the symbolic
interaction tradition. Rather than defining the self, a concept too multifaceted to define, I will
outline its various criteria of evaluation by addressing the works of Mead, Cooley, Goffman and
others. These criteria include attribution of selfhood, self-awareness, intersubjectivity, selfconcept/reflexivity, and narration. Third, I will address how animals have selves using these
criteria of evaluation, assessing the sociological evidence of animal selfhood. Fourth, I will
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examine the significance of animal selfhood, particularly how it relates to the moral worth of
animals. Fifth and finally, I discuss future research ideas in the conclusion.
Animals as Symbolic Actors
The fundamental approach animal interaction sociologists (Alger and Alger 2003; Arluke
and Sanders 1996; Brandt 2004; Irvine 2004; Sanders 1999; Sanders and Arluke 1993) take
towards animals is that they are different from humans in degree rather than kind. This means
that most animals are not merely biologic organisms that aimlessly react to stimuli, but are social
agents capable of interpreting the situation and subsequently acting with purpose. Animal
interaction sociologists argue that animals, like humans although in more elemental ways, are
minded social actors who can interact symbolically, interpret and act towards symbols, define
situations, take the role of the other, and create intersubjective meaning, all of which indicates
that animals possess selves and even culture.
All of this represents an important departure from George Herbert Mead, the writer and
thinker to whom many interactionists referred when creating their versions of the self. Mead
(1934) argued that humans and animals are qualitatively different beings. He believed humans
are rational animals who, unlike any other animals, communicate using significant symbols. In
contrast to humans, Mead asserted that animals only communicate via a conversation of gestures,
which are thoughtless exchanges lacking self-consciousness and shared meaning. Importantly,
Mead claimed that the ability to think is contingent on the ability to use significant symbols.
Consequently, he declared that animals cannot think:
The animal does not think. He does not put himself in a position for which he is
responsible; he does not put himself in the place of the other person and say, in effect,
“He will act in such a way and I will act is this way.” If the individual can act in this
way… we have meaningful conduct. …In order that thought may exist there must be
symbols, vocal gestures generally, which arouse in the individual himself the response
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which he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of view of that response
he is able to direct his later conduct. (Mead 1934: 73).
Despite Mead’s insistence that symbols are necessary for thought, animal interaction
sociologists argue that thinking does not rely on language use, and therefore, animals are capable
of thought. Sociologist Clinton Sanders (1999) argues that animals can think because their
intentional awareness directs their future actions. In other words, animals can problem solve to
achieve their goals. Examples of such animal thinking include animals using receptive language
skills in novel and challenging situations (see Pilley and Reid 2011), animals deceiving others to
achieve goals (Strum 1987), animals using tools to acquire food (Weir, Chappell, and Kacelnik
2002), and primates who learn to use money to “buy” what they desired (Wolfe 1936). In
addition, animal interaction sociologists’ informants—mostly pet owners, but also veterinarians,
shelter workers, and trainers—also believe that their animals or the animals with whom they
work are thoughtful agents. In contrast to Mead, sociologists who study animals argue that
thinking does not derive from language, but is an outcome of social interaction and experience
(Arluke and Sanders 1996).
Animal sociologists (Irvine 2004; Sanders 1999) also point out that some animals, mostly
primates, can use language. Koko, a lowland gorilla, knows over 1000 American Sign Language
signs (Patterson and Linden 1981). Other animals besides primates can also use language. Irene
Pepperberg (1991) taught Alex, an African grey parrot, to vocally classify shapes, colors, and
forms. Both Koko and Alex show another dimension of thought besides problem solving: the
ability to use concepts.
Perhaps more controversial than the agreeable notion that animals can think, animal
interaction sociologists also argue that animals symbolically interact with each other and with
humans even though most animals cannot use language. In other words, language is not
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necessary for symbolic interaction. This argument is a radical deviation from traditional
symbolic interactionist thought because symbolic interaction is commonly defined as
communication that makes use of significant symbols, primarily language (Blumer 2004: 22).
Consequently, symbolic interactionists have typically dismissed animals as symbolic
interactants. In fact, Mead (1934) often used animals as negative reference points to make the
case for symbolic interaction among humans.
Animal interaction sociologists claim that animals symbolically interact even without
language because they act towards things based on the meaning those objects have for them,
because the meaning of such objects is a product of social interaction, and because these
meanings are outcomes of an interpretive process rather than an involuntary reaction. Symbolic
interaction among animals is possible because animals define mutually the situation, or foster a
collective agreement on the form, content, and purpose of a particular interaction, and they take
the role of the other, or imaginatively see things from the perspective of someone else.
Probably the strongest case for animal symbolic interaction is play. Sanders (2003)
argues that animals symbolically designate objects, define situations, and role take during play.
In an autoethnographic account, Sanders (from Sanders and Arluke 1993) noted that his two
Newfoundland dogs, Emma and Isis, could symbolically interact during a game of “stick.” One
of his dogs, usually Emma, would pick out a stick during their walks in the woods. Emma would
try to get Isis’ attention by holding her head up, putting her tail high, tensing her body, and
directing her gaze towards Isis. Isis would subsequently attempt to take the stick away.
According to Sanders, the dogs have defined the situation as playful. Emma and Isis would
reverse roles; one dog would be the “holder,” the other would be the “chaser.” This suggests the
dogs can take the role of the other. Sanders also claims that his dogs have created rudimentary
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rules to this game, as they have agreed that the stick must be held by an end so the chaser has
something to bite onto. Reflecting on his dogs playing, Sanders (Sanders and Arluke 1993: 381)
concludes, “This would seem to be an interesting example of the symbolic redefinition of a
natural object, mutual definition of the situation, ability to take the role of the other, and the
sharing of an activity characterized by mutually agreed upon rudimentary rule.” Sanders (2003)
also argues that the same properties apply to playful animal-human interactions, which is the
primary way animals and humans symbolically interact. During play, both humans and animals
define objects and act towards them in a meaningful way, define the situation as playful with
certain rules, and take the role of the other.
Animal play is significant because it indicates that animals convey intent and meaning
(Bekoff 2006). Animal play does not appear to be a conversation of gestures, during which
animals uncontrollably and thoughtlessly respond to the behavior of other animals. Emma and
Isis’s play behaviors are arguably forms of metacommunication (Bateson 1972), or signals that
denote the meaning of subsequent behaviors. For example, certain bodily gestures, such as a
dog’s play bow (Bekoff 2006), are signals of play. In other words, play gestures mean “this is
play.” Through play signals, animals are able to communicate their playful intentions to cointeractants. To further complicate matters, animal play is patterned after fighting as it involves
biting, scratching, and growling. Yet, animals can successfully distinguish gestures that denote
“this is combat” from “this is play” (Bateson 1972). Animals attach a different meaning to a
playful bite than a combative bite. For example, a bite no longer stands for an act of aggression
when animals play (Bekoff 2006). Playing animals do not quite mean what they “say” in the
sense that the signals they exchange in play are untrue, unserious, or not literal (Bateson 1972:
141).
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Play further indicates that animals have the capacity for intersubjectivity or shared
understandings. Leslie Irvine (2004) argues that animal-animal and human-animal
intersubjectivity occurs through the sharing of intentions, the focus of intentions, and emotional
states. During play, Irvine argues that animals are capable of sharing their intentions, thereby
mutually defining the situation. For instance, when dogs play they respond to each other in ways
consistent with play. They are sharing similar intentions. If they did not, then the play interaction
would stop. Animals can also share the focus of attention according to Irvine. For instance, on a
walk with his dogs, Clinton Sanders noted:
When Emma and Isis look at me, they usually pay attention to my eyes. I have noticed on
walks how important looking is to them… If on the walk I stop and look in a particular
direction, they will stop, glance at me, and gaze off in the direction I am looking. This
seems a fairly clear indication of their elemental ability to put themselves into my
perspective. In a literal sense they attempt to assume my “point of view.” If I look at
something they conclude that it is probably something important (Sanders 1999: 144).

What Sanders was looking at mattered to his dogs and they wanted to share his focus. Finally,
Irvine argues that animals are also capable of sharing emotional states with others. According to
Irvine, many pet caretakers believe that their dogs and cats are responsive to their feelings. For
example, one caretaker, after a terrible day at work, believed his dog recognized his bad mood
and in response comforted him (Irvine 2004). Through the sharing of intentions, the focus of
intentions, and understanding emotional states, animals and animals as well as animals and
humans can foster intersubjective meanings.
Are the works reviewed thus far anthropomorphic, as some skeptics (Hilbert 1994) have
claimed? They are to a degree, but this is because describing animals outside of human terms is
difficult (Bekoff 2006). When scholars try to avoid anthropomorphism, they present animals as
automata, devoid of emotion or feeling. Animal researchers therefore cannot ignore
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anthropomorphism. Sanders (1999) and Irvine (2004) argue that they use critical
anthropomorphism meaning that they systematically interact with and observe animals to
critically understand and describe their behavior. Critical anthropomorphism is analogous to
Weber’s verstehen because both terms explain subjective social action (Irvine 2004).
In summary, the distinction between “behavior” and “action” illuminates the tension
between traditional symbolic interactionism and animal symbolic interactionism. Traditional
symbolic interactionism, greatly influenced by Mead, is Neo-Cartesian. It enforces an
unbridgeable gap between human and animal. Traditional symbolic interactionism posits that
animals are products of behavior, not agents of action. Behavior is a mere physical response
stemming from environmental or inner-physiological stimuli without understanding, intention, or
feeling. Behavior is mindless and unintentional; it is something that happens to animals (Crist
1999). Animals, therefore, live in a world of stimuli that control their behavior. In contrast,
animal symbolic interactionism is Neo-Darwinian. This perspective posits that there is
evolutionary continuity between human and animal, meaning that the species are more similar
than dissimilar. Animals do not merely behave. They act. Action, as opposed to behavior, is
accompanied by mental states; it has a subjective meaning. Animal action is therefore mindful,
intentional, and meaningful to animals (Crist 1999). Action is something animals do, which
suggest that animals live in a world of objects towards which they act. Because the animal
interaction sociologists take animals as actors, they argue that animals can think, interact
symbolically, role take, and define situations.3 Animals, therefore, are different from humans in
degree rather than kind.

3

See Jerolmack, 2009 for a critical analysis of some of these ideas.
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One of the most significant claims in the animal symbolic interaction literature is that
animals have selves. However, before I evaluate this claim, I will first examine the sociological
self. Sociologists, even sociologists who study animals, address the self in many ways.
Therefore, in the next section of this paper, I will evaluate the social self as it is understood in
symbolic interactionism.
The Sources of the Self
Sociologists refer to the self in multiple ways. The self is a construction (Turner 1976).
The self is an object (Mead 1934). The self is a performance (Goffman 1959). The self is a
feeling (Cooley 1964). The self is a narrative (McIntyre 1984; Taylor 1989), not even to mention
other various distinctions, such as William James’ (1890) material and spiritual selves. In this
section, I will review the various ways sociologists, mostly symbolic interactionists, have
thought about the self. I draw especially on Mead, Blumer, Cooley, and Goffman. From their
insights, I will construct five criteria of the self, which I will use to evaluate animal selfhood in
the following section. These criteria make up a succession of more demanding standards of
selfhood, from the least to the most socially and cognitively complicated. The criteria include
attribution of selfhood, self-awareness, intersubjectivity, self-reflexivity/concept, and narration.
Most sociologists who address the self explicitly, particularly symbolic interactionists
(Goffman 1959; Turner 1976), argue that individuals do not possess an essential or real self that
resides within them. Instead, they argue that the self is an attribution. It is a social product that is
influenced by culture and history. Indeed, there are considerable variations from one culture to
another in how humans self-describe themselves (Hewitt 1989). In addition, there are also
historical variations within societies of the expression of real selves. For example, Ralph Turner
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(1976) argues that Americans have experienced a change in self-definitions during the 20th
century away from an institutional self to an impulsive self.
Social interaction also shapes the production of the real self. During interaction, a
performer and audience collaboratively produce the performer’s self. The performer enacts a self
before the audience, and if the performance is successful, the audience will attribute this self to
the performer. But there is no essence to this self. An essential self did not cause the
performance. Rather, actors manage the impressions of others so that they appear to be the kind
of social character they are supposed to be. The performed self, therefore, is not a result of our
essential being, but is a product of interaction between a performer and audience. In Presentation
of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959: 252) makes this explicit:
…The self itself does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of
his action, being generated by that attribute of local events which renders them
interpretable by witnesses. A correctly staged and performed scene leads the
audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this
self—is a product of a scene that comes off, and it not the cause of it. The self,
then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location,
whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect
arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the
crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited.
From this perspective, there is no such thing as a real self. Instead, it is, in effect, an illusion that
is collectively maintained during interaction.
The attribution of selfhood is most conspicuous when mutuality among interactants is
problematic. Attributions of self are more perceptible when individuals define “impoverished
interactants” than when they define socially “equal” interactants. For example, family members
attribute selves to severely mentally disabled persons (Bogdan and Taylor 1989), and similarly,
nursing staff attribute agency to dying nursing residents by asserting that the residents chose the
circumstances and timings of their death (Rodriquez 2009). The severely disabled persons and
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dying nursing residents do not give (any) complex performances of the self, and therefore the
family members and nursing staff do more of the interactional work to define them.
Consequently, the caretakers’ attributions of self appear obvious, especially to outsiders. For
example, laypersons might define dying nursing residents as helpless, yet nurses define them as
active beings (Rodriquez 2009). I now present the first—and least restrictive—criterion of
selfhood.
Criterion 1: Attribution of Selfhood- Individuals attribute self-characteristics to
others during the course of interaction. The meaning of the self is found in these
attributions, not in one’s inner being. Furthermore, the foundation of this
perspective does not rest on mutuality. For example, significant others often
attribute “impoverished interactants” selves. Individuals even attribute inanimate
objects selves. The self is thus created during the act of defining a self.

In addition to self as an attribution, another sociological approach to the self, influenced
by George Herbert Mead (1934), is self as object. In other words, humans have the ability to act
towards themselves as objects, meaning that they can refer to or address their selves in an
interpretive manner. Mead argued that the self becomes an object to itself when an individual
views his or her self from the perspective of significant and generalized others. Through this
process of self-objectification, humans develop self-awareness. Mead’s student, Herbert Blumer
(1969; 2004), also argued that the self is an object to itself, but stressed self-interaction more
than Mead. In other words, individuals can act towards themselves as they act towards others.
For example, I can become angry with myself, feel proud of myself, have conceptions of myself,
set goals for myself, talk about myself, talk to myself, all of which involve self-interaction. To
have a self means that one is able to become the object of one’s own actions.
In the process of becoming an object to oneself, Mead (1934) stressed temporality,
cooperative action, and self-control. I will use Mead’s “game stage” to illuminate these points.
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During a baseball game, children show temporality—one’s ability to imagine one’s self in
particular sequences of action—when they take the role of the generalized other to interpret their
future lines of action. For example, when a batter hits a baseball, the players must know how the
other players are going to respond to know how to proceed. The players can imagine themselves
in particular sequences of action in which they play an active and dynamic role in conjunction
with other selves - ‘if the ball is hit here, my teammates should respond this way, and I will
accordingly respond.’ Moreover, as this example demonstrates, the children partake in
cooperative action—the enjoinment of the self with co-interactants towards a common
objective—during the game. The children’s cooperation depends on each player taking
generalized attitudes, such as the role of the whole team, rules of the game, and notions of
sportsmanship, towards themselves. Complex coordination is thus possible because the children
make indications to themselves regarding how they should act in relation to their teammates. The
children therefore exert control over their conduct and take themselves into account when they
act.
The generalized other, made up of the social attitudes of one’s group, gives the self its
unity. Mead (1934) argued that the self does not fully develop through an individual merely
taking of the attitudes of others towards the self. Rather, the self fully develops once an
individual takes the social attitudes of her organized social group towards her self and her
conduct. When taking the role of the generalized other, individuals become aware of themselves
within a larger normative group context, shaping how they think of themselves and act in a given
situation. They become self-conscious members of their community.
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One must be aware of the self in order to view and act towards the self as an object. If a
being is not aware of some object, then the being cannot indicate and direct action towards it.
Under this premise, here is the second criterion of selfhood:
Criterion 2: Self Awareness- In the most elemental sense, a being has a self if said
being is aware of oneself. A being achieves self-awareness when the subjective
self becomes an object to itself. Individuals achieve self-objectification through
two means, both of which are mutually constitutive. First, an organism becomes an
object to (and therefore aware) of itself by taking the attitudes of significant and
generalized others towards oneself, which shapes the organism’s behavior and
self-experience. Second, an organism becomes an object to itself when interacting
(i.e., conversing) with oneself. Both forms of self-objectification involve an “I”
and a “Me.” When a being takes the attitudes of others towards oneself, the “I” is
influenced by and responds to the “Me.” When a being interacts with oneself, the
“I” and the “Me” have a conversation.
Sociologists have also argued that the self is a performance that is shaped by status, roles,
and social situations (see Goffman 1959). In Goffman’s (1959) account of social interaction, the
self is an active agent which attempts to influence how others will respond to the self’s
performance. Agents intentionally or unintentionally present themselves in numerous ways to
manage their audience’s impressions. They can present their categorical social identities to their
audience, like gender, familial status, age, occupation, etc. They can also present a distinctive,
personal self behind those social identities. Actors can successfully control their audiences by
making the audience believe in the part they are playing. In turn, the audience will try to acquire
information about the performer, such as her social or personal characteristics, to interpret how
they should act towards this person. The audience expects the actor’s social statuses and
distinctive characteristics to fit with her conduct. If the actor seemingly gives a sincere
performance, the audience will attribute the self presented to the performer. Through this
working consensus, the actor and audience mutually create and uphold a self.
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However, performances do not always go smoothly. They can become problematic,
jeopardizing the presented self. For example, a performer might make a controversial or
embarrassing comment. In response, the performer and audience adapt to this interactional
disruption. The performer may use defensive tactics to protect his own projections, and/or the
audience may try to save the actor’s presentation of self through protection practices or tact. The
performance may also be spoiled when the audience believes the performer is being insincere.
For example, a dinner guest may tell her host she enjoyed dinner, but the host can use the guest’s
expressions given off, such as how quickly the food is raised to the guest’s mouth, to evaluate
the guest’s expression given (Goffman 1959: 7). The guest, aware she is being monitored by the
host, will calculatingly attempt to convey to the host that she enjoyed the meal through her
presentation of self. In such a case, the co-interactants participate in an “information game” of
concealment and search (Goffman 1959: 8).
While Goffman (1959) presents the self as an intentional and strategic actor (an “I”), he
views the performed self as a collective product of interaction. A self is not simply enacted by a
performer, but it is evaluated by its audience. The self and its audience intersubjectively produce
the performed self during immediate interactions as they collectively define the situation. Stated
otherwise, the self that emerges during interaction is a collectively constructed self, as the actor
and audience “work together” to define the actor. An actor’s self presentation coincides with the
self that the audience attributes to the actor (Cahill 1998). Following these considerations, my
third criterion of selfhood is:
Criterion 3: Intersubjectivity- Performer and audience intersubjectively create the
self during interaction. The self is collaboratively manufactured when a person
who enacts a self before an audience is accorded that self by audience members.
Overall, the self and audience, acting together, contribute to a single definition of
the situation, producing some sort of interactional agreement about the self
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presented. Unlike Criterion 1, agents must share similar interactional abilities
under this perspective.

In addition to self as object and self as intersubjective performance, sociologists have also
argued that the self is a feeling that is influenced by our interactions with others and by larger
social categories. This view of the self is particularly influenced by Charles Horton Cooley
(1964), who argued that the self is our imagined ideas of what others think of us. His idea of a
“looking glass self” is well known:
The self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination
of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that
appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The
thing that moves us to pride or shame is the imagined effect of this reflection
upon another’s mind. (Cooley 1964: 184)

What evokes a self-feeling is not the mere reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, or
how we think others judge us. We view ourselves based on our interpretations of how others
evaluate us. The meaning of the self is thus indirect because how we think and act towards our
self is understood through the way others act towards it. In other words, self-definitions are
heavily influenced by social definitions.
Furthermore, self-feelings are also influenced by how well individuals conform to
normative standards, such as cultural expectations. For example, a low-income father who is
unable to become his family’s breadwinner feels he is a failure because he imagines that his
friends and family see him as such (Griswold 1994). This example demonstrates that how others
evaluate us, and therefore how we feel about ourselves, is heavily influenced by normative
categories that are independent of the intentions and characteristics of individuals.
Under criterion 4, the self is a feeling, which involves the ability to reflect on oneself,
thereby producing a self-concept.
40

Criterion 4: Self-concept/reflexivity- Beings who are self-reflexive are able to
interpret what others think of them by objectifying the self from the others’
perspectives. When self-reflective beings imagine how others evaluate them, they
produce their self-concept, or their assessment of self on the basis of social
evaluations. These social evaluations are shaped by larger normative
characteristics, such as cultural expectations, gender roles, etc.

Finally, sociologists, although not from the symbolic interactionist tradition, have thought
of the self as a narrative (McIntyre 1984; Taylor 1989). The self is a discursive construction,
which individuals communicate and experience in everyday life through storytelling (Holstein
and Gubrium 2000). The self expressed through narrative is always an emergent process that
individuals tell, retell, and modify over time (Hewitt 2003). The narrative self, therefore, is an
actor (storyteller) and malleable product (story).
Individuals tell stories about themselves for various reasons, including self-presentation
and self-approval. Persons convey their stories to others to present seemingly unique selves, and
they also tell their stories to others and to themselves to account for their actions. In brief,
individuals tell self stories to make sense of their lives. Humans use narratives to produce
coherent, continuous, and consistent selves (Irvine 1999; Mason-Schrock 1996).
While narrators pick and choose stories and how to tell them, their stories of self are
bounded by culturally available models of self-narration (Holstein and Gubrium 2000). In other
words, narratives of self are not purely an individual accomplishment. They are constrained by
social situations, group membership, and larger cultural forms. These constraints affect the
available discourse in a particular setting for self-construction, and the probability that an
audience will accept an individual’s story (Hewitt 2003). However, symbolic interactionists
(Irvine 1999; Mason-Schrock 1996) argue that narrative constraints do not determine the
structure and content of self narratives, but are resources that individuals use to convey an
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individually and collectively meaningful self. For instance, localized group cultures provide
members resources for the construction of an intelligible self, such as transsexuals’ narrative of a
“true self” (Mason-Schrock 1996).
The creation and maintenance of acceptable narratives of self is therefore a community
effort. Communities create culture, which provide members resources for the construction of self
(Mason-Schrock 1996). Within a community, life stories must mesh so that tellers and listeners
share “some deep structure about the nature of a life” (Bruner 2004: 699). Life stories are
therefore only meaningful in the context of other life stories. Indeed, the narratives of any life are
associative, as they part of a larger interconnected web of narratives (McIntyre 1984).
Individuals are consequently never more than the co-authors of their narratives. I now present
my last criterion of selfhood:
Criterion 5: Narration- The self is a story we tell to others and ourselves about
who we are. Telling stories about the self implies that one is aware of oneself,
that the self is an intersubjective creation as other individuals shape one’s
narrative, and that one is reflecting on one’s self either in the backstage where we
tell stories about ourselves to ourselves, or on the frontstage where we tell our
stories to others. Furthermore, how a person’s narrative is received by
audiences—its intelligibility and believability—shapes one’s self-concept. A
good self story—one in line with local narrative conventions—is likely to be well
received by an audience, positively shaping one’s self-concept. Self-narrative,
therefore, involves self-awareness, intersubjectivity (i.e. narrative resources and
narrative webs), and self-reflexivity/concept.

In summary, my five criteria have addressed two major ways that sociologists typically
address the self (see Callero 2003). First, sociologists refer to the personal self (Mead 1934;
Cooley 1964), which I emphasized in criterion 2 (self-awareness), 4 (self-concept), and 5
(narration) of this paper. The personal self is a cognitive ability fostered by the social.
Sociologists who study the personal self analytically focus on the social constitution of reflexive
self-awareness, such as how social experiences influence self-understandings, self-meanings, and
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self-images (Cahill 1998; Callero 2003). Under this perspective, the self is a human universal, as
all social humans have the ability to act towards themselves. The other sociological approach to
selfhood is the public self, a self that is known and visible to others (i.e., Goffman 1959), which I
highlighted in criterion 1 (attribution of self), 3 (intersubjectivity), and 5 (narration) of this
paper. Sociologists who refer to the public self focus on the social construction of socially
defined acting persons as they give performances, accounts, and narratives of their distinct
selves. Under this perspective, the self is not a bounded quality of an individual because the
production of the self is contingent on immediate situations and larger social forces (see
Goffman 1959 and Turner 1976). These two perspectives, of course, are not mutually exclusive.
For example, our personal selves, in particular our self-concept, are shaped by our public
performances. Nevertheless, the conceptual focus on each approach is different. Sociologists
who refer to the self as reflexive self-awareness are evoking ideas of the personal self, whereas
sociologists who focus on the social production of individual characteristics are evoking the
public self.4
How does animal selfhood stack up against the five criteria of the self that I have
constructed? In the next section, I will evaluate the evidence of animal selfhood using these
criteria. Afterwards, I will evaluate the animal interaction sociologists’ specific claims of animal
selfhood.
Thinking about Animal Selfhood: An Overview and Evaluation
By my first criterion, self as attribution, animals clearly have selves. Human caretakers
often ascribe certain selfhood characteristics to their pets, such as distinct personalities, personal
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See Cahill (1998). He argues that Goffman (1959) actually was not examining the self. Rather, Cahill argues that
Goffman’s focus was on the person. The self for Cahill is a reflexive self awareness of one’s agency and identity,
whereas the person is “a socially defined, publicly visible embodied being” (p. 135).
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tastes, emotions, cognitive abilities, and personal history narratives (Alger and Alger 2003;
Sanders 1999). For example, Janet and Steven Alger’s (2003) study of cat owners and Clinton
Sanders’ (1999) research of dog owners revealed that caretakers thought of their pets as unique
individuals who possessed distinctive personalities varying in temperament, demeanor,
playfulness, talkativeness, and intelligence. For example, one of the Alger’s informants
described her cat:
Jasmine is a tomboy. If she were human, she would wear blue jeans and get dirty.
She is defiant and strong-willed for a kitten. She has a very colorful personality.
She’ll scream at you if she doesn’t like what you are doing. (Alger and Alger
2003: 16)
Similarly, one of Sanders’ (1999) informants described her dog as attention-seeking and loving:
Ricky really likes getting attention and she seeks it. But if you’re not willing to
give it to her, she’ll go find something else to entertain herself. She’s bold, she’s
aggressive. At the same time she is affectionate- willing to take what you give her
(Sanders 1999: 26)

In addition, caretakers regularly spoke of their animal companions as persons with
distinct personal tastes including food, activities, playthings, and people. One of Alger and
Alger’s (2003: 17) informants said that his cat, Alfonse, likes “peas and lima beans and corn.”
Likewise, here is one of Sanders’ informants describing her Doberman’s love of rocks:
She just loves rocks... She just loves big rocks; the bigger the better. When she
finds a new one she is so happy she howls. She’ll lie and chew them all day. She
puts them in her water bucket and sometimes it takes two hands to get them out
(Sanders 1999: 27).

Caretakers also believed that their pets were empathetic and emotional and could display
emotions such as love, joy, sadness, fear, jealousy, and anger. One of Sanders’ informants
described her puppy’s anger after she left him alone at home:
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It’s funny, usually after I have been at work all Friday I don’t go out unless I am
sure that somebody is going to watch him. But one time I left him alone and when
I got home, HE WAS ANGRY (emphasis in original). He just let me know. He’d
follow me around and he would look up at me and he would just bark. It was like
he was yelling at me. And I would say, ‘What is it with you?’ and when I would
stop talking he would look at me and bark—like ‘You left me here. How could
you do that?’ You could read it in his face (Sanders 1999: 20).
Caretakers moreover thought of their pets as minded social actors. They believed that
their pets could think through situations and solve problems. For example, a dog owner believed
her dog, Toby, thought of “trade” during dinner. Toby loves butter, and he gets a little restless
when his caretakers leave it on the dinner table out of his reach. According to his caretaker:
Toby thought through the problem of how to get the bread and butter… We hear
him rummaging around the house, up and down the stairs, until he finally
appeared with a treasure: a roasted pig ear…Toby is allowed to take one out of
the box each day. He had obviously hidden this one. He laid it down at my feet.
Naturally Toby received a piece of bread with slabs of butter. Toby reasoned and
came up with the idea of trade (Sanders 1999: 127)
Finally, pet owners attributed individuality to their pets through telling their narrative
history, such as how they acquired their animal companion. One of Sanders’ informants
emphasized the personal history of his dog, Fred:
… I had had a few beers so we stopped by the side of the road so I could take a
leak. I was standing there and this puppy runs up. I thought that there must be
someone around so I called and called but no one answered. We decided to just go
ahead and take him with us. Every time we stopped at the shore I let him out and
he ran off. But when we got back to the car there he was waiting for us. I figured
it was fate—I was destined to have a dog. (Sanders 1999: 28)
In summary, through their daily interactions and familiarity with their animals, caretakers
attributed unique qualities to their pets. In doing so, they constructed their pets as beings with
distinct selves. Although caretakers do not use the language of self, they do use a closely related
language and rhetoric of personality. Personality is a way caretakers talk about selfhood.
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Although I will elaborate on this in the next section, I submit that criterion 1 is a weak
standard of selfhood. The point is not that animals have distinct personalities, tastes, feelings,
and personal histories, but that pet owners believed dogs and cats had them. In other words, the
animal interaction sociologists’ evidence for distinct animal selves is not an objective reality of
animal selves, but is an attribution of thought. Moreover, these selves are meaningless to animals
because they are human creations. Animals do not and cannot act towards their “essential self”
because it is not an object to them. Thus, animals do not have a notion of a distinct, unique self.
Furthermore, both flora and inanimate objects can also have selves by this standard, which
means that even objects that unquestionably lack self-consciousness can have a “self.” Let us
now examine criterion 2, self-awareness.
Although the animal interaction sociologists do not make this argument explicitly, animal
interaction is one way to gauge animal self-awareness. As I have described, the animal
interaction sociologists argue that animal interaction, particularly play, seemingly transcends
Mead’s (1934) conversation of gestures, as it involves minded behavior, role taking, defining the
situation, metacommunication, and intersubjectivity. Play interactions therefore have
implications for animal selfhood. Sanders (1999) and Irvine (2004) argue that animals engaged
in play take into account the mutually defined play situation, including the actions of others. In
other words, animals indicate things to themselves from the perspectives of co-interactants and
the situation in order to construct lines of action. The animal self, therefore, is an object to itself
from the attitudes of others.
If Sanders and Irvine are correct, they still have a ways to go before showing that animals
have full fledged selves in a Meadian sense. Animal play is possibly an example of Mead’s play
stage, involving rudimentary aspects of temporality and coordination. However, animal play
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does not extend in the complex coordination of the game stage. In other words, Sanders and
Irvine’s account of animal play does not employ a generalized other, which Mead felt was
necessary for one to fully become an object to one’s self in conjunction with others.
Yet, there is also reason to believe that Sanders and Irvine are incorrect. While the
connection between animal play and the self is reasonable, it is also speculative. If animals make
indications to themselves from the perspectives of others, I submit that they must possess a
theory of mind, which is the capacity to infer others’ mental states such as their thoughts and
feelings (Gergely 1994). Although he does not use “theory of mind,” Sanders (1999) argues that
animals assume the perspective of others when they role take. For example, his dogs will
frequently share the focus of attention, as if they each think to themselves, “He is looking at
something. What is he looking at?” I would argue, however, that the dogs’ mutual gaze is joint
attention but not necessarily shared attention (Povinelli and Prince 1998). Even though the dogs
are gazing at the same object, they are probably not aware of each other’s intentional focus on
the object; the gaze is not shared. Gaze following in social mammals may have may evolved as a
means of averting danger rather than understanding the minds of others.5 Therefore, Sanders’
dogs may not assume each other’s point of view, but fairly automatically respond to sudden
shifts in each other’s head movements and gazes (Povinelli and Prince 1998). My point is that
during animal interactions, animals may not make indications to themselves from the
perspectives of others. This would require them to wonder what other beings are thinking before
they act, which, as I will elaborate on in the following section, may not be empirically verifiable.
Let us now examine the animal interaction sociologists’ detailed and thoughtful claims of animal
self-awareness.
5

See Povinelli and Prince 1998. They argue that even primates, particularly chimps, do not possess a theory of mind
even though primates follow the gazes of others.
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Sociologists Janet and Steven Alger (2003) conducted ethnographic research at a cat
shelter, during which they searched for evidence of feline self-awareness. They argue that
animals are self-aware using five criteria, all of which they applied to the shelter cats they
studied. First, animals are self-conscious because they can adapt to novel circumstances or find
solutions to new problems. Alger and Alger (2003), for example, argue that the shelter cats
resolved the issue of shelter overcrowding by resorting to intimacy. Second, animals are selfaware because they can learn from others and their own experiences. In the shelter, Alger and
Alger claim the cats learned from each other through role taking, by which the cats understood
that fighting and territoriality were intolerable behaviors. Third, animals are self-aware because
they have the ability to make choices in situations that provide more than one course of action.
For example, the shelter provided the cats with many different types of foods and sleeping areas,
and the cats consistently chose certain foods and sleeping arrangements, indicating that they
made choices among many options. Fourth, animals are self-aware because they have the ability
to cooperate. Cooperation in the cat shelter manifested when newly arrived cats acclimated to
their surroundings with the helping paws of current cat residents. Alger and Alger assert that the
shelter cats attempted to comfort and befriend the new cats, which helped the new cats adjust to
shelter life. Finally, animals are self-aware because they possess an overall complexity of
behavior. According to Alger and Alger, cat life at the shelter was very complex. In fact, they
claim that the cats developed a culture, defined as the particular adaptations that cats made to
their living conditions, which were transmitted to the new cats at the shelter. This culture
possessed certain norms, sanctions, and roles. The most significant norm of this culture was
affection and solidarity. When any cats broke this norm through fighting or territoriality, other
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cats stopped their disruptive behavior. However, the cats usually upheld their norms through
positive sanctions, such as cuddling or other forms of affection.
According to the Alger and Alger (2003), the shelter cats’ complexity of behavior—their
culture—signifies feline self-awareness. As broad as these claims are, they do, however, fall
short of what Mead meant by self-awareness, which is becoming an object to oneself. Even their
second criterion, learning from others, which seems closest to self-awareness, does not qualify in
Mead’s sense because there is no evidence that the cats actually objectify themselves when they
are influenced by other cats.6 In addition, it is plausible that the alleged learned behaviors, such
as lack of territoriality and fighting, were not cultural but were ecological. In other words, the
human controlled conditions of the shelter (the physical layout, constant food and water supply,
spayed and neutered cats) produced certain behaviors in the cats, such as lack of conflict. Under
an ecological perspective, there is no need to assume that the cats learned norms and values from
each other. There is no need to assume the self or culture. Instead, using an ecological
explanation, one can posit that the cats individually adapted to the human controlled conditions
of the shelter, producing certain patterns of feline behavior.
In addition to Alger and Alger (2003), Leslie Irvine (2004; 2007) also argues that animals
have selves, specifically an “I” or what she calls a core self. She uses literature on infant
selfhood to make the case for animal selves, because the core self of both an infant and an animal
is not contingent on language use. Borrowing from William James, Irvine (2004) argues that
there are four central characteristics to the core, subjective self: agency, coherence, affectivity,
and self-history. Irvine argues that these characteristics of animal selves become visible to
humans during interaction. Humans can know the selves of animals because animals reaffirm

6

I will discuss the problem of evidence in the next section.
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human subjectivities. Importantly, these elements of the self are also criteria of animal selfawareness. These characteristics make animals aware of the “I.”
How do the features of core selfhood foster animal self-awareness? First, Irvine (2004)
claims that animals have agency, which she defines as the capacity for self-willed action and
self-control. Agentic beings are aware of their desires and intentions, which they act on and have
control over. Irvine claims that dog training is the strongest evidence for animal agency. Dog
trainers demand that their dogs exercise self-control. This implies that a dog has a sense that he
or she can initiate action, because to control one’s self means one has a sense of will. Only
agentic beings have self-control. Sanders’ (1999) research on guide dogs is another possible
example of animal agency, specifically self-willed action. When a guide dog is ordered to cross a
busy street but does not cross because of traffic, the dog appears to make a choice among several
plans of action, indicating a sense of volition. They are, more or less, aware of their ability to act
and they therefore decide to construct a certain line of action. I would also add that animal
agency implies that animals are not merely instinctual beings. If animals can control their
behavior and choose among several plans of action, then instinct—unthinking and uncontrollable
responses—cannot always explain animal behavior.
Animals also possess coherence, the awareness that their selves are single, bounded,
physical entities. In other words, animals understand that they are embodied entities, which
allows animals to distinguish themselves from others and therefore recognize distinct others.
According to Irvine (2004), forms and hiding are two examples of coherence in animals. She
argues that animals can recognize and distinguish forms because animals are coherent beings.
Using dogs to make her case, Irvine argues that dogs recognize and discriminate between
humans based on their social experiences with them. For example, dogs will greet their owner
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coming home from work differently than a bugler. Or, when dogs recognize a person, they might
wag their tail or growl depending on their experience with this person. Hiding is another
indicator of coherence among animals. Irvine argues that animals hide because they have a sense
of self as a bounded physical object. In addition, Clinton Sanders (1999) cites research of
animals hiding from predators as evidence of an embodied self. For example, grizzly bears hide
from human hunters to observe them. Bears also purposefully avoid leaving tracks in order to
evade human hunters. This means, according to Sanders, that bears are aware of themselves in
relation to others.
Coherence is an important characteristic of selfhood because it gauges a sense of a
bounded self, distinct from other selves. However, Irvine fails to show how animals have a selfreflective sense of oneness. An animal’s recognition of others does not mean this animal is aware
of or reflecting on one’s self. Self-other differentiation and recognition is part of an organism’s
biological apparatus. It exists so that an organism can survive and is not predicated on selfawareness (Lewis 1994). “Even T-cells can recognize and differentiate themselves from foreign
proteins” (Lewis 1994: 22). Irvine and Sanders, however, do raise an interesting point about
animals hiding from others. This might demonstrate that animals are thinking, "You can't see
me" suggesting they are aware of themselves as objects. But while this seems plausible, it also
seems speculative. The relationship between hiding and self-awareness is unclear, but this does
not mean scholars cannot construct logical explanations. Sociologists and ethologists first have
to address why animals hide before it is linked to self-awareness. Ultimately, I am unconvinced
that forms and hiding give animals a sense of self or a reflective sense of how their endeavors
“are very much part of them” (Irvine 2004: 133).
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Irvine (2004) also argues that animals have affectivity or the capacity for emotions. Irvine
argues that animals possess two types of feelings: categorical and vitality affects. Categorical
affects are particular emotions, such as when an animal feels happy or sad during a specific
instance. Vitality affects are not particular emotions, but are general characteristics of individual
animals, i.e. “My dog is frisky.” Irvine claims that when humans describe an animal’s vitality
affects, they are referring to an animal’s subjective self. In other words, humans do not simply
give animals emotions and subjectivities, but recognize such self-characteristics in animals.
However, I would argue that in order to demonstrate the relationship between emotions and the
self, sociologists cannot merely state that animals have emotions. Sociologists must present
evidence of self-conscious emotions in animals such as embarrassment, envy, empathy, pride,
and shame. Self-conscious emotions require animals to take the role and the other and act
towards themselves from that perspective, producing a self-feeling.
Finally, animals have self-history or continuity of experience. Irvine (2004) uses
veterinarian visits as examples of self-history. Irvine notes that most dogs seem to know and are
fearful about going to the veterinarian. This is because dogs remember their previous visits. They
are able to consistently trigger a particular emotion for a specific setting, implying that animals
possess not only memory but also a sense of continuity. However, sometimes animals become
desensitized to veterinarian visits. A dog who is scared during his first veterinarian visit may feel
more comfortable during subsequent visits. Yet, Irvine argues that animals still have continuous
selves even when their behaviors change in specific settings. This is because animals change
over time as they acquire new abilities and confront new opportunities. Thus, while animal
selves persist throughout time, they are not stagnant. In brief, Irvine argues that animals have
self-histories or continuous selves because they remember what happened to them in the past,
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and because they largely stay the same selves over time. However, I would argue that there is a
difference between memory, which some animals clearly have, and self-history, which some
animals might not have because it implies memory of oneself. An animal’s memory of a
veterinarian visit is different from an animal’s memory of self at the veterinarian. In order to
demonstrate self-history in animals, sociologists must demonstrate how animals have memories
of their selves, and how memory of oneself is distinguishable from memory.
In summary, Irvine argues that during human-animal interactions, an animal’s agency,
coherence, affectivity, and self-history—an animal’s subjective self— become apparent to the
animal and to humans. Animals are aware of their ability to act upon the world. They are aware
that they are coherent selves distinct from other selves. They are aware of their history and use
this history to make sense of themselves in future situations. Through interacting with pets,
caretakers recognize these self-properties in their pets too. Yet, this is an incomplete version of
selfhood using my criteria. Next, I will consider criterion 3, the intersubjective construction of
self.
There is not much evidence for animal selves as intersubjective constructions. While
Irvine (2004) argues that humans and animals can achieve intersubjectivity, her focus is on
shared thoughts, feelings, and intentions between human and animal. For example, many of
Irvine’s informants felt that their pets were sensitive to their moods. In contrast, I am using
intersubjectivity to specifically show how the self is a collective construction in the spirit of
Goffman.
Animal interaction sociologists might argue that my first criterion, self as attribution,
should actually fall under this criterion. A human caretaker and animal companion “work
together” to define the animal’s self. The animal displays her distinct characteristics to others.
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The human caretaker, in turn, recognizes the animal’s self, and may even reject the animal’s
“performance” (i.e. “My dog is not being herself today”). The animal’s self, therefore, is an
intersubjective creation. But this approach seems inaccurate, at least using Goffman’s
framework, because animals do not knowingly present their “selves” to their human caretakers in
an attempt to manage their impressions. My dog might try to make me feed him or take him for a
walk, but I cannot think of any case when he has tried to manage my image of him, especially
since he is presumptively unaware of any symbolic framework (i.e., identity, role) that he can
use to present a normative image of a dog. In short, animals do not act with the intent and
ambition that Goffman assigns to humans.
While the production of intersubjective selves among animals is problematic, I still want
to think through a rudimentary case: social animal dominance hierarchies (Sanders 1999). An
animal’s status within the hierarchy is governed by his relationships. In primate groups, status
depends on family ties, such as parent-child relationships, and friendship bonds. For instance,
primates whose parents are high-ranking will also possess high status. However, primate status is
not simply determined by relationships but also by interactions with others. During interactions,
primates recognize their own status (an indication that they are self-aware) in relation to the
status of other primates. For example, a high status primate challenges a low status primate for
food. He presents his high status to another primate through aggression. The low status primate
recognizes the challenger as high status and, in turn, submits and relinquishes the food to him.
The self presented is in line with the self accorded; it is an intersubjective accomplishment.
Conspecifics, however, do not always accept self-presentations of high status individuals.
Challenges to status thus ensue. If the “high status” primate loses to the “low status” one, then
there is a change in the overall status hierarchy, which primates subsequently use to determine
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how they should act towards other group members. In other words, the primate selves are
intersubjective creations that are constantly defined and redefined during interactions.
Skeptics might argue that biological characteristics, such as age, strength, and size
determine which animals are dominant and which are submissive. But these characteristics alone
do not determine rank. What matters is how well animals perform these characteristics. For
example, an alpha chimpanzee might appear larger than others, but this is because he is puffing
himself out and walking in an exaggerated way, whereas others make themselves look low or
small when they interact with him (Martin 2009). In fact, the alpha male might actually be
smaller than the other chimps in his group. Thus, there are social elements to dominance orders:
hierarchies are primarily determined by networks of relationships, they are interactional
accomplishments that subsequently shape how primates act towards others, and, at least among
primates, they encompass rudimentary performances of ranking.
Sociologist John Levi Martin (2009: 119) further argues that animals in dominance
hierarchies understand their standing in relation to the whole group. He asserts, “…it is
impossible to explain the actions of animals of more intelligent and social species unless we
posit that they have some sense of not only their own position vis-à-vis other animals, but of the
order as a whole.” Stated otherwise, animals in dominance orders view themselves as objects
from the perspective of significant others and the larger social order. If such animals have a
conception of the larger animal community, these animals can conceivably take the role of the
generalized other. These animals, therefore, have a “Me” in addition to their “I,” which in
Mead’s formulation suggests that these animals have a complete self. Social animal dominance
hierarchies thus rudimentarily indicate that the self—an animal’s recognition of her social
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standing from the perspective of significant and generalized others—is intersubjectively created
and recreated during interaction.
The intersubjective creation of self among primates indicates that primates might also
possess a self-concept, which brings us to criterion 4. Self-concept is the relationship between
self-assessment and social evaluations. A primate may possess a self-concept if she can assess
her self in relation to others. In one sense, a primate’s self-concept could be informed by her
interactions with low or high status primates. For example, a low ranking primate may feel some
sort of negative self-feeling when interacting with a high status primate. However, this notion of
a self-concept is limited for two reasons. First, scholars would need to empirically demonstrate
that animals are capable self-feelings in conjunction with other selves. Second, animals are
limited in communicating how they evaluate each other. Social evaluations often have complex
symbolic meanings. Animals would have to understand certain evaluative concepts—such as
laziness, intelligence, humor, attractiveness, success, weirdness, etc.—in order to apply them to
their own self-assessments. These concepts are human ones, and it is doubtful that they apply to
animals. For example, while animals have intelligence, at least from the perspective of humans,
there is no evidence that animals can comprehend the meaning of intelligence and use it to
evaluate others or apply it to their own self-image. While being self-aware may not rely on
language use, it is more likely that a self-concept does.
Furthermore, a self-concept presupposes larger symbolic structures, such as race, gender,
sexuality, etc. These structures shape how others evaluate us and subsequently how we view
ourselves. This implies that in order for animals to have a self-concept, they must at the very
least have certain normative group expectations that shape how they evaluate each other and
themselves. While Alger and Alger (2003) argued that cat interactions were governed by the
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cats’ normative expectations of friendship and affection, they did not consider how the cats
assessed themselves when they violated or even followed these expectations.
Finally, there is no explicit evidence that animals possess selves under criterion 5, which
is narration. This criterion, the strongest criterion of selfhood I am considering here, requires
language, so it is unsurprising that animals cannot tell stories about themselves. Animals can
have “narrative selves” most palpably when their caretakers construct narratives for them, which
I discussed under criterion 1, attribution of self. While most animals do not have the ability to
construct their own stories linguistically, some animals might be capable of telling stories about
themselves using either spoken or sign language. Consider this exchange between Koko, a
gorilla who communicates using American Sign Language, and her trainer/companion, Penny
Patterson (Patterson and Cohn 1994: 282):
Penny: What did you do to Penny?
Koko: Bite.
Penny: You admit it?
Koko: Sorry bite scratch.
Koko: Wrong bite.
Penny: Why bite?
Koko: Because mad.
Penny: Why mad?
Koko: Don’t know.
Koko seems to be saying, ‘I am sorry I bit you. I realize that was wrong, but I was angry.’ Is
Koko telling a story here? A typical narrative has a connection between one event and another,
has a temporal order (beginning, middle, and end), and has some sort of conclusion that projects
a desirable or undesirable future (Polletta, Chen, Gardner, and Motes 2011). Koko and
Patterson’s exchange has a connection among events as they both respond to each other in
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intelligible ways. Their exchange has a temporal order; it starts with a demand for a confession,
proceeds with an apology, and ends with an account of self. Their exchange also has a moral
conclusion. Although Koko is unsure why she bit Patterson, she is sure that it is wrong to bite.
Perhaps the moral of the story is, “It is wrong to bite people.”
Koko clearly does not show the complexity with which humans narrate their lives. She
cannot tell her complete life story. Nor is it likely that she tells her life story to make sense of her
life. But she can tell simple narratives of self. Without laboring the details, Koko also shows
dimensions of self-awareness, intersubjectivity, and self-concept. However, American Sign
Language primates are outliers compared to other animals, since most animals cannot use sign
language. Symbolic primate selves, therefore, should not be generalized to all animals.
The Sociological Claims of Animal Selfhood: A Critique
While the sociological claims of animal selfhood are convincing at times, especially
evidence for intersubjectivity, self-concept, and narrative among primates, I find that many
claims suffer from clear epistemological and empirical problems concerning the human
knowledge of animal selfhood. Since the animal interaction sociologists mostly focus on my first
and second criteria of animal selfhood, attribution of self and self-awareness respectively, I will
spend most of this section evaluating these forms of animal selfhood. Given the conceptual
problems with animal selfhood, I also question whether scholars should make the case the
animals have rights on inconclusive empirical evidence.
Criterion 1 is the attribution of self. In the symbolic interactionist literature on animalhuman relations, humans clearly attribute distinct personal qualities or selves to their pets
(Sanders 1999; Alger and Alger 2003; Irvine 2004). The animal interaction sociologists,
however, are too willing to interpret this data as evidence of (real) animal selves, rather than
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evidence of human accounts of animal selves. These scholars are making claims about the
essence of animals in relation to how humans define and subsequently act towards them. In fact,
Clinton Sanders (1999) argues that everyday pet owners are like folk ethologists who, through
their familiarity with their pets, know what their pets are really like. However, there are two
epistemological problems with this approach: one is animal-focused and the other human
focused.
First, as already stated, there is no way sociologists can demonstrate that animals have a
notion of a distinct self. While I might think my cat is frisky, my cat does not have this selfnotion since “frisky” is a human created object she cannot act towards. Second, there is a
distinction between human interpretations of animal subjectivities and animal subjectivities. The
animal interaction sociologists blur this distinction as they take human accounts of animals as
essences of animals.7 In contrast, I submit that the units of analysis are humans, not animals.
Sociologists, therefore, can use human accounts of animals to make claims about what humans
think of animals, but they cannot use these accounts to make claims about animals. I thus argue
that this literature does not inform readers about animal subjectivity and selfhood, but how
humans, both the researchers and informants, construct animal subjectivities. This is because
human constructions of animals are more readily attainable and interpretable than animal
subjectivities.
Human accounts of animals should not constitute evidence of animal selves because
human interpretations of animal subjectivities are historically and culturally mediated. Animal
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This approach defies traditional symbolic interactionism because it assumes objects have a certain essence or truth
value, something symbolic interactionists rarely consider. Most interactionists are primarily concerned with how
actors define and act towards objects and not the core properties of the objects (See Hewitt 2003). Indeed, if objects
are cultural and interactional products, they have no essence.
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subjectivities are therefore contextual and cultural products, not objective realities. For example,
throughout the 19th, and especially in the late 20th century, humans increasingly sentimentalized
animals and nature because of state formation (Elias 1994; Franklin 1999), urbanization (Jasper
and Nelkin 1992; Thomas 1983), and postmodern culture (Franklin 1999). Prior to these events,
humans rarely sentimentalized animals. Without laboring details here, the general argument is
that the state, urbanization, and postmodernity caused humans to increasingly view some animals
as distinct subjects.
I argue that how humans talk about distinct animal selves does not simply reflect animal
subjectivities, but is refracted through culture. Larger symbolic structures affect how humans
think and talk about animals, which animal interaction sociologists do not consider in their
analysis of animal-human relationships. Human caretakers commonly talk of their pets as
distinct subjects, but the culture of human-animal relations makes this sentiment thinkable and
expressible. I am therefore unsurprised that pet caretakers talk about their animals as subjects,
and I take their accounts with a grain of salt. If it is acceptable for caretakers to talk about their
pets as subjects, I doubt this talk is evidence of distinct animal selves. Just because caretakers say
something about their animals does not mean it is true—although it is true that they said it.
Even though the pet as a sentimental subject is the dominant cultural prism through
which caretakers think of their pets, some caretakers do not think of their pets as subjects. “Pet”
is not a neatly coherent cultural category. Humans frequently treat their pets as utilitarian objects,
even though this violates the cultural framework of animals as subjects. Many humans mistreat
their animals either through abuse or neglect, and others abandon and euthanize their pets when
they no longer want them. Consequently, shelters euthanize millions of unwanted pets each year
(HSUS 2009), some more humanely than others. Caretakers who give up their animals,
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especially for convenience, unlikely see their animals as distinct selves with certain tastes but as
a genderless “its.”
I emphasize the incoherency of pets as cultural categories to demonstrate that there is
nothing essential about pets since humans treat them differently. Pets are polysemic and
contradictory cultural categories; they are both sentimental subjects and utilitarian objects. For
example, guide dog trainers may treat their dogs as behaviorist machines. Some pet owners may
act towards their pets as “superficial subjects;” they might talk about their pets as subjects, but
they may decide to give their pet to a shelter when caring for the pet becomes inconvenient.
Other pet owners may act towards their pets as pure subjects, and could never imagine giving up
their animals because they view their pets as their soul mates. These different views of pets are
social and cultural artifacts that influence how humans interpret the inner lives of animals. While
animals may shape how humans think of them, culture makes it possible and intelligible to think
of animals in certain ways. Talk of distinct animal selves, therefore, reflects culture(s) of animalhuman relations more so than the essential qualities of animals.
Overall, the animal interaction sociologists fail to examine the larger culture that
influences how humans define and subsequently act towards animals. In my view, these
sociologists carry and reflect the sentimental culture of animals, more so then they analyze and
problematize this culture. They are taking part in a cultural debate, more than they scrutinize the
meaning of animals or investigate those meanings empirically. If animals are cultural products,
the preoccupation with animal selfhood obscures other fruitful questions. Alternative questions
to “What is the inner life of an animal like?” are “Why do humans contrastingly view animals?
Why are some people more likely to give animals selves than others? What does this say about a
larger culture regarding animals?”
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In summary, the animal interaction sociologists seldom question human accounts of
animal selves but accept them for what they can tell us about animals. But if these accounts of
animal selves are products of sentimentalization via culture, I would argue the accounts are
attributions of human thought rather than an objective reality. We can imagine what an inner life
of an animal is like, but we cannot know this. Stated otherwise, “Humans have false intuitions
about the inner lives of animals but limitless imaginations of them” (Gopnik 2011: 52). While
criterion 2, self-awareness, does not suffer from this epistemological pitfall, it does suffer from
empirical handicaps.
Under criterion 2, I argued that a being is self-aware if it is an object to itself from the
perspectives of others and/or through self-interaction. In contrast, Alger and Alger (2003) and
Irvine (2004) have different criteria of self-awareness. Alger and Alger (2003) argue that the cats
they studied were self-aware because they adapted to novel situations, they learned from each
other and their own experiences, they made choices, they cooperated, and they displayed a
complexity of behavior. Irvine (2004) claims that animals have selves, or become aware of their
subjective “I,” because they possess agency, coherence, affectivity, and self-history. However,
both Alger and Alger’s (2003) and Irvine’s (2004) accounts of animal selfhood are beleaguered
with three empirical problems.
First, Alger and Alger and Irvine do not convincingly show how animals become
conscious of themselves from the perspective of others, which is a fundamental quality of selfawareness. They stress particular characteristics of self-awareness while ignoring the process of
self-consciousness. That is to say, they are working backwards; they focus on outcomes of
selfhood such as agency, coherence, learning, complexity of behavior, etc. They stress outcomes
over processes because the outcomes are more empirically inferable. There is nothing wrong
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with this approach, but this is only part of the necessary evidence. These sociologists need to
show, if possible, how animals are self-aware or how animals become objects to themselves.
This implies not only demonstrating how animals have an “I” but also how they have a situated
and generalized “me.”
Second, there is little evidence in this literature that animals self-interact, or act towards
themselves as they act towards others. Do animals get upset with themselves (or others)? Feel
proud of themselves (or others)? Hate themselves (or others)? If animals can act towards
themselves as they act towards others, then this would be adequate evidence that animals are
self-aware; they are treating themselves as objects. However, animals acting towards themselves
may not be readily observable in most cases.
Third and finally, the lack of a common language between human and animal presents
empirical problems for knowing the animal other. Unlike animals, humans have empirically
demonstrable selves known through language. Someone might tell a friend, “I can’t believe I
said that to John. He is probably going to think I am crazy.” This person’s self is articulated to
others through a common language. This self, therefore, is easily verifiable. Furthermore, human
selves are also confirmed through self-directed actions. Acting towards ourselves is an everyday
occurrence, which we easily convey to others. For example, if I get mad at myself for giving a
lousy lecture, I can relate this to a sympathetic colleague. The self, therefore, is readily knowable
through language. While the self may not be contingent on language, it is easily recognized
through language.8 This makes the sociological research of animal selfhood a precarious
enterprise.

8

Perhaps this is why Koko’s self narrative might be the most persuasive evidence of animal selfhood presented
herein.
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Animal Selves, Animal Rights
Perhaps the most important consequence of selfhood is its moral implications. For
example, Animal Liberation author, Peter Singer (1990: 20), reminiscent of John Locke, argued
that beings that have self-awareness can “think ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the
future.” According to Singer, one of the central aspirations of self-aware beings is a concern over
what happens to them, especially that which may jeopardize their desire to live. That is, selfawareness is fundamental to possessing in interest in one’s life. If animals are self-aware, and
therefore have an interest in their lives, then a moral question arises: can humans justify killing
something that does not want to be killed? Some philosophers have debated this question, with
the debate often revolving around the subjective characteristics of animals. In this section, I
examine how philosophers and sociologists have mostly upheld but sometimes refuted animal
rights based on animal self-awareness.
Peter Singer is perhaps the world’s most well-known animal rights philosopher, though
curiously, he does not advocate that animals have rights partly because he argues that animals do
not have self-consciousness. Instead, Singer maintains that animals are sentient, and therefore are
capable of suffering. Singer argues, then, that though animals have an interest in not suffering,
they do not have an interest in life because they are not aware of themselves. Humans, then,
should not cause animals to suffer, but according to Singer, humans can own and kill animals if
their suffering is minimized. For Singer, suffering is the primary problem (Francione 2000).
Singer does not outright condemn animal use, but rather accepts it so long as it is humane and
painless. Singer, while very important in the animal welfare and rights movements, actually
denies animal rights and justifies animal use because animals lack self-consciousness.
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In contrast to Singer’s perspective, animal rights philosopher Tom Regan (2004) takes a
more radical approach as he argues that animals have inherent value, meaning that they have
value independent of the value they are attributed by others, because they are “subjects as a life.”
According to Regan, a being that is a subject of a life possesses mental sophistication, exhibiting
certain subjective qualities, such as perception, memories, desires, intentions, and a sense of the
future. Importantly, subjects of a life possess some form of self-awareness. Regan argues that
animals have psychological identities, or notions of self, which can change over time, though as I
have pointed out this varies depending on the species considered. Regardless, the foundation of
Regan’s animal rights perspective is thus based on the notion that animals have complex
subjective states; this is what makes animals a subject of a life. The implications of Regan’s
perspective are more extreme than Singers. While Singer’s utilitarian perspective justifies animal
use in circumstances that do little harm to animals, Regan’s animal right perspective maintains
that humans cannot use animals at all because doing so would violate animals inherent worth.
Regan argues that animal use is wrong because animals have rights.
Following in Singers and especially Regan’s footsteps, animal sociologists have also
invoked self-awareness to make moral claims about how humans should act toward animals.
While Arluke and Sanders (1996) are troubled by how humans treat animals, they do not try to
persuade the reader to adopt a specific moral perceptive. Instead, they partake in sociological
analysis, as they describe how humans categorize animals based on worth, such as good animals,
like pets and tools, from bad animals like vermin and demons. They also explain how humans
can love and harm animals through various strategies and justifications. In contrast, the last
chapters of the Alger’s Cat Culture and Irvine’s If You Tame Me take a value laden approach,
sharing a common theme: persuading the reader that animals have moral worth. More
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specifically, they claim that if animals have selves and culture, then humans have no justification
to oppress them. Their work is not simply a sociological examination of animal selfhood, but as
Jerolmack (2005) puts it, a thinly veiled form of animal rights. Indeed, as the Algers (2003: 196197) confess, “Because we are animal activists as well as social scientists, the findings of our
study have made us even more committed to the animal rights perspective.”
Both the Algers and Irvine take a Reganian perspective to animal rights, as they argue
that animals are subjects of a life, since they possess culture and selves, and therefore have
inherent value. The Algers argue that domestic animals deserve a right to moral consideration
and greater protections from the state, as many of them are euthanized each year. They base this
moral argument in their own evidence; echoing Regan, they argue that animals should be part of
our moral community because they “enter into complex relationships, are able to see things from
another’s point of view, learn from one another, adopt to novel circumstances, and indicate selfawareness and individuality…” (Alger and Alger 2003: 198). They then go on to generalize from
their study about how all animals are oppressed, describing the poor conditions farm animals
face, the troublesome practices of animal experimentation, and the consumerist outlook humans
have toward pets. The Algers view cats and animals more generally as subjects of a life that have
inherent value. Consequently, they urge sociologists to study animals from the “perspective of
stratification and oppression” (Alger and Alger 2003: 210).
Leslie Irvine (2004) also takes a Reganian perspective on animal rights, as she argues that
animals have an interest in their lives because they feel pain and are self-aware. Like the Algers,
she argues for protections and educational programs for companion animals. She also makes
wider generalizations about animals, as she explores the case for animal rights from an
abolitionist perspective, which advocates the abolition of all animal use including food, clothes,
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and research. Irvine (2004: 182), siding with the abolitionist view, even goes on to argue that pet
keeping is immoral. She argues that:
…recognizing animal selfhood and its influence on human identity should lead us to
acknowledge the value of animals’ lives. In turn, we should realize that it is immoral to
keep them for our pleasure, regardless of whether we call them companions or pets.
According to Irvine, animal selfhood gives animals inherent worth and gives humans “profound
obligations” (2004: 184) to animals, and as such, humans must contemplate the morality of
human-animal relations, including eating and pet keeping. Like Alger and Alger, she takes an
animal rights approach to her research, carefully encouraging the reader to change their view of
animals.
For the Algers and Irvine to argue that animals have rights because dogs and cats are selfaware is a bit of a stretch. This speaks to one of the central problems of the Reganism approach
to animal rights: determining which animals are subjects of a life. As I and others (Warren 1987)
have argued, subjecthood comes in degrees. Are insects, fish, or amphibians subjects of a life
and therefore have inherent value? Some insects, after all, demonstrate complexity of behavior.
Even Mead (1934) argued that ants have complex group life and social organization. Perhaps
ants are subjects of a life because they have mental complexity, such as perceptions, desires,
intentions, and even self-consciousness, that facilitates their social organization. However, as I
have argued, it is unclear how humans can empirically demonstrate these qualities in most
animals, especially insects. Even if it was true that ants possess these characteristics, they are
unlikely to possess them to the same degree that humans do. Ant self-awareness is likely to be
much different than human self-awareness. Overall, it is difficult to ascertain which animals have
rights and which animals may not have rights using Regan’s criteria of mental sophistication.
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Regan, however, argues that in cases where we are unsure, we should assume animals are
subjects of a life. Assuming that animals are subjects of a life, though, is different than evidence
for such capacities in animals.
Since animal selfhood suffers from empirical and epistemological problems, claims of
animal rights based on animal subjectivity are dubious. The animal selfhood premise of this
argument is precarious, and thus social scientists and philosophers should not so readily accept
its conclusion of animal rights. Animals cannot have rights based on subjective qualities that
they may not possess. Rather than focus on subjectivity, there are other salient factors to consider
in granting rights to others. For example, from a Kantian perspective, those who are rational
should have rights because they can alter themselves through reason. Rationality is important
because it provides opportunities to reason with others and to nonviolently resolve conflict.
However, if rationality is the benchmark, then animals are likely excluded from any notion of
rights. To avoid this drawback, another salient factor for animal rights is sentience, the capacity
for sensation. Even if animals are not rational like humans, this does not mean that humans can
be cruel to animals. Moral rights are complex. Animals may not inherently have them (though it
is unclear if any being “inherently” has rights), but humans may ascribe rights to animals,
especially those who are sentient. As Francione (2000) argues, sentient beings care what happens
to them, and very likely value their lives. Sentient animals are logical candidates for moral rights
because they prefer to be treated in specific ways, particularly in ways that do not harm them
(Warren 1987). We thus do not have to assume that such animals have complex subjective states
for them to have rights. Because animal self-awareness is complex and uncertain, it makes much
more sense to use other factors, particularly sentience, as standards of animal rights.
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Conclusions
Even though I have been critical of animal selfhood, I do believe that sociologists should
at least consider it a possibility. Just because we are not entirely sure that something is true, does
not mean we should assume it is false (Sanders 1999). Animal selves, in a limited Meadian
sense, are potentially real even though in most cases they are unwitnessable and unverifiable
phenomena. Nevertheless, sociologists interested in animal selves need to demonstrate how
animals can become objects to themselves from the perspectives of others or through selfinteraction.
The first step in this process, perhaps to the displeasure of sociologists, is to demonstrate
the biological foundations of the self. Mead argued that the self was biosocial, by which he
meant humans are biologically equipped for selfhood, but this biological ability is only
manifested in social experience. Researchers interested in animal selves need to show what types
of cognitive, sensory, and locomotive abilities are necessary for selfhood, and how humans and
animals compare on these dimensions. Marc Bekoff (2006) argues that neural imaging is a
promising approach because it can identify brain activities associated with self-consciousness.
Bekoff suggests collecting data on self-conscious neural processes in humans and comparing
these processes as they occur in animals engaged in self-directed behaviors, such as chimpanzees
examining themselves in mirrors. If the neural processes between the selected humans and
animals are similar, this might reveal objective standards of self-consciousness in humans and
some animals, which ethologists could search for in other animals. Secondly, sociologists need to
demonstrate how animals who seemingly are biologically equipped for selfhood act towards
themselves. This is no easy task, but it is a necessary one. Until this is achieved, most animals,
except for the language trained apes, do not have verifiable selves.
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Even if animal interaction sociologists can successfully demonstrate how animals have
selves, their research should also speak beyond animal-human interactions to larger sociological
matters. For example, research on animal selfhood should produce further knowledge of the self.
The significance of animal sociology is not only what it can tell sociologists about animals, but
what the study of animals can tell sociologists about larger sociological issues and concepts. This
will further legitimate animal studies in sociology, as it will contribute to the larger discipline a
theoretical import (Arluke 2003). In addition, more research needs to be done on different types
of animals. Generalizability is an important factor in the social sciences, and the rules of the
game cannot be suspended just for animal sociologists. Therefore, sociologists have to be far
more cautious than these scholars in claims about “animals” based upon research of dog and cat
behaviors. While it is plausible that many mammals have selves, it is not clear if most birds, fish,
or insects have such capabilities.
Given that research of animal selfhood suffers from empirical and epistemological
problems, I would encourage sociologists of animal-human relations to research how animals
function as symbolic resources. This research could explore how people use animals to make
claims about their identity, status, morality, sophistication, distinctiveness, etc. This is promising
research because it has the potential to address larger sociological issues. Both sociologists of
culture and symbolic interactionists can make substantive contributions here. I suggest
sociologists research taste publics, such as animal shows, in which animals represent status,
leisure, and competition. Bourdieu’s (1984) work on distinction and capital seems salient in such
environments. In fact, I have conducted research on groups of competitive equestrians who draw
moral boundaries between themselves, yet ironically these boundaries are not very important to
them. Sociologists could also research how humans use pets to construct families, such as
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parents who utilize pets to teach their children morals and manners. Other sociologists could
explore how people use animals to make claims about their self, such as vegans who claim a
moral, spiritual self in an increasingly amoral world. Or, in line with symbolic interactionism,
sociologists could compare how individuals define with how they act towards animals. For
example, many humans believe that animals and nature are moral, pure, and good compared to
amoral humans who engage in war, murder, and other questionable acts. In addition, as animal
interaction sociologists have demonstrated, many people think of animals as active subjects, who
are emotional, cognitive, and self-aware. But these same people might eat animals. This research
could highlight the emotion work people use to make sense of their contrasting definitions and
actions.
In closing, animal interaction sociologists still have a long way to go to show how
animals act towards themselves as objects. Consequently, I propose sociologists of animalhuman relations research animals as symbolic resources. Sociologists who take this approach can
make more convincing empirical claims than sociologists who treat animals as symbolic actors
because there are no attempts to know the animal other. In addition, sociologists who research
animals as symbolic resources can produce conceptual findings that transcend animal-human
relations, unlike sociologists who focus solely on the abilities of animals. Indeed, the promise of
the sociology of animal-human relations is not simply what it can tell us about animals, but what
our relationships with animals can tell us about social life.
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CHAPTER 3
VEGANISM: ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 9

In 2014, Senator Cory Booker became a vegan. He explained during a recent interview
with the Daily Beast that he does not want to harm animals, stating “being vegan for me is a
cleaner way of not participating in practices that don’t align with my values.” While Booker
emphasizes personal values, New York Post writer Eliyahu Federman in his article “Cory
Booker’s Animal Rights Extremism” believes that Booker is trying to impose his “extreme
animal rights” values on others through his legislative decisions and through his seemingly
influential social media musings. However, Booker's own explanation of why he is vegan is
individualized. In accounting for his veganism, Booker stresses that his actions and values are his
alone and avoids imposing his morals onto others. Another famous vegan, Moby, a musician, has
also explained why he is vegan in a recent Rolling Stone article. There, he described his rich
connection with pets growing up, which caused him to have an epiphany: if he loved his cat and
would never harm him, how could he do that to another animal? Moby explained, “My reason
for becoming a vegetarian was simple: I loved (and love) animals and I don't want to be involved
in anything that leads to or contributes to their suffering.” Two years after becoming vegetarian,
Moby transitioned into veganism. Moby, however, does not argue that everyone should be
vegan. He argues, “Just because I'm a vegan I'm not saying you should be a vegan. It would be
ironic if I refused to force my will on animals but was all too happy forcing my will on humans.”
Cory Booker and Moby’s accounts of veganism are significant for two reasons. First,
they both discuss veganism in individualized ways. Booker stresses that his decisions and values

This article was previously published. Ryan Turner. 2019. “Veganism: Ethics in Everyday Life.” American
Journal of Cultural Sociology 7: 54-78.
9
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are personal; Moby stresses that his likes and practices are based in his distinctive experiences.
Second, Booker and Moby do not emphasize veganism as a general moral imperative. Rather,
they seem to have either encountered or promoted the notion that veganism is an individual
choice, supporting the ostensibly American belief that individuals have the freedom to live as
they desire. Federman, who wrote about Booker in his New York Post piece, urged Booker not
to force his veganism onto others. But there are no other suggestions that that was Booker’s
intent. Similarly, Moby explicitly states that he would not force his will onto others. Moby
indicates that individuals should decide on their own if they wish to be vegan, demonstrating that
he does not think of veganism as morally binding on others. Both issues—individualized
discourse about veganism and a refusal to formulate veganism as a general moral imperative—
emphasize individualism. Drawing on the tradition of modern individualism (Bellah et al, 1985),
Booker and Moby individualize their morals rather than stress morals as collective obligations.
To learn more about how ethical vegans10 think about presenting veganism to others, I
interviewed twenty-four vegans and conducted fieldwork at vegan gatherings. In my interviews
and conversations, I found that vegans adopt two contrasting moral positions on veganism. The
first position is “strict individualism.” When vegans take this position, they privately believe and
publicly present veganism as an individual choice, not a general moral imperative that others
ought to follow. While these vegans are troubled by how humans treat animals, they do not think
others ought to be vegan. The second position is “strategic individualism.” When vegans take
this position, they privately believe that veganism is a general moral imperative or collective
moral obligation, meaning that they see veganism as a matter of collective right and wrong. They
therefore believe that all individuals, with perhaps some exceptions (for example people from

10

I use “vegan” throughout the paper as a shorthand for “ethical vegan.”
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non-industrialized countries) are morally obligated to veganism. They thus believe that killing
animals for human consumption is wrong, at times comparing it to slavery and murder.
However, when these vegans discuss veganism with others, they tend to talk about it in the same
terms as Booker and Moby11. They often explained to others why they were vegan in
individualistic ways. They stressed the personal character of their decisions, values, and
experiences and resisted making moral claims about how nonvegans ought to live their lives. As
I will show, vegans use strategic individualism to avoid interpersonal conflict and to engage in
effective activism. Indeed, many vegans I interviewed feel that their interactions with nonvegans
can facilitate conflict as nonvegans may be disinclined to their position on animals. They
therefore invoke individualism to manage the impressions of others, producing
nonconfrontational and civil interactions.
In this paper, I use veganism to examine American individualism. Sociologists have long
claimed that individualism is the first cultural language of Americans, and consequently
Americans have trouble talking about community obligations (Bellah et al 1985). While I found
this to be true of strict individualism, strategic individualism does not fit this claim. In fact,
vegans who use strategic individualism reject individualism, specifically as a moral position on
veganism. That is, their first moral language is of collective obligations to animals. While vegans
sometimes publicly individualize veganism to avoid interpersonal conflict, they may not
privately believe in it as doctrine of veganism. Rather than experiencing individualism as an
internalized cultural schema, they strategically use individualism to define a situation. I thus
argue that individualism is not simply a deep, taken for granted American value. Rather,

11

While Booker and Moby publicly individualize veganism, it is unclear if they employ strategic individualism or
strict individualism because their private beliefs about veganism are uncertain. For example, they may think of
veganism as a public good but present it as an individual choice. To know if this is the case, I submit that the
best way to understand their perspectives is through in-depth face-to-face interviewing.
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individualism is also a strategic resource that individuals can use during presentations of moral
self.
This paper has four main parts. First, I will review the literature in cultural sociology that
addresses “American Individualism.” I will show what sociologists mean by the term
“individualism” and how they use it. I submit that it is fruitful to think of individualism as a
conviction and a resource. I will also briefly review literature on veganism and impression
management. Second, I will explain how I collected and analyzed my evidence. Third, I will
present my evidence categorized by two positions vegans can take: strict individualism and
strategic individualism. Finally, in the discussion and conclusion, I address the substantive and
methodological implications my research has for how sociologists think about individualism and
social action.
American Individualism
Sociologists of culture have long argued that “liberal individualism”—the belief that
each person should have the right to think and act in a way that is largely free from collective
restrictions (Grabb et al 1999: 513)—is an important American value, dating to the American
Revolution (Lipset 1996) or at least the abolition of slavery (Grabb et al 1999) and intensifying
in modern America (Bellah et al 1985). Alexis de Tocqueville offered one of the most influential
formulations of liberal individualism during his visit to the United States in the early 1830s. In
Democracy in America ([1840] 1954), he argued that the equal and democratic conditions of the
United States encouraged Americans to value individualism, which he describes as “...a mature
and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass
of his fellow creatures...” ([1840] 1954: 506). Because the US was democratic and equal,
Americans believed they had the power to shape their own destiny, that individuals made

75

something of themselves without having to depend on others. Individualism seemingly trumped
obligations to others. Consequently, Americans had the capacity to isolate themselves from
community. Tocqueville worried that individualism, because of a lack of community obligations,
could lead to despotism. In other words, if people did not get involved in public affairs, their
independence could be in jeopardy. Yet Tocqueville saw that Americans could counter the
pernicious effects of individualism through political and religious participation, forming civic
associations, and reading newspapers, which made readers aware of common interests.
Individualism could thus be restrained by community responsibility.
Since Tocqueville, many sociologists have claimed that liberal individualism is a
prevalent American value today. Perhaps the most prominent work on modern individualism,
influenced by Tocqueville, is Robert Bellah and others' (1985) classic Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life, in which they argue that American’s cultural
“first language” is individualism. Bellah argues that Americans, especially middle class white
Americans, believe in an autonomous, independent self; that Americans are their own persons
free to make their own choices. Americans view liberal individualism as a moral right; they
should be free to achieve certain goals, desires, happiness without others telling them how to do
so. Bellah (1985: 142) explains, “Anything that would violate our right to think for ourselves,
judge for ourselves, make our own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally
wrong, it is sacrilegious.” Any violation of liberal individualism is a moral transgression against
the dignity and sacredness of the individual. Thus, the central moral meaning of Americans’ lives
is to become their own persons on their own terms (Pugh 2015; Silva 2015).
To become an autonomous individual—one’s own person—Americans break away from
family, community, and inherited ideas (Bellah et al 1985). For example, Americans tend to
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think that they must leave the family to become an independent person or an adult (Schalet
2011). Per Bellah, individuals indicate to themselves and others that they are their own persons
through utilitarian and expressive individualism. The former indicates that individuals are free to
maximize their interests, typically material needs. The person enacting utilitarian individualism
is defined by his or her personal accomplishments and success (Hewitt 1989). Expressive
individualism, on the other hand, refers to the expression of one’s inner person, one’s true nature,
free of social conventions. The person enacting expressive individualism is defined by his or her
“real self” that can overcome social constraints.
Bellah et al (1985) argue that Americans value community—a group of people who are
socially interdependent, who participate in discussions of the public good—less than the
individual, a change from previous Americans who, according to Tocqueville, valued both.
Consequently, communalistic ways of organizing life, such as Republicanism and Biblical
traditions, are merely Americans’ second cultural language. These traditions define the person
not simply as an individual but as a member of a religious, social, or political community (Jensen
1994). However, because Americans view these traditions as part of their second language, they
do not have a strong collective aspect to their sense of self. Americans do not seem to value a
community in which spiritual and ethical life can prosper, nor are they involved in political
affairs for the betterment of their communities. Rather, they resemble utilitarian or expressive
individuals, preoccupied with their own needs and desires. Even when Americans are part of
something that resembles community, they have a hard time speaking of their collective
obligations to each other. Instead, they believe that individuals have the freedom rather than
collective obligation to join communities (Bellah et al 1985). Americans thus speak of
community through the language of individualism.
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Bellah et al (1985) claim that Americans have become radically individualistic, causing
them to detach themselves from community and political involvement, echoing Tocqueville's
concern. Other sociologists have questioned the extent to which Americans are overly
individualistic (see Cerulo 2008, Fischer 2008, Jensen 1994, Williams 1970), yet they still
acknowledge that individualism is important to Americans. For example, Cerulo (2008), rather
than argue that Americans are radically and preponderantly individualistic, highlights the
temporality of individualism; in some contexts Americans are “me-directed” and in other
contexts they are “other directed.” Similarly, Fischer (2008) argues that Americans value both
individualism and group loyalty, a form of “voluntarism.” According to Fischer, Americans see
groups as voluntary associations. Americans can freely join groups, with the expectation that
they are loyal to the group, and they can freely leave these groups. Voluntarism celebrates group
affiliation and individual choice.
Sociologists of culture thus argue that liberal individualism is a prominent American
value even with some qualifications12. These sociologists largely see individualism as a system
of belief, an enduring and constraining part of American society that manifests within individuals
as conviction. Americans are constrained by their cultural heritage, largely unaware of how
individualism shapes their thoughts and actions. Bellah (1985), as I have suggested, is a leading

12

Americans also value other forms of individualism, particularly economic individualism, which refers to the
self-reliant individual who attains society’s scarce material resources through individual merit, such as hard work
ethic. Economic individualism is central to the American Dream narrative that anyone can get ahead if he or she
tries hard enough (Hochschild 1995). Sociologists have also used both forms of individualism to explain
sociological evidence, such as decline in social obligations to community (Bellah et al 1985), how Americans talk
about morals (Jensen 1994), lack of political participation (Bellah et al 1985; Putnam 2001), how Americans think
about adulthood and teenage sexuality (Schalet 2011), how Americans think about inequality and their self-worth
(Bobo 1993; Lewis 1993; Lamont 2000; Silva 2015), and how Americans evaluate poverty and social spending
programs (Gilens 1999; Rank 2003), among other explanations.
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representative of this position, as he argues that liberal individualism constrains Americans to
their detriment.
Following the approach of conceptualizing culture as a “toolkit” or repertoire (Swidler
1986; Lamont and Thevenot 2000; Weber 2005: Lizardo and Strand 2010), which emphasizes
that culture is made up of common stocks of meaning that individuals can assemble in their
social acts (Silber 2003), I contend that what is missing from this valuable literature on liberal
individualism is an understanding of how individuals use individualism in their everyday lives to
construct lines of action or solve problems13. Sociologists who study individualism have paid
attention to how Americans are constrained by and embody individualism, but they have paid
less attention to how individuals enact individualism in various social situations. In other words,
sociologists have shown how individualism acts on individuals, more so than how individuals
enact individualism. Moreover, when sociologists do link individualism to action, it is usually in
abstract ways like “decline in community,” “social isolation,” or “lack of political support for
poverty programs.” Sociologists do not have a good sense of how individuals, either through
their informants’ accounts or through their own observations, pragmatically enact individualism
in everyday social situations. While there is a debate about how individualistic Americans are, I
think most sociologists can agree it is a cultural tool that Americans have at their disposal. With
these considerations, what do individuals do with individualism? What do they accomplish by
using individualism?
In summary, while sociologists often think of individualism as a system of belief
internalized by individuals as conviction, sociologists can also conceptualize it as cultural

13

O’Brien (2015) is an exception, as he argues that individualism is not a deep American cultural value that
directs Americans toward voluntarist conduct, but rather a strategy of action that Americans use to resolve the
cultural dilemma of fulfilling external obligations within an individualistic context.
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resource that is deployed in everyday life. In the pages below, I will demonstrate how vegans
who employ strict individualism represent individualism as conviction, as they believe that
veganism is an individual choice. In contrast, vegans who employ strategic individualism
represent individualism as a resource, as they strategically use individualism as a cultural tool to
manage the impressions of nonvegans. I thus argue that individualism is not simply a set of
values or even a language. It is also a strategic resource that individuals use to achieve their
goals.
Impression Management and Veganism
Vegans often find themselves in situations where they feel compelled to explain
themselves to nonvegans (Greenebaum 2012; Twine 2014). In Erving Goffman's language, these
are occasions of impression management. According to Goffman (1959), impression
management occurs when interactants attempt to control how others view them through various
interactional techniques, such as role display, expressions given, prop use, and more. In other
words, when individuals present themselves with specific characteristics and capacities to others,
they try to convince others in the parts they are playing. Moreover, Goffman argues that
impression management has a moral character, as individuals who project a self to others expect
others to honor that projection. The main goal of impression management is to define a situation
so that co-interactants have a good sense of how to interact with each other, producing smooth
interactions.
Impression management is not only a method of projecting a self-image, but it is also a
way to uphold a “ceremonial order that is maintained by a system of etiquette” in which
individuals satisfy minimal public deference (Goffman 1967: 114). For example, co-interactants
may either enact “negative politeness” by not imposing themselves on others, or “positive
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politeness” by respecting others’ self-projections (Brown and Levinson 1987). Moreover,
Goffman argues that individuals are subject to “involvement obligations,” feeling that they must
focus on and involve themselves in interactions in which they participate. To do otherwise—to
withdraw from the ceremonial order—individuals risk attributions of being discourteous or
impolite. Individuals tend to uphold this interactional order of civility through their own
involvement in the interaction and ensuring that co-interactants sustain theirs.
While joint involvement in the ceremonial order of interaction produces civil interactions,
alienation can occur. Impression management, then, requires individuals to perform what
Goffman (1959: 208) calls “expressive responsibility” to avoid disrupting one's projected image
of oneself. Impression management thus requires planning on the part of individuals. However,
self-presentations do not always go according to plan. One's presentation may be spoiled because
of unmeant gestures, or others may discredit one's projected self, producing embarrassment and
shame in individuals “over what he has or appears to have done to himself and the interaction”
(Goffman 1956: 268). Thus, self-performances are delicate acts that can be jeopardized by
interactional mishaps. Discredited individuals and their co-interactants, in response to
embarrassment, may try to realign the interaction through “defensive” and “protective” practices
(Goffman 1959: 13).
Vegans, given their moral positions on animals, may be discredited in the eyes of others,
especially if they present veganism as a collective moral obligation (Greenebaum 2012). Indeed,
vegans often experience various social tensions, including a lack of emotional support from
family and friends (McDonald 2000; Cherry 2015); antagonistic interactions with nonvegans,
such as nonvegans teasing vegans (Jabs et al 2000); and a lack of acceptance from nonvegans
(Potts and White 2008). Nonvegans often view ethical vegans as judgmental “killjoys”, those
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who disrupt the affective social order by destabilizing a negotiated sense of shared happiness
(Twine 2014).
Given these unfavorable responses, vegans may try to manage the impressions of
nonvegans to produce amicable interactions. To produce such interactions—to show others that
one is “involved”—individuals feel obliged to convey their interests in ways that others will find
“useable,” forming a bridge that individuals build among each other (Goffman 1967: 116). For
example, in her study of vegans' impression management techniques, Greenebaum (2012) argues
that vegans frequently participate in face-saving behaviors when interacting with nonvegans by
reaffirming the positive social value of co-interactants. Specifically, they try not to be “killjoys”
in the presence of nonvegans by avoiding confrontation, promoting vegan education, focusing on
health benefits, and leading by example. In Goffman’s terms, they uphold the ceremonial order
of interaction by maintaining the face of others.
Greenebaum's research is valuable, demonstrating the face-saving strategies vegans use
to avoid conflict and involve others, a pattern also prominent in my evidence. However, she does
not connect these strategies to larger cultural practices. For example, many of her interviewees,
in my view, individualize veganism, to which many nonvegans may be receptive because
individualism is a common American value. In contrast, I will demonstrate how the impression
management tactics of vegans are rooted in American individualism. In addition, the public
presentation of veganism pays theoretical dividends, particularly in sociological understandings
of individualism, which Greenebaum does not emphasize. Importantly, I will show that vegans
use individualism as a cultural tool to manage the impressions of others, theoretically
demonstrating that individualism is not simply a matter of internal conviction, but as an
expressive strategy of conflict avoidance.
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Methods
While individuals become vegan for different reasons, such as personal health or
environmental concerns, I intentionally sampled “ethical vegans,” those who become vegan
primarily for the sake of the animals14 (Francione and Garner 2010). I interviewed twenty-four
vegans from the Northeastern US to learn more about how they think about presenting veganism
to nonvegans, starting with three initial interviews in the Spring of 2011, and the rest in 2013 and
2014. I interviewed seven men and seventeen women, all of whom were white except for one
Latina. In addition, most of the interviewees were college-educated, which is typical of vegans in
the United States (Cooney 2013). During the interviews, I asked participants about how they
think about veganism, how they became vegan, how becoming vegan changed their relationships
with others, how they talk about veganism with others, what they think of nonvegans and what
nonvegans think of them, and how veganism impacts their day-to-day life. Most of the
interviews lasted anywhere from one to two hours. All interviewees’ names are pseudonyms.
I also conducted eight extended observations. I went to a Northeastern vegetarian festival
in 2014, attending a two-hour presentation about strategies for vegans to discuss veganism with
family and friends. I also attended seven vegan potluck dinners/lunches starting in February to
April 2011 and again in fall of 2012, some of which had themes like how to be jubilant activist,
or how to evaluate the morality of local and “humane” farming. At the first potluck, I announced
to the group that I was conducting research, though not all participants at later potlucks knew of
my research because potluck participation was variable. However, I informed participants of my
research if I interacted with them. After the first potluck, the organizer of the group also gave me
permission to attend future gatherings.
14

This is one of the main reasons individuals adopt veganism (Cooney 2013), though my argument does not rest
on representativeness.
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Most of the potlucks had between ten and twenty attendants. Six of the potlucks took
place at a local vegan restaurant usually on Sunday evenings, and one took place at a local
church for lunch. The potlucks typically lasted around three hours, starting with informal
socializing, then dinner, and then a film screening or a presentation by a guest speaker. Most of
the speakers supplied handouts to the group, during which I wrote down fieldnote jottings
summarizing previous and current interactions. I blended in with many of the participants during
this time because many of them also took notes. During these potluck events and vegan inspired
presentations, I observed vegans talk about veganism, and how they thought about conveying
veganism and animal rights to hunters, farmers, friends, and family members. I also asked the
participants how they became vegan, and how they talk about veganism with others.
While I would have liked to conduct observations of vegans interacting with nonvegans,
this was not practical because vegans can avoid these interactions. Veganism is not a
conspicuous social identity such as race or gender. Thus, vegans can easily “pass.” They do not
always have to account to others—they do not have to tell others they are vegan—making it
difficult to observe vegan-nonvegan interactions. While I do make claims about what vegans say
to nonvegans based on vegans' accounts of these exchanges, I take their accounts of lived
experiences seriously, as they are capable of “reflexive accountability,” meaning that orderliness
of activities is observable and reportable by members (Berard 2005). Furthermore, many vegans
are thoughtful about how they present their moral beliefs to nonvegans, which I discovered and
explored during my interviews. Nevertheless, the lack of observational data is a limitation to this
research. I address this issue in further detail in the discussion of the paper.
I made a point to inform my interviewees that I was also an ethical vegan. I believe this
helped established rapport. In fact, many of my participants expressed that they felt comfortable
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expressing themselves to me. However, while my positionality facilitated rapport, it is also
possible that it could have influenced the integrity of my evidence. For example, it is possible
that my interviewees, knowing that I am vegan, may have exaggerated their ethical veganism and
understated their strategic individualism to give the impression that they are a consistent
character so that I would see them in a good light, an example of what Goffman (1959: 34-35)
refers to as “idealization.” However, I believe that because my interviewees felt that I understood
their perspectives on interacting with nonvegans, they could comfortably express to me that they
often censored their moral beliefs to define the situation.
I recruited interviewees through my fieldwork and through snowball sampling. Five of
the initial interviewees were recruited during fieldwork. At the potlucks, I approached those who
seemed comfortable around me and interested in my research, and asked them for an interview.
No one declined. The other nineteen were recruited through snowball sampling, as I asked
interviewees if they knew of other ethical vegans who might be interested in an interview.
Finally, I transcribed and coded the interviews and fieldnotes, paying attention to how
vegans morally evaluate institutionalized animal use and how vegans convey their moral beliefs
to nonvegans. I coded generally, focusing on themes like moral beliefs about veganism,
interpersonal conflict, self-censorship, and various forms of presentation of self, such as conflict
avoidance, veganism as moral imperative, and veganism as individual choice. Out of this, strict
and strategic individualism emerged as common positions. In the following sections, I present
and analyze my evidence by examining the different forms of individualism.
Veganism and Individualism
Strict Individualism
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Strict and strategic individualism do not represent groups of vegans, but positions that
vegans can take, although it is uncommon for vegans to adopt both positions since they are
morally distinct. The vegans who identify with strict individualism are troubled by how humans
treat animals in instrumental relationships, but, unlike those who identify with strategic
individualism, they do not enforce collective moral obligations toward animals. They largely
think that it is up to individuals to decide to stop consuming animal products. While they feel it
is wrong for them to consume animal products, they do not think it is necessarily wrong for
others to consume animal products.
Many vegans in my sample did not identify with strict individualism, yet those that did
show how liberal individualism can influence how Americans think about morals. I asked James,
who has been vegan since 2008 after learning about common practices in the dairy industry, if
consuming animal products is wrong. James believes that using animals is not “an issue of right
or wrong,” reasoning “I don't think a lot of people are informed of alternatives. Many are also
unaware of the suffering involved.” In other words, nonvegans are not wrong to consume animal
products because they do not know of vegan alternatives, nor the harm they cause. James does
not hold nonvegans morally accountable because they know not what they do. James'
individualized perspective on veganism is also conspicuous during his interactions with
nonvegans. He said, “I think I usually say I’ve been vegetarian for a long time and the more I
learn about the conditions animals are kept under, the more I realize it’s the right decision.” Like
Booker and Moby, James stresses his experiences and decisions when explaining his lifestyle to
others.
Like James, Pilates instructor Julie also values liberal individualism to think about the
moral status of animals. As a Pilates instructor, she believes in self-actualization and non-
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judgment. She claimed that individuals should strive to be “the best they can be.” I asked her if
people can be the best they can be and consume animal products. She replied, “That’s not for me
to decide. I just know it’s not for me.” She further explained that if someone killed an animal she
would “probably question where you are still at. But again, I can’t be my best operating from a
place of judgment.” Unlike those who adopt strategic individualism, who I will describe below,
Julie feels that she cannot say that consuming animal products is wrong. Julie is unusual in this
sense, a clear contrast to the vegans who endorse veganism as a general moral imperative. She
feels it is wrong for her to consume animal products, but she cannot make that judgment for
someone else. Her morals are, indeed, radically individualistic.
Craig, who co-owns a bar and describes himself as someone invested in “counterculture,” also thinks of veganism as an individual choice. He believes that he cannot judge
nonvegans for consuming animal products because he and other vegans also make unethical
choices. He pointed to the food, drinks, and material objects around us at the cafe where we
conducted the interview, and said, “I don't know where this stuff comes from.” He explained that
the workers who made those goods worked in poor conditions for a pittance, something he finds
unethical, yet he still supports it by purchasing these goods. Craig believes that because everyone
makes unethical choices, we cannot really judge each other. He concludes, “I don't like to come
from a place of self-righteousness or damning other people.” Moreover, given that Craig is
skeptical of rigid moral standards, he does not think of veganism as a collective obligation,
stating that individuals can adopt veganism “if it's the right choice for them.” He goes on to
claim, “Do what you can. That's kind of the best you can hope for. Even if you are still being a
vegan you could do things that aren't the right thing. And you look at those and try to change
them when and where you can.” Craig's moral outlook on veganism also influences how he talks
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about it with nonvegans. He never tells others that “you need to change your diet.” He does not
impose his morals onto others. In fact, others usually approach him, asking him if he is vegan for
health or ethical reasons. He often replies it is a mixture of those things. He explained to me, “I
don't think people want to get too deep into it generally, so I will give them a little bit of an
answer. Generally speaking, it feels like small talk.”
James, Julie, and Craig all believe, more or less, that individuals are responsible for
defining morals. They believe that individuals should try to be the best persons they can and do
what is right for them. Craig argues, “I think you have a responsibility as a human, in my
opinion, to try to do the right thing and be helpful and compassionate.” But as Bellah (1985)
would have asked, how do we know what is right or compassionate? James, Julie, and Craig's
reply is 'because it is right for us.' Veganism, then, is right for them but it may not be right for
others. Perhaps they have not entirely thought out the implications of their positions, or they are
unable to find a language for talking about collective obligation and so fall back on a language of
individual choice.
Like the individuals Bellah and others interviewed in Habits of the Heart, these vegans
see individualism as their first cultural language, a conviction that defines their moral outlook.
Yet, as we will see in the next section, many of the vegans I interviewed—those who tend
toward strategic individualism—did not think of individualism as their first language, providing
an important contrast.
Strategic Individualism
Unlike most Americans who often feel that no one can really say that one value system is
better than another (Bellah et al 1985), or that there is a right way to live one's life, when vegans
employ strategic individualism they believe that veganism is the right way for humans to live. In
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this sense, they do not experience individualism as a conviction, at least in regard to veganism.
Instead, they use individualism as an interactional strategy to manage others’ impressions about
veganism. For example, they often explained to others that they are vegan because they do not
support animal slaughter, or they supplied nonvegans with information about animal agriculture
so that nonvegans can decide what to do with that information. While their accounts of veganism
had a moral undertone, they largely stressed their personal decisions and beliefs or gave
“objective” information rather than make normative claims about human’s collective obligations
to animals. Thus, when vegans employ strategic individualism, they view veganism as a general
moral imperative, but wind up treating that imperative as if it were simply an individual decision.
Veganism as General Moral Imperative
Vegans who used strategic individualism often held firm moral standards, believing that
causing harm to animals is wrong and therefore everyone—perhaps excluding indigenous
people—ought to be vegan. For example, Mary, a dedicated animal rights activist, believes that
humans should not own or use animals. Consequently, she is incredulous of the “animal
movement’s” emphasis on improving the treatment of animals. She explains further:
The bottom line is slavery. I don’t believe in any animal being used for any reason
what-so-ever other than being rescued or giving refuge. That’s it. Horses, I don’t
care. I would never ride a horse again. To me, that’s an indignity to the horse.
And even vegans will say ‘really, you’ve never rode a horse before?’ They don’t
see that as hurting the horse. And it may not hurt the horse, but to me it is a matter
of any use.
Mary compares animal use to slavery; she does not believe in using sentient beings, which
includes both humans and animals, as means to human purposes. Consequently, the issue for her
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is not treatment, but use. Humans, in her view, cannot justify using animals as resources
independent of how humanely they are treated. Her approach to veganism is clearly a moral one.
Consequently, Mary does not think of veganism as a personal choice or in her words a “food
choice”; it obscures how veganism is a matter of, as Mary puts it, “social justice.”
Angela, a college student from a liberal arts college, also feels that causing harm to
animals is a moral matter. During our interview, she told me a story about going to Malaysia,
where she witnessed nearly lifeless chickens stuffed in small cages at a local market. In response,
Angela started crying in the store. She explained to me that she was upset because she thought
the vendors were doing something wrong. She said, “I know in my mind I should have released
those chickens, I should have told them that they are wrong. Like they shouldn’t be doing that
regardless of anything because they are hurting another being.” For Angela, harming animals is
unethical. This is what motivates her to be vegan.
Sherry, who adopted veganism shortly after watching a film about animal
experimentation, also views veganism as a general moral imperative. She argues that animals
“have rights unto themselves,” that they are not here for humans. She also believes that humans
do not need to eat animals to maintain healthy lives, and therefore they should stop consuming
animal products. She explains, “There’s no need to have an animal be raised, tortured, and
slaughtered.” She continued, “It makes no sense to me at all, we’re not living in caveman times
anymore” suggesting that because plant foods are abundant in post-industrial societies, humans
should not subject animals to slaughter. Furthermore, Sherry has a strong morally charged
emotional reaction to the institution of eating animal products. She explains:
For me, when I watch people eating meat it’s that level of... I abhor it. Just like
you saw a slaveholder here you would be like that person is bad. That is wrong. I

90

need to step in. You get this feeling, and that is my feeling when I see people
eating meat and when I see them talking about killing meat and stuff like that. I
kind of have this feeling of like, ‘oh my God, that is so sick. And you have no
idea what you are doing, and it’s really awful and wrong and bad.’
Vegans also made claims about veganism as a general moral imperative at the vegan
potlucks I attended. For example, during one potluck dinner, Paul, who has been vegan since
1983, gave a presentation about animal activism, during which he asked the twenty people in
attendance their dreams for peace among humans and nonhumans. Some of the dreams were:
animals are treated equally to humans; animals are not subject to experimentation; humans
should respect all forms of life; all humans are vegan; end animal suffering at the hands of
humans; all life is sacred; and to end racism, sexism, and speciesism. These visions are all
normative claims about humans' collective obligations to animals. Clearly, many vegans at this
event believed that veganism is a general moral imperative; they believed that humans should not
harm animals. They should “go vegan.”
The Strategic, Individualized Presentation of Self
When vegans employ strategic individualism, they view veganism as a public moral
good, but present veganism as a matter of choice during interaction with nonvegans, thereby
individualizing their collective morals. I argue that these vegans individualize veganism to avoid
conflict and to engage in effective activism. Many vegans, like Sherry, believe that discussions
about veganism can become contentious. Sherry thinks that discussions about ethical veganism
can cause nonvegans to feel internally conflicted, and they cope with defense mechanisms. She
said, “I think they (nonvegans) become more entrenched, I think they become angrier, and all
their defense structures go up.” The result is a combative interaction, something many vegans in
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my sample wish to avoid. Furthermore, many of these vegans believe that discussions about
ethics with nonvegans are unproductive because it will turn nonvegans away from veganism. For
example, Paul told me during our interview that he believes vegans cannot make ethical claims
about animals because “people don't want to hear that.” He thinks it is more fruitful to tell
nonvegans about the plight of farm and research animals and they can “do whatever they want
with that.” In other words, Paul, and others who use strategic individualism, believe that
veganism is a general moral imperative yet strategically present it as individual choice to avoid
interpersonal conflict and subsequently invite others to consider veganism. Their inconsistent
thoughts and actions are not cognitive failures but self-consciously strategic, as they use
individualism as a resource to achieve a goal.
I submit that one obstacle that vegans often confront in discussing veganism as a
collective moral obligation is a presumed anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism is the belief that
humans have greater moral value than animals, usually because humans are rational and have
complex subjective inner experiences, including selfhood. Consequently, the interests of humans
are privileged over the interests of animals (Steiner 2005). In the United States and other
societies, anthropocentrism is manifested through the property status of animals (Francione
2000). Americans are thus more likely to think of animals as objects than as sentient beings
worthy of equal moral consideration. Vegans, however, especially those who employ strategic
individualism, do not share this dominant view of animals. Questioning the order of things,
however, is often met with resistance by the status quo (Jacobsson and Lindblom 2013).
Anthropocentrism thus limits discourse about veganism as a general moral imperative, making it
difficult for vegans to discuss the moral status of animals. Consequently, I contend that many
vegans in my sample resort to using strategic individualism to address ethical veganism.
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I found that since many vegans perceive resistance to ethical veganism, they use strategic
individualism to devise ways to limit this resistance. In Goffman’s (1967) sense, they avoid
conflict to produce civil and polite interactions, honoring the value of others by sustaining a
standard of involvement and considerateness, what Cahill (1987: 313) has referred to as the
“interpersonal rituals of our religion of civility.” Some vegans use strategic individualism to
involve others in this ceremonial order of civility, hoping to avoid conflict. Such vegans—like
other middle class Americans (Baumgartner 1991, Lamont 1992) and prominent vegetarians
(Maurer 2002)—tend to value conflict avoidance in itself, yet others also value it as a method of
effective activism. To avoid dissension, they enact three tactics, starting from the least to most
common: 1) avoid talking about veganism, 2) present veganism as a personal choice or
experience, and 3) provide information. Each of these tactics, explained below, emphasizes the
individualization of the vegans’ collectivist morals.
While many vegans feel proud to be vegan, some of them shied away from discussing it
with others because they worried about conflict. For example, Kate, who aspires to be a medical
doctor, is vegan for ethical reasons. While discussing animals raised for food, she said,
“Everyone knows that killing animals in that way is not moral. How can you, how can a human
say that they are more important than another form of life?” Yet, in many occasions, Kate herself
does not say this during interactions with nonvegans. In fact, she avoids using the word vegan
around others because it has “negative connotations.” When I asked her about how she tells
others she is vegan, she replied:
I try to be really nonchalant about it if someone asks or comes up because I don’t
want problems to start, you know what I mean? Because I’ve had issues in the
past where people (pause). And there’s this whole like negative connotation with
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being a vegan. So like sometimes, I say, ‘I follow a plant based lifestyle diet...’
There’s a negative connotation being vegan. Like you’re that activist vegan that’s
gonna convert you, and I’m not like that.
Kate, aware that others think of vegans as pushy, takes their perspective into account. She
thus avoids using the word vegan when addressing others to prevent interpersonal conflict. She
wants to involve others, upholding the interactional ceremonial order of civility. Indeed, Kate
understands that “plant-based diet” is more likely to conjure notions of choice than collective
moral obligations to animals (Maurer 2002), thereby facilitating a smooth interaction. A few
vegans in my sample preferred to talk about health instead of commitments to animals. They
thought that others would be more receptive to claims about personal health because it is viewed
as a choice, something neither imposed on nor consequential for others. These vegans, then, talk
about health to avoid conflict. Similarly, Rachel, a recent vegan who is a librarian, argued that
she does not always tell others, especially those she does not know well, that she is vegan
because “I don’t want them to feel uncomfortable. I don't want them to feel like I'm pushing my
ideas or ethics onto them.” Both Kate and Rachel think that nonvegans are morally obligated to
veganism, yet they mute these collective commitments during interactions. They strategically
avoid using the word “vegan” to avoid conflict; they do not want to appear as individuals who
are morally demanding. In doing so, they implicitly present veganism as a choice that others are
free to make, thereby strategically enacting liberal individualism.
While some vegans who practice strategic individualism participated in conflict
avoidance by eschewing language of veganism, most of them did, at least occasionally, discuss
veganism with nonvegans. However, their publicly presented beliefs about veganism
contradicted their private moral worldview. Some vegans talked about their veganism as a choice
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or personal experience rather than a collective obligation to animals. For example, Mary
admitted to me that she has a hard time talking about veganism with non-vegans because it can
make them uncomfortable and even antagonistic. She explained, “All these things
(conversations) cause so much conflict that I use a lot of avoidance behavior.” Mary wants to
discuss veganism with others as a general moral imperative, but feels that most nonvegans resist
such discussions, which shapes how she talks about veganism. She usually explains to others that
she is vegan by conveying, “I have looked into, I have researched what happens to animals and it
just horrified me. I just couldn’t take it anymore. So I’ll say something like ‘I’ve learned what
goes on and I just can’t contribute to it anymore.’” Mary stresses how her experiences shape her
choices. She learned about animal agriculture and decided not to support it. While Mary hints at
moralism—causing harm to animals is bad—she does not stress her morals as collective
obligations. Instead, she individualizes her commitments as a strategy; she believes that this is a
nonthreatening way to talk about veganism.
Similarly, Angela, who earlier wanted to tell merchants at a Malaysian market they were
wrong for harming chickens, also individualizes veganism to manage others’ impressions. She
offers either a long or short version, moving cautiously from a discussion of her own beliefs to
claims about the objective conditions of an industry.
If they ask for the short version, I’m just like 'oh well I care about animals, and I
don’t believe in like the production of them.' And if I tell the longer version, I’ll
tell them about being vegetarian and like all the connections with animals that
I’ve had. Then becoming vegan, specifically what happens in the industry and
why I don’t agree with that.
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Like Mary, Angela stresses her own choices. She talks about her likes and her beliefs. While her
beliefs have a moral undertone, they are largely individualistic because she does not discuss
morals as collective obligations but as personal decisions. She does not present veganism as the
right thing to do. For Angela, this is purposeful action. She talks about herself as a strategy to
produce nonthreatening interactions. She explained that though she feels very strongly about
veganism, she realizes that her message can offend people so she tries “to find that line between
getting your information across and like saying what you have to say, but also not overstepping
and attacking them and that.” In sociological terms, Angela wants to uphold the negative face of
others, producing a “politeness of non-imposition” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 62). Her strategy
to not appear as a confrontational individual is to talk about herself, to reduce collective
obligations to individual choice. She confided, “I’m definitely a liberationist at heart, but I don’t
usually tell people,” meaning that she is hesitant to express to others that she believes that
humans should not own and control animals.
Other vegans also present veganism to others as a choice. Sherry, who thinks of veganism
as a general moral imperative as demonstrated above, tells others “Oh, I’m vegan so I don’t eat
that. Or I’m vegan so I won’t do that. Something like that.” She claimed that it can be difficult to
talk about veganism with others, stating “I don’t like conflict, and I don’t like making other
people feel bad and then off of that, when people feel bad, some will awaken themselves and
some won’t.” By talking about herself, by strategically deploying individualism during her
interactions with others about veganism, Sherry manages the interaction so that it does not
become unpleasant. Individualism is not something she values as moral viewpoint, but
something she uses to achieve the goal of conflict avoidance. Connie, a college lecturer, agrees
with Sherry's approach. She believes that vegans are better off talking about veganism as a

96

choice or experience than a general moral imperative because nonvegans dislike when vegans
impose their ethics onto them “by sticking their noses in other people's business.”
Lastly, during one of my observations of a vegan potluck dinner, a soft-spoken man
named Gene asked Paul, a vegan who was giving a presentation about animal rights, how to tell
hunters that their actions are immoral. Paul suggested that Gene tell the hunters that “hunting
might be okay for you, but it is not okay for me.” Moreover, Paul instructed Gene to use I
statements, like “I don’t like to kill animals, or I chose not to kill animals.” Paul’s answer does
not actually help Gene talk about morals with hunters. Instead, Paul’s answer indicates that Gene
should avoid engaging in discussions about morals with hunters by resorting to individualism. As
shown above, Paul thinks of this as a strategy, as more nonvegans will be open to this type of
discourse. Yet, Paul's approach is noteworthy because earlier in the presentation he talked about
veganism and animal rights as general moral imperatives, claiming that humans do not have the
right to “murder and exploit” animals.
The last way that vegans who use strategic individualism avoid conflict is through
description rather than prescription, meaning they think it is better to “give people information”
than “be pushy.” Many of them gave information about the problems with modern animal
agriculture, such as explaining how the dairy industry supports the veal industry, or how male
baby chicks are ground up alive because they cannot lay eggs, or how animals in factory farms
are in confined areas for their whole lives. Rachel, while explaining to me how she tells others
about the dairy industry, said “if they ask, I want to give them the truth, because I didn't know
the truth for a long time. And they can take the information and do what they will.” By providing
information about the industry, Rachel tries to give others the opportunity to reflect on their
choices. She uses individualism strategically; she believes that giving others information will

97

produce amicable interactions. She expressed, “I don't ever want to make other people feel
badly... I do try to sort of steer the conversation so I'm giving the information.”
During my fieldwork at a vegan/vegetarian festival in the Northeast, I attended a question
and answer session that dealt specifically with strategies for talking to family and friends. The
speaker of the event and some audience members thought of giving information as an effective
form of impression management. The speaker told the audience that “we should be respecting
animals and not unnecessarily killing and torturing them,” indicating that humans have a
collective moral obligation toward animals. Yet, he is also aware that many nonvegans are
unreceptive to such claims because “they feel shamed. They feel some sense of guilt, or they
may take it personally; you’re kind of telling them they are a bad person and that’s not consistent
with how they view themselves.” Many members of the audience, then, wondered how to talk
with family and friends in a constructive way about veganism as general moral imperative. For
example, one participant named Melinda said, “There is still this violence being done to animals
and we have to kind of be okay with that going on... and you just want to shake people but you
can’t 'cause that’s not what’s effective. So how do you kind of integrate that to be okay with
what you know is not okay?” In response to this question, he said “all you can really do is give
information and try to hope that they will accept that.”
In general, the speaker frequently emphasized the idea of “giving information” about the
welfare of farm or research animals to manage the impressions of others. For example, he said
“Sometimes it can be helpful to give information and have them kind of read it on their own at
their own pace, and then you can come back and talk about it afterwards.” While he and some
members of the audience see veganism as a general moral imperative, he thinks it is best that
vegans individualize their collective commitments to avoid unpleasant interactions.
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Other vegans also think that giving nonvegans information is an effective way to avoid
conflict, yet they also believe that this method is an effective form of activism. For example,
Mary said:
They (nonvegans) might be willing to do it on their own. If they are not pushed,
you know this whole thing is like a strategy. To me it is a fear of conflict but it is
also a strategy not to push. Plant and seed and they’ll go to whatever extent and
wrestle with their conscious. And if they see you again, maybe they’ll be another
question. Maybe there won’t be. It’s like a... there’s a certain amount of
gentleness that can be very effective.
Mary does not only value conflict avoidance in a Goffmanian sense of defining the
situation; she also values conflict avoidance as a method of recruiting nonvegans to veganism.
Similarly, Bryan, who works in real estate, believes that giving nonvegans information about
institutionalized animal use is an effective recruitment strategy. He argued, “I would much rather
educate than make a moral claim,” explaining that “Everybody has done things in their life that
they probably shouldn’t do, and a lifetime of eating things that they shouldn’t be eating; it could
be hard to reconcile if it’s being presented in a moralistic fashion.” Bryan is strategic about how
he talks about veganism. While he thinks it is wrong for humans to consume animal products, he
also thinks nonvegans are unopen to such a position. He therefore takes a milder approach by
supplying information about institutionalized animal use. Indeed, he believes that individuals are
more likely to adopt veganism if “people find it on their own” rather than being “converted.”
Vegans who employ strategic individualism think that presenting veganism as a choice
and providing information are effective tactics because each limits the imposition of morality
onto others, allowing nonvegans to feel unencumbered and decide on their own (rather than
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morality dictating) if they wish to be vegan or eat fewer animal products. Both approaches are
centered around conflict avoidance and a larger code of ceremonial conduct in which individuals
participate in the protective positioning toward maintaining the face of others producing “the
communion of reciprocally sustained involvement” (Goffman 1967: 116-117), characteristic of
contemporary civil society (Cahill 1987). Vegans who take this approach enact negative and
positive politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987), not wanting others to feel threatened, alienated,
or angered by their moral positions. Indeed, they do not want to give others the impression of
constraint but the empowerment of choice. Consequently, they strategically used individualism
to honor and involve others, thereby limiting conflict and engaging nonvegans.
In summary, while the stereotype of the “pushy” or “outspoken” vegan is common (Cole
and Morgan 2011), very few of the vegans in my sample fit this stereotype; they believed that
they should not be “pushy” or “forceful” with others. I have come to understand that this means
that they believe they should not evoke collective morals when explaining veganism to others;
they should not tell others how to live based on a moral principle. They largely believe that
presenting veganism as a general moral imperative—something they privately endorse—will
deter individuals from considering veganism. Consequently, they tend to talk about their choices
and experiences when explaining why they are vegan to nonvegans, and gently present
nonvegans with information about animal agriculture for nonvegans to mull over. Individualism,
then, is not a value or language with which they identify; it is a cultural tool that they use to
achieve the goals of conflict avoidance and effective activism.
Discussion
I have made two central points in this paper. First, this research demonstrates that
individualism manifests in two different ways: strict individualism and strategic individualism.
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Strict individualism refers to individualism as a commitment and philosophy for and in itself,
experienced by individuals as conviction. Strategic individualism refers to individualism as a
cultural resource, a second order commitment, deployed strategically to manage the impressions
of others. Second, I have argued that the concept of strategic individualism furthers sociological
understandings of individualism. While strict individualism is a familiar sociological
representation of Americans as a deeply individualized people, strategic individualism is
important because it counters that representation. It demonstrates that individualism is also a
strategic resource that individuals can use to achieve their goals. Individuals, then, do not always
experience individualism as a conviction central to their sense of self. Instead, they can construct
a façade of individualism, deploying it as an interactional strategy.
Strategic individualism as a concept functions both as a critique and extension of Bellah
et al’s (1985) Habits of the Heart. It is a critique in that I have argued individualism is a strategic
resource used to define a situation, demonstrating that it does not always operate as a cultural
force that individuals experience as conviction as Bellah argued. However, while I have
contrasted Bellah’s conceptualization of individualism with mine, these two perspectives are not
incompatible. Rather, my conceptualization, while a critique, is also necessarily an extension of
Bellah’s work. Strategic individualism works as a form of discourse because individualism is a
larger system of belief or language, as Bellah convincingly demonstrated. That is, strategic
individualism has cultural resonance because of America’s individualistic value patterns. Thus,
these perspectives, while distinct, are not oppositional but supplementary.
Conceptualizing individualism as a strategy rather than a conviction applies to other areas
of social life. For example, strategic individualism is applicable to politics. Nina Eliasoph (1998)
demonstrated how some political activists used individualistic language to discuss public issues.
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In the backstage, Eliasoph often heard activists talk about public issues as matters of structural
injustice. Yet when engaging with the public, some activists relied on individualistic language by
emphasizing concern for their and their children’s livelihoods. Like some of the vegans I
interviewed, they focused on themselves rather than the moral principles they were advocating.
While Eliasoph (1998: 184 and 250) is unsure and even incredulous if these activists are using
individualistic language strategically to influence the media and the public, she does concede that
a few activists may use individualistic language to get attention. Thus, even though some
activists thought of public problems as matters of collective obligations, they strategically
framed such problems as matters of individual self-interest to reach the hearts and minds of the
public. Strategic individualism is also applicable to religion. Individuals may think of religion as
a larger collective commitment, but might individualize their beliefs during interactions with
those who think of religion as a choice to avoid interpersonal conflict. As a strategy, they may
claim that their religion is their personal belief and that others are entitled to their own beliefs as
well. In general, strategic individualism is most easily applicable to situations in which social
actors wish to avoid or limit moral dispute, whether these situations are political, religious, etc.
This research also links closely to theories of “moral minimalism” that are associated
with John Stuart Mill’s principle that individuals can live as they desire so long as they do not
mistreat others. It is a basic consequentialist morality in which individuals deem actions moral in
so far as the actions do not cause others harm. In On Liberty (2002), Mill formulated this
minimalist morality in regard to the relationship between the individual and the state. Arguably,
however, moral minimalism is a prominent part of American moral life more generally (Callahan
1981), solidified by American’s beliefs in liberal individualism, tolerance, and freedom, all of
which are based on the belief that individuals are moral to the extent they do not cause harm.
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To the degree that moral minimalism encourages individuals to live as they wish without
meddling others, a common consequence of moral minimalism is conflict avoidance. For
example, moral minimalism may be a central part of suburban life in the US, as suburbanites
frequently avoid confrontational responses to interpersonal neighborhood grievances given the
weak social connections among neighborhood residents (Baumgartner 1991). Furthermore,
elementary school personnel teach their students to use I-statements so they can share their
feelings in ways that “does not make someone defensive” (Empowering Education 2015: 3). As I
have demonstrated, vegans also practice moral minimalism, though strategically, through
conflict avoidance. They do not want to “harm” or offend nonvegans by threatening their moral
sensibilities. They thereby engage in moral minimalism using individualistic discourse to
produce civil, nonconfrontational interactions.
This research also contributes to sociological understandings of conflict avoidance.
Research on conflict management has demonstrated that social context, particularly the strength
of social ties, influences how individuals manage conflict (Baumgartner 1991; Cooney 1998;
Morrill 1991; Tucker 1993). Research also shows the variety of ways that individuals manage
conflict—including vengeance, discipline, avoidance, negotiation, settlement, and toleration—
and the conditions under which each appears (Black 1993). It furthermore shows how interaction
shapes conflict management. For example, Black (1993: 79) defines conflict avoidance as the
“handling of a grievance by the curtailment of interaction”, such as segregation or decreased
interaction. While individuals frequently avoid conflict by avoiding interactions or remaining
silent during interactions (Black 1993), interactionists have frequently demonstrated that
individuals can also avoid conflict using interactional strategies, such as impression management
techniques (Goffman 1959) or aligning actions (Stokes and Hewitt 1976), among others. Conflict
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avoidance, then, involves not only the curtailment of aggrieved interactions. It also involves the
use of interaction itself, particularly forms of discourse that limit disagreement.
While agents can use interactional techniques to limit conflict, how they manage conflict
depends on the cultural repertoires available to them (Silber 2003). Given that individualism is a
common stock of meaning in the US, I submit that strategic individualism is a resource that
individuals can use to limit conflict while still engaging others through a veil of civility. For
example, vegans may use strategic individualism to come across as individuals who do not bear
on others to avoid unpleasant interactions and to establish rapport with nonvegans. Strategic
individualism, then, is a central way that vegans attempt to avoid conflict while still trying to
involve others, especially for vegans who use strategic individualism as activism. Rather than
evade others, they use strategic individualism to include them. Furthermore, I submit that
strategic individualism is a prominent way that individuals preemptively avoid conflict,
especially in cases of potential moral dispute regarding the greater good. Consistent with Brown
and Levinson’s (1987) argument that interactants produce politeness through culturally specific
linguistic means, strategic individualism is a discursive politeness strategy that Americans will
likely utilize to limit conflict over incongruent moral worldviews.
Lastly, I believe this research has implications for the debate in cultural sociology about
using interviews to study social action. Jerolmack and Khan (2014) and Vaisey (2009) argue that
interviews are not a good method for understanding conduct because what people say is a poor
predictor of what people do. Jerolmack and Khan (2014), reiterating what Herbert Blumer (1955)
wrote over sixty years ago, argue that sociologists cannot assume that subjects’ attitudes
expressed during interviews are also expressed during interactions. While attitudes are one
possible line of conduct, individuals can fail to express them during interaction because
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“meaning and action are collectively negotiated and context-dependent” (Jerolmack and Khan
2014: 178). If what people do is subject to the situations they encounter (Blumer 1969), then,
according to Jerolmack and Khan, sociologists must observe situational conduct.
While Jerolmack and Khan make an important point—that if sociologists want to
understand social action, they must attend to the social context in which that action takes place—
I think all is not lost in using interviews to make sense of social action. Sometimes we are
interested in disjunctions between what people say and what they do. Sometimes, though, we are
interested in how people make sense of and even justify apparent differences between what they
say and what they do (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968). Yet other times, we are interested in
how people reconcile differences between what they say in different situations. That is what I
have done here by examining vegans' private morals and how they think about and go about
presenting their morals to nonvegans. Sociologists can use interviews to learn about the attitudes
people hold, and how individuals think about presenting these attitudes to others. Because
individuals can become objects to themselves (Mead 1934), interviewers can ask interviewees
about the social objects they note in their environment to determine which aspects of the
situation are consequential to their conduct (Thomas 1928; Lamont and Swidler 2014). For
example, I discovered though in-depth interviewing that many vegans note that nonvegans are
unreceptive to ethical veganism. In response to their self-indications, vegans strategically deploy
individualism to avoid conflict and potentially recruit nonvegans. None of this would have been
visible through observations alone. Thus, sociologists can use interviews to see how individuals
define their environments and how those definitions direct their conduct.
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Conclusion
In the beginning of this article, Moby told us that he does not think that others ought to be
vegan because he does not want to force his will on others. Yet, he has also said, “Basically we
should stop doing those things that are destructive to the environment, other creatures, and
ourselves and figure out new ways of existing” (Fisher-McGarry and Robbins 2006: 64) While
he is not explicitly addressing veganism, he is making claims about humans' collective
obligations to animals. A vegan, then, will not always talk about veganism the same way to
others. This is especially true of vegans who use strategic individualism. In some situations,
particularly with individuals who are also ethical vegans or at least open to ethical veganism,
they may stress veganism as a general moral imperative. Thus, strategic individualism is not
static nor is it anything approaching a “master status”; it is a situational response that varies
depending on the definition of the situation. Yet, I suspect that many vegans will employ
strategic individualism in many interpersonal situations because individualism and
anthropocentrism are common stocks of meaning.15 Even large animal welfare and rights
organizations urge vegans to avoid absolutistic moral messages as it might perturb nonvegans
(Maurer 2002).
While some vegans use strategic individualism to facilitate conflict management, such
individualistic language may have unintended consequences. These vegans do not depict
veganism as a public moral good or general imperative, but as an individual practice (Maurer
2002). This individualized tactic—this idea of live and let live—does not allow vegans to make
the case that they have made the right choice and that others should follow. Under this logic,
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The exception may be “abolitionist” vegans who view veganism as a general moral imperative, and that vegan
activism must include this message (Francione 2000). None of the vegans I interviewed identified with this
approach, but I explore this group in the next chapter.
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vegans reaffirm the individualistic notion that each self defines its own moral universe. People
decide as individuals what is good or bad, so the self and its feelings become their moral guide
(Bellah et al 1985). Socially constructed or even objective standards of what is moral are left out
of the conversation. Ironically, in avoiding conflict, in not explaining veganism as a general
moral imperative, vegans publicly uphold the dominant view of animals: animals as objects.
Their unwitting message to nonvegans may be that humans can choose to exploit animals,
indicating that animals do not have objective or inherent moral value. Thus, while individualism
helps vegans diplomatically discuss veganism, their use of it may also undermine the moral
imperative they privately endorse.
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CHAPTER 4
LEADING THE MIND TO WATER: THE MORAL STRATEGIES OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
In Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber (1946: 109) asks, “What kind of man is to be
allowed to put his hand on the wheel of history?” In answering this question, he juxtaposes two
ethical worldviews that politicians (or individuals in general) might exercise. He argues that
ethical conduct is oriented toward either an “ethic of ultimate ends/conviction” or an “ethic of
responsibility.” In the former, individuals are driven by the purity of their principles and
promote their grand, idealized version of the world (Hammond 2009). They are dedicated to
ultimate, non-negotiable values, concerned about doing what is right independent of the
consequences. If undesirable consequences emerge from one’s “action of good intent,” (Weber
1946: 121), one believes that one is not culpable, while “the world, the stupidity of men, or
God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil” (Weber 1946: 121). Those who
practice an ethic of conviction are largely unconcerned with the outcomes of their actions, but
instead feel a responsibility toward the integrity of their value orientation. This is strikingly
similar to Weber’s (1978) conceptualization of value-rational social action (O’Donovan 2011),
which is action on the basis of a conscious belief of a value for its own sake. Those who
practice an ethic of ultimate ends consciously believe in the importance of a particular value,
independent of its consequences. Values act as normative forces, directing actors to feel
compelled to act in specific ways. Such individuals ask “what are the demands of my values?
And how can I act consistently with them?” (Starr 1999: 419). As Weber describes it, the ethic
of ultimate ends evokes the phrase, “Here I stand; I can do no other” (1946: 128).
On the other hand, those who practice an ethic of responsibility are driven less by purity
of principles themselves but more by a concern about the consequences of their ethical conduct,
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privileging prudence over the purity of their own actions (Hammond 2009). Weber underscores
two aspects of this ethic. First, an ethic of responsibility involves a calculation of how specific
actions may lead to specific consequences, pursuing the “best chances for the best
consequences” while minimizing poor outcomes (O’Donovan 2011: 105). Such individuals take
into account how means lead to specific ends, acting strategically, thinking of the most efficient
way of achieving political or ethical goals. In addition, those who act “responsibly” may also
believe in the inevitability of value plurality and conflict between individuals (Starr 1999), and
use such definitions to inform their conduct. Second, an ethic of responsibility involves a
feeling of accountability for the foreseeable effects of one’s actions, holding oneself answerable
for one’s decisions. Taken together, individuals practice an ethic of responsibility when, first,
they ponder how their convictions, ideas, and decisions might affect the lives of citizens, and
second, hold themselves accountable to individuals or institutions for the results of their actions.
Overall, an ethic of responsibility is an ethic of proportion and compromise; a responsible
person does not act on convictions if such action may result in undesirable consequences (Davis
1999). It is also an ethic of accountability; a responsible person is answerable to their actions.
While Weber argues that such ethical conduct “endangers the salvation of the soul” (1946: 126)
in that individuals may not truly express their beliefs, a concern with consequences may result
in the greater credibility of their claims. Again, this ethical conduct strikingly resembles
Weber’s (1978) instrumental-rational action (Weber 1978)16, which is characterized by a
“calculation of consequences” (Starr 1999: 410) in which individuals weigh means, ends, and
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Some sociologists question associating value-rational action with an ethic of conviction, and instrumental-rational
action with an ethic of responsibility. For example, individuals can pursue instrumental-rational action, yet act
irresponsibly if they do not take ownership for the results of their actions (O’Donovan 2011). O’Donovan argues
that responsibility is not simply a concern for the consequences of one’s actions, but a feeling of being accountable
for one’s actions. A politician, for example, can feel concerned about how her decisions may impact the public, but
she may not take responsibility for them especially if others disapprove of them.

109

consequences. This type of social action is shaped by larger expectations exerted on one’s
conduct, which are used to guide the means of one’s rationally pursued ends (Weber 1978). In
short, while an ethic of ultimate ends is centered on value demands, an ethic of responsibility is
centered on effectiveness of achieving goals. Even shorter, the two ethics contrast principle
versus strategy.
While Weber’s distinction is often invoked, it has rarely been studied as an empirical
proposition. I thus empirically examined Weber’s distinction by interviewing and observing two
prominent animal rights activist groups, welfarists and abolitionists. I found that each practice
one of Weber’s forms of ethical conduct. The welfarists, who want to ameliorate the worst
practices in animal agriculture, practice an ethic of responsibility. They feel responsible for the
consequences of their activism. For example, they take into account different framings of
animal rights, the value orientations of non-activists, and the overall most effective means to
their ends. More specifically, they worry that if their moral claims are too strong, targets may
feel alienated and will thus continue to use animals, an unwelcome consequence. They typically
emphasize individualistic discourse, presenting veganism or anything less as choices individuals
make based on their own moral intuitions and principles. In short, they believe that the most
efficient way of helping individuals adopt animal rights ideologies is to come across as
unthreatening and undemanding in discourse and behavior. In addition, they also hold
themselves accountable for their activism, in that they provide a rationale for their course of
action, arguing that their approach has helped individuals become vegan. On the other hand, the
abolitionists, who wish to abolish animal use altogether and think of any use as morally wrong,
practice an ethic of conviction or ultimate ends. Unlike the welfarists, they believe that they
should fully express their ethical perspectives, embodying Weber’s noted description of this
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conduct, “Here I stand; I can do no other.” In other words, they unwaveringly express their
moral principles, advocating for the abolition of animal use. They do not censor their beliefs to
appease others, but instead encourage others to think deeply about their moral commitments to
animals. They thus emphasize animal rights as a collective obligation enforced by larger moral
meanings of justice and fairness.
While each animal rights group largely fits into each of Weber’s ethical conduct, I also
found that each group complicates Weber’s distinction. Weber’s distinction is important, but
like most ideal types, it is more intricate in practice. Based on interviews and observations of
the welfarists and abolitionists, I argue that the central properties of each ethic are not as distinct
as Weber argues. In other words, adopting an ethic of responsibility does not mean abandoning
an ethic of ultimate ends and nor does adopting an ethic of ultimate ends mean abandoning an
ethic of responsibility. The welfarists show that an ethic of responsibility, like an ethic of
ultimate ends, also involves moral convictions. For example, rather than feeling a conviction
about a specific value orientation, I found that welfarists are morally committed to strategy
itself. While many welfarists believe that harming animals is wrong, they believe that the public
will reject such a message. In response, the welfarists opt for less morally charged language in
the name of effective activism, sometimes viewing their strategic commitments as nonnegotiable. For the welfarists, then, strategy is a form of moral commitment. Moreover, the
ethic of ultimate ends, like an ethic of responsibility, also involves strategy. Abolitionist vegan
activists, for instance, certainly believe in the integrity of their value orientation, yet they also
believe that advocating for their moral positions will yield positive outcomes, such as more
individuals converting to veganism. While Weber argued that individuals who adopt an ethic of
ultimate ends are unconcerned with the consequences of their ethical conduct, for the
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abolitionist, this does not manifest in practice as they view morality not only as an orientation
but as a strategy. In short, Weber’s distinction is more complicated in practice; an ethic of
responsibility includes commitment, and an ethic of ultimate ends includes strategy.
Social Movements and Strategic Dilemmas
The animal rights movement faces a strategic dilemma regarding the best way to
encourage the public to adopt veganism or reduce animal product consumption. As I will
demonstrate in more detail, this predicament revolves around the presentation of ethics as either
responsibility or ultimate ends. More generally, strategic dilemmas are characteristic features of
social movements, as they face choices and constraints such as resource mobilization—both
material (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and symbolic (Zurcher and Snow 1981)—identity
mobilization, framing, among others. In this section, I mostly focus on problems of culture that
social movement may encounter, particularly framing and identity. Activists often face macro
cultural pressures to adopt tactics that are legitimate in the eyes of generalized others. In
response, activists develop their own micro or idioculture (Fine 1979), more or less
characterized by “bundles of narratives” (Fine 2002), which forge bonds between members thus
creating and sustaining a collective identity, strengthen commitment to movement goals, and
mobilize framing processes.
One central dilemma activists encounter involves strategic discourse. Social movements
often contemplate how to frame their message in ways that persuade non-movement members
to join the movement or adopt the ideology of the movement. This can be a formidable task for
movements, as they are characterized by beliefs and attitudes counter to the dominant groups
(Taylor and Whittier 1995). In resolving this tension, activists often rely on “framing”, which
refers to how social movement actors present their ideas and demands in ways that might
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resonate with the public, producing linkages between the “schemata of interpretation” of
activists and the public (Snow et al 1986: 464). Snow’s framing perspective is often credited for
bringing ideas back into social movements (Oliver and Johnston 2000), including elements of
culture. According to Fine (1995), activists often rely on cultural displays in their framing
techniques to recruit or transform others from outsiders to insiders. Though activists may hold
attitudes at odds with the larger public, they usually craft their messages in ways intended to
resonate with the larger public, usually by monitoring public discourse, specifically the media
(Gamson 1995b and 1998). Frames that resonate with the public include both cultural logics and
personal experiences with which non-movement members may identify (Snow and Benford
1992; Gamson 1995b).
Movement members invest in crafting a “collective action frame,” which includes
meanings and beliefs that help legitimate a social movement (Snow and Benford 1992). These
frames offer ways to interpret problems and imply a call to action. In general, the different types
of collective action frames include injustice, agency, and identity (Gamson 1992). The justice
frame refers to spreading moral outrage over a perceived inequity. The agency frame stresses
collective action as a means to combat a larger social problem. Lastly, the identity frame refers
to the process of groups rallying around their identities to demand rights and group justice.
Movement members may have disputes over the best collective action frame, as we will see
below with the animal rights movement.
Identity construction is also a problem for social movement members since it is important
for the perpetuation of a movement (Fine 1995). This is especially pertinent to identity
movements. Movement members primarily establish their collective identities through
narratives. Roughly, movement members often share similar experiences, which evoke member
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narratives about these experiences. Such storytelling, in turn, promotes membership
identification and legitimation, ultimately facilitating collective action (Fine 1995). According
to Fine (1995), narratives are particularly important for binding movement members together.
This is accomplished through various narrative types: horror stories, war stories, and happy
endings. In the former, movement members stress negative experiences that justify their
participation in a movement, such as women in the feminist movement who share stories of
sexism. War stories refer to tales of hardship that movement members experience during their
activism, such as dealing with a skeptic. Lastly, happy endings refer to activists’ success in
creating positive movement-based outcomes. Each narrative functions to bind group members
together though forging collective identities, problem solving, and the celebration of attained
goals.
The formation of movement identity is also a problem in the sense that identities, while
frequently forging members together, are contested resources within movements. One
prominent example is Gamson’s (1995a) work on queer identity movements, specifically
assimilationist/liberationist debates. Assimilationist queer activists believe that they should
enforce their identity, emphasizing their similarities to others, while liberationists emphasize the
deconstruction of queer identity because identities are, after all, oppressive constructions that
must be abolished17. Each subset has a different collective action frame: assimilationists stress
“normality,” largely in an effort legitimate the movement among non-members (e.g., “we’re just
like you”), while liberationists underscore power, viewing identity categories as not simply
forms of difference but hierarchies that oppress marginalized individuals. Gamson’s distinction
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There are also queer activists who enforce identity, but stress differences rather than similarities to the larger
public. “We’re here, we’re queer, get used to it” expresses the position well.
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between assimilationist and liberationist politics also respectively maps well to Weber’s ethics
as responsibility and as ultimate ends.
Weber’s distinction between ethics as responsibility and ethics as ultimate ends is also a
dilemma activists may face. A topical example of this tension is found in the Black Lives
Matter movement. They tend to practice ethics as ultimate ends, valuing the integrity of their
moral position over the consequences of taking those positions. Furthermore, they are explicitly
against “respectability politics” as they do not believe that marginalized groups should gain
status by adhering to dominant standards of what it means to be a respectable person
(Higginbotham 1993; Patton 2014). For example, Black Lives Matter participants often engage
in disruptive protests, designed to confront the consciousness of others. They also argue that
individuals deserve rights independent of their performance of respectability (Obasogie and
Newman 2016). Some critics of the Black Lives Matter movement have argued that the
movement could be more effective if they were less disruptive and did not alienate the public.
From Weber’s perspective, this is a tension between ethics as ultimate ends and ethics of
responsibility. The Black Lives Matter protesters value ethics as ultimate ends, whereas critics
argue they should engage in responsible politics. Just like the animal activists, there is a tension
between ethics as conviction and ethics as responsibility.
The Strategies of the Animal Movement
An important strategic dilemma animal activists encounter is the antinomy between
ethics as responsibility and ultimate ends. Though not using Weber’s language, in her recent
book, Culture and Activism: Animal Rights in France and the United States, Cherry (2016)
demonstrates this tension between American and French animal rights activists. She argues that
American animal rights activists value pragmatism more than the French, as they focused on the
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most effective ways to achieve their goals. For example, many activists tried to persuade the
public to eat less meat or become vegan not by simply promoting animal rights, but by linking
animal agriculture to poor environmental and personal health outcomes. In other words, the
activists broadened their motivational frame to resonate with a larger number of individuals.
Many of the activists I interviewed, particularly the welfarists, engaged in the same tactics, as
they were concerned about the consequences of their actions rather than the purity of their
claims. However, Cherry did not include abolitionist animal activists from the US in her work,
even though they provide an important contrast by emphasizing purity over pragmatism.
The animal rights movement does not only face a strategic dilemma in terms of Weber’s
ethics, but also a variety of strategies they can use to potentially change how humans treat and
use animals. For example, Cherry (2010) argues elsewhere that American animal rights activists
engage in “boundary shifting” strategies, such as boundary blurring and boundary crossing. The
former strategy refers to how activists blur the boundaries between human and animal,
demonstrating the similarities between each. For example, some activists said that humans and
animals are cousins because they evolved from the same species, or that humans and animals
suffer in the same ways. Boundary crossing refers to tactics in which activists crossed boundaries
by dressing up as dead or distressed animals, made famous by the People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA). This tactic evokes absent referents (Adams 1990), specifically
the absent animals, and how their suffering is similar to human suffering.
Other strategies include the use of moral shocks (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), which are
events or situations that induce such outrage in people that they feel compelled to take political
action. Moral shocks, especially in animal rights, are frequently enacted through condensing
symbols, which are verbal or visual images that neatly capture a range of meanings (Jasper and
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Poulsen 1995), such as images of animals in research labs or slaughterhouses. For example,
Munro (1997) examined Australia's Coalition Against Duck Shooting (CADS), and found that
one of their chief strategies was to create and circulate images representing duck hunts to the
mass media. One image showed a hunter dressed as a soldier with a semi-automatic weapon
shooting a duck. CADS used the image as moral shock or a prognostic frame (Snow and Bedford
1988) to persuade the public to view duck hunting as excessive and unnecessary violence toward
animals.
The literature on animal rights also incorporates Snow et al's (1986) framing processes as
a way to make sense of animal rights activism (Jasper and Poulsen 1995, Einwohner 1999, Mika
2006). Snow constructs a variety of frames, but one that is of importance to animal activists is
“frame transformation,” which refers to social movement frames that can have transformative
effects on individuals, as they see the world is a new light by supplanting old values with new
ones. Transformative frames are important to animal activists because they attempt to transform
the interpretive frames of the public, and they bind activists together. For example, Jasper and
Nelkin (1992) describe an animal activist’s meeting in which activists account for their
converted state by describing the experiences that propelled them into activism.
In summary, animal activists face strategic dilemmas, just like other social movement
members. Animal activists in the US tend to adopt a pragmatic approach, relying on multiple
frames to persuade and motivate the public, such as animal cruelty, health, and the environment.
Furthermore, activists also try to persuade the public to question the human-animal divide
through boundary blurring strategies, and to motivate the public to change their behavior through
moral shocks. The animal rights movement, then, perhaps more than other social and civil rights
movements, are largely concerned with changing the behavior of individuals as distinct from
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changing institutions. While civil rights movements emphasize policy and legislative changes
that protect victim groups, the animal rights movement is more likely to stress self-alteration by
encouraging individuals to change their behavior. In this sense, the animal rights movement is
largely concerned with converting the public, or at the very least altering them, as a means to
achieve animal welfare and liberation. This is an important point, one that the literature on
animal rights tends to ignore. It is worth examining, then, how animal activists think and go
about altering the public. To address this, I now examine the moral strategies of the welfarists
and abolitionists and how they rely on Weber’s ethics to encourage others to change themselves.
Methods
I distinguished animal rights activists based on their ideologies and actions. I included
activists who believe in the regulation of animal use and those who believe in its abolition,
comprising welfarists and abolitionists, respectively. I interviewed eighteen welfarists and eight
abolitionists from the US to learn more about how they think about presenting animal rights to
the public, starting with interviews in the Spring of 2016 until the Fall of 2017. Abolitionists are
less common in the US, hence the smaller number of abolitionists interviewees. However, the
abolitionists are a group with a high degree of agreement. Indeed, abolitionists have strict social
boundaries. To identify as an abolitionist involved strict and unwavering beliefs. Thus, all of my
abolitionist interviewees made the same points about activism. In other words, there was a high
degree of saturation, and I concluded that more interviews were unnecessary.
Most of the interviewees were white and college educated. During the interviews, I asked
participants about how they got involved in animal rights, their activism goals, their approach to
activism, their views of effective animal activism, how they present themselves during activism,
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and what they think of the animal rights movement in general. Most of the interviews lasted
anywhere from one to two hours. All interviewees’ names are pseudonyms.
In addition to interviews, I also conducted brief content analysis and observations.
Regarding the former, I examined welfarist and abolitionist groups leaflets about animal rights. I
analyzed how the groups depict animal suffering, human obligations to animals, and how
individuals can help animals. I also conducted seven extended observations, specifically
attending protests organized by a welfarist group. Five of the protests were of a local animal
store that sold animals as pets. The activists claimed that this store sold dogs from “puppy mills,”
which the activists considered harmful to the dogs. I also attended two circus protests organized
by the same group. These protests questioned the use of wild animals in circus acts. I attended
these protests occasionally, starting in 2014 and stopping in 2017. I received permission from the
group’s organizer to attend the protests as a participant observer, though not all of the protesters
knew of my research because protest participation was variable. However, I tried to inform
participants of my research if I interacted with them.
Most of the protests had between ten and sometimes twenty attendees. The protests
typically lasted around two hours, starting with groups members meeting each other at an agreed
upon location. From here, the leader of the group, Kemmy, would bring out signs from her
vehicle. These signs were specific to the protest. Some signs asked the public not to shop at the
puppy store and others had information about puppy mills. The signs either consisted of large
print or images of dogs in puppy mills. During the protests, I usually tried to talk to the protesters
about themselves and why they got involved. I tried to be part of near-by interactions to blend in
with the group. I also noticed how the public responded to the activists. Typical responses
included honks, which the activists interpreted as support, and thumbs up. I personally
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experienced someone “flipping me off” so not all responses were positive. Many times, the
public would simply drive by without much of a reaction. After the protest was over, I sat in my
car and jotted down some notes. From there, I would construct field notes later at home based on
my observations.
One limitation of the observations was that I did not get to observe the activists
interacting with the public very much. The activists always protested near the entryway of the
store plaza or circus, which consisted more of car than foot traffic. As a result, I had to rely on
my interview data to ask activists how they interact with the public. While I do make claims
about what activists say to the public based on activists' accounts of these exchanges, I take their
accounts of lived experiences seriously, as they are capable of “reflexive accountability,”
meaning that orderliness of activities is observable and reportable by members (Berard 2005).
Furthermore, many activists are thoughtful about how they present their moral beliefs to the
public, which I discovered and explored during my interviews. In other words, the activists had
clear talking points that they wanted to convey, which they could easily relay to me.
Nevertheless, the lack of this observational data is a limitation to this research.
I recruited interviewees through my fieldwork and through snowball sampling. Three of
the interviewees were recruited during my fieldwork. At the protests, I approached those who
seemed comfortable around me and interested in my research and asked them for an interview.
No one declined. The other interviewees were recruited through snowball sampling, as I asked
interviewees if they knew of other animal activists who might be interested in an interview.
Finally, I transcribed and coded the interviews and fieldnotes, paying attention to
activists’ beliefs and how they construct effective activism. I coded generally, focusing on
themes like beliefs about animal activism, effective activism, various forms of presentation of
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self, ethic of responsibility and ethics as ultimate ends. Out of this, ethics as responsibility and
ultimate ends emerged as common positions. In the following sections, I present and analyze my
evidence by examining the different forms of ethics.
Welfarists: A Tension Between Private and Public Ethics
The welfarists focus on the treatment of animals, and advocate for incremental changes in
legislation and individuals to benefit animals. For instance, they support regulatory protections
for animals, such as limiting animal confinement, and promote meat reduction and veganism to
the public. Many of the individuals I interviewed participate in these goals. For example, some of
them collected signatures from the public to propose a bill to the state senate that would limit the
intensive confinement of farm animals. They also leaflet, table, or have informal conversations
during which they supply vegan literature and rhetorical information to others.
Many of the welfarists believed that humans ought not to harm animals, yet they avoided
making claims about human’s collective obligation to animals during activism. That is, they
usually censored themselves; they did not fully express their private beliefs during activism.
This is strategic action, as a frequent issue activists confront is alienating potential sympathizers
through their proselytizing (Munro 1997), especially if their activism portrays the public as
wrongdoers (Mika 2006). Animal activists are asking individuals to confront and change their
deeply ingrained behavior, which could cause conflict. The welfarists typically want to recruit
others through activism, rather than alienating them. For example, Carrie, a librarian, explains
that activism is about practicality. She would like to “open all the cages and make all farms
sanctuaries, but that’s just not going to happen.” She argued that it is difficult for activists to
alter how the public views animals, in part because humans have constructed animals as others.
She explains, “We’ve eaten them for so long, they have to be different.” Because she believes
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that the public might resist animal rights, she tends to censor her beliefs regarding humananimal relations. In other words, she wants to frame her message in a way to which the public is
receptive.
Other welfarists also censored themselves. Jane, a college student, believes that animal
consumption is wrong, but she thinks that the public might feel attacked by animal activists who
promote such a message. She explained “I think it’s wrong” but she feels she cannot freely
express that perspective to the public because some individuals “are dissuaded because they’ve
been told you’ve been doing something wrong right now.” Similarly, I asked Emma, an
undergraduate student majoring in resource economics, if she tells individuals that consuming
animal products is wrong. She said, “I say it’s cruel. I think people get extremely offended
when you insult their morality, or you say they’re not moral. They do not like that.”
Importantly, Emma later explained that she believes that animal consumption is wrong: “I mean
that’s my belief system and that’s why I do what I do, but I don’t think I’ve said that ever.”
Lastly, Kyleen, an animal activist of thirty years, also believes that animal consumption is
wrong, yet she is concerned about the consequences of framing her message that way to the
public. She explained:
It’s something I’m passionate about, and I do believe, and to be honest with you, I
do in some ways think it’s wrong, but I think labeling, you know, if you label
“that’s wrong,” then you’re just setting it up somehow for people to say, well
what makes you, you know, like morally superior?

Kyleen further explained that framing animal rights as a collective obligation would alienate the
public. They could become defensive because they feel that the activists are judging them. In
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total, many welfarists believe that they cannot express their collectivist beliefs regarding animal
rights as it may perturb the public.
The welfarists are good representations of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, as they give a
great deal of thought regarding how their activism may affect the public. They overwhelmingly
feel that if activists alienate the public through collective moral discourse, the public will not
adopt animal rights ideologies, consistent with the ethic of responsibility’s emphasis on prudence
over purity. For example, Jane believes that individuals are unreceptive to an “all or nothing”
ultimatum, such as presenting animal rights or veganism as a moral obligation. For Jane, framing
animal rights as a collective moral obligation will result in the public feeling alienated and
therefore unlikely to adopt an animal rights ideology. Instead, she thinks that animal activists
need to tone down their moral message, and think about how the public might consider animal
rights. She believes activists should not present animal rights as a larger moral obligation
because individuals might feel threatened. She explained, “I don’t think people are going to
change their opinions just being attacked, and if we want long term sustainable change, people
have to come to these conclusions that it’s wrong on their own.” Jane, like other welfarists,
believe that they should not push the public toward animal rights, but rather help them
understand the larger problem and let them evaluate it using their own moral terms.
Other welfarists avoid public expressions of their convictions, worrying about the
consequences of expressing their convictions while participating in activism. For example,
Charlyn, an undergraduate at a local university, explained her approach to animal rights to me,
saying, “So my philosophy—I usually don’t even get to talk about this because I even have
vegan friends who aren’t in the same space as me—but my philosophy is that we were never
meant to eat these animals. These animals have the equal right to live.” She believes that humans
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and animals’ lives are equal, but she also notes that the public is unreceptive to such a moral
position. Like the other welfarists, Charlyn does not want to alienate the public and thus tends to
censor her moral beliefs about animals, reasoning “I don’t say this (it’s wrong) because it’s very
intimidating to people and they get intimidated.” In reference to animal use as morally wrong,
she further explained, “When I’m having conversations with people I’m not super comfortable
talking to about it, because I just get really nervous that I’m going to come off super preachy and
people are just going to get turned off by it.” Like Jane, Charlyn practices an ethic of
responsibility; she is concerned that if she stresses animal rights as a collective obligation, others
will find animal rights unappealing, an unwanted outcome. In summary, the welfarists think
harming animals is wrong, but rarely relay that message while participating in activism. As I will
show in the next section, the welfarists compromise their values in the interests of strategy.
Welfarists: Commitment to Responsible Activism
While the welfarists are a fair representation of Weber’s ethic of responsibility, they also
complicate Weber’s conceptualization in an important way. The welfarists do not simply
demonstrate a concern for the consequences of their conduct. Instead, I argue that they
demonstrate a commitment to the means they envision will bring about those consequences. The
ethic of responsibility, then, is not neatly divorced from an ethic of ultimate ends. That is,
welfarists feel a conviction that their strategy will cause others to adopt animal rights ideologies.
Their strategy is their moral commitment, as they believe their approach is effective. The
welfarists chief strategy is the use of conventional cultural resources, particularly individualism,
but also its variations, including tolerance and pluralism, to alter others. That is, animal activists
use common cultural values to persuade the public to engage in unconventional acts such as
limiting animal use or adopting veganism. They feel that many Americans dismiss veganism as
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extreme (Cooney 2013) and are unwilling to limit their animal use. Consequently, they
strategically avoid using “radical '' moralistic language about animals, instead opting to
emphasize values that they believe the public holds in order to resonate with people’s lived
experiences (Snow and Benford 1988) or plausibility structures (Berger and Luckman 1966).
Thus, like Weber’s portrayal of an ethic of responsibility, the welfarists are not committed to
expressing their value orientations; while they privately believe animal consumption is wrong,
they do not convey such moral beliefs to the public. Yet, contrary to Weber’s portrayal of an
ethic of responsibility, the welfarists feel a moral commitment to improving the lives of animals.
In so doing, they come to moralize strategies themselves. In this sense, an ethic of responsibility
is not only compatible with an ethic of ultimate ends but an expression of it.
One objection to my interpretation of Weber’s ethics of responsibility is that Weber
would not disagree that responsible activists can still have commitments. After all, it is an ethic
of responsibility. But, like ethics as ultimate ends, the welfarists’ commitments were at times
unwavering. That is, they believed in their strategy as the only viable option. As explained
above, many welfarists did not support the presentation of animal rights as a collective obligation
because it would not convert people. They put their foot down and could do no other. In this
case, they cannot imagine that an abolitionist strategy would produce the intended results.
One important proselytizing strategy the welfarists employed was presenting animal
rights under the prism of American individualism. According to Bellah et al (1985) and many
others, Americans tend to think of many aspects of public and private life in individualistic
terms, meaning that they emphasize choices and experiences over collective commitments to
community and the public good. Consequently, many Americans believe that they are free to
achieve goals, desires, and happiness without others telling them how to do so (Jensen 1995).
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Many of the activists were aware that most people want to eat animal products, and do not care
for activists who tell them otherwise. Thus, instead of presenting animal rights as an absolutist
morality, which many of them privately believed, many activists presented animal rights in
individualistic terms. For example, Emma tries not to offend the moral sensibilities of others
while engaging in activism by giving the impression that she is not forcing people to change but
giving them information to make an informed decision. She said:
I think it’s also telling people to eat less meat instead of eating no meat that really
helps. The Humane League Labs, they’ve done a ton of studies about how certain
things work... Not like how can we make people vegetarians, but save the most
animals in general. So they were going through each statement (to use in a leaflet)
and they said “go vegetarian,” “eat less meat,” “go vegan,” and “eat less meat”
worked the best because people were like ‘oh ok, I can do that. I don’t feel like
I’m being forced to do something. I can do that,’ you know?

Emma practices an ethic of responsibility, yet she also clearly demonstrates a
commitment to her means because they yield desirable ends. Emma feels dedicated to an
individualistic strategy for altering others, as it will lead to favorable consequences. For example,
she believes in crafting a moral message that caters to individual’s experiences and desires as the
ideal method to alter others. The message allows others to engage in meat eating, yet encourages
them to eat less meat as a morally commendable act. They can have their meat and eat it, too.
Emma believes this is an effective approach because targets do not feel coerced to convert but
encouraged to alter themselves. In this context, morality is not an imposition of what is right, but
an individual decision about the right way to live. Indeed, Emma remarks that this is her central
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approach to activism, expressing, “I’m not forcing you to do it. I’m just having you think about it
in this way… And let yourself think about that and then go with what you want.” In her activism,
Emma possesses a value commitment to strategy, not to larger moral worldviews. She is
committed to individualism as a strategy, demonstrating that, contrary to Weber, those who
practice an ethic of responsibility also show a commitment to ultimate ends.
Similarly, Shirley, a mental health counselor, also demonstrates an ethic of responsibility
as she believes that individualism is an effective tactic to alter others. She told me that she used
to be very direct with people about animal rights, such as telling people that they should be
ashamed for consuming animal products, and comparing animal agriculture to the Holocaust.
Predictably, others did not respond positively to her, and she now engages in what she calls
“peaceful activism,” which she claims is “an opportunity for someone to grapple. Instead of
being like you do this. Which I think is pretty basic human psychology, right? If I’m just like
‘you, you, you.’ It’s like I statements, right? It’s providing facts.” Given her prior experiences,
Shirley is concerned about the consequences of her activism. She does not want to blame others,
but focuses on her beliefs and larger facts about animal agriculture. In addition, she rarely tells
others that consuming animal products is wrong because “I think that’s what got people really
defensive.” In Shirley’s view, to construct morality as a collective obligation is to blame others
who do not adhere to the larger code of conduct. She thus practices an ethic of responsibility by
avoiding such discourse.
Yet, Shirley, like other welfarists, also shows how practicing an ethic of responsibility
involves moral commitment to strategy. Like other welfarists, Shirley values “effective
activism,” which emphasizes the best means to an end. Shirley thinks effective activism is “to
have people think about the reality of their participation without a sense of blame but inviting a
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sense of responsibility.” Shirley’s approach is not to blame others for wrongdoing and tell them
how they should live, but to provide information to them so they can make educated decisions
about and feel responsible for their participation in animal use. Morality is reduced to what
individuals are willing to do rather than what they ought to do. For Shirley and many others,
presenting morality in such a way is a strategy to resonate with others, to bridge frames (Snow et
al 1986). As Shirley recognizes, rigid standards of morality often alienate others, especially in an
individualistic culture (Bellah et al 1985). Jane shares Shirley’s views, believing that if animal
activists tell the public they should go vegan “they feel attacked.” In response, Shirley and Jane
see their activism as an opportunity to inform others in hopes they make some changes in their
lives. Both Shirley and Jane are not so much driven by their convictions regarding how animals
should be treated, but by their tactics to create change. They practice an ethic of responsibility,
yet they also demonstrate how such an ethic involves moral commitments, particularly to
specific means that may lead to desirable outcomes.
Activists also practice an ethic of responsibility by invoking an individualized
proselytizing strategy of “personalizing” morality, which refers to the ways the activists present
animal rights frames in terms of how they connect to the experiences, desires, and values of
others. The activists try to find “where others are” and cater their message accordingly. For
instance, Kyleen worked on gathering signatures for a local ballot initiative to increase the space
for farm animals to move. She believes these incremental changes are effective because:
I think you really have to meet people where they are… I’m vegan and I want no
exploitation of animals, but the public at large isn’t that way so these standards
for the ballot initiative that we’re doing about the confinement, some people see
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that as small measures, and that it’s not even acceptable, but I feel like it’s really
necessary to start small and where people are at.
Kyleen further explained that “meeting people where they are” means that activists
should frame their message with the attitudes of others in mind. She believes that many
individuals are not open to veganism, but they are open to the humane treatment of farm animals.
Or some activists find that others are more interested in the health benefits of veganism rather
than the welfare of farm animals, so they emphasize personal health as a way to connect with
others.
Note that Kyleen feels a tension. She wants no exploitation of animals, yet she advocates
for measures that actually result in what she thinks of as animal exploitation. That is, she wants
every cage to be free of animals, but she gathered signatures that keep animals in cages, albeit
bigger ones. In Weber’s sense, she clearly practices an ethic of responsibility. Her activism is not
so much driven by her convictions about animal rights. Indeed, she seems to advocate for
legislation she does not believe in. However, she practices responsible activism in that sense that
she advocates on behalf of animals so long as her activism is in line with public support. For
example, she does not think the public will accept her convictions of “no exploitation” of
animals. In response, practicing an ethic of responsibility, she and other activists attempt to
change others based on “less exploitation” of animals, which the welfarists largely believe will
yield positive outcomes, as the public seemingly supports the regulation of animal use over the
abolition of it.
Kyleen, however, in another way does engage in activism she believes in. While her
moderate activism and extreme convictions are seemingly at odds, she also holds convictions
about doing activism. Like Shirley and Jane, she believes in doing what is most effective,

129

meaning she believes in engaging in activism that produces positive outcomes. As I have
stressed but as Weber did not, it is in this sense that Weber’s ethic of responsibility involves
conviction, but not toward one’s value orientations but toward one’s proselytizing strategies. In
general, the activists feel certain that they can alter the public by emphasizing things that they
feel the public already values. For example, Kyleen’s proselytizing and activism summon two
different values to alter others: individualism (morality is adjusted to individuals) and humane
treatment of animals (rather than no exploitation of animals). She further believes more
absolutist messages, such as “eating animals is wrong,” are ineffective because “I don’t want
people to feel judged, but somehow coming to it from a not harming perspective.” By
emphasizing values recruits potentially already believe, Kyleen hopes to minimize conflict and
thereby maximize alteration. Kyleen thus practices a modified ethic of responsibility.
Responsibility is itself a commitment.
Other activists also emphasized personalized morality as a method of responsible
activism. For example, Sue argued that activism is effective by stressing the gravity of the
problem, but also making the issue relatable to people. She explained:
So like relating it to like if they had a pet or—because I had pet chickens when I
was a kid— or if they have been to a farm, or anything like that. Making it
something that they can personally relate to, not just nine billion animals are
killed, like make it so that of those nine billion, one of those was going to be your
pet chicken when you were a kid.

Sue tries to connect with others by demonstrating how aspects of their lives, such as caring for
pets, are connected to larger problems in animal agriculture. She further explained that she tries
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to “tailor everything I’m saying to each person” during activism, such as leafleting. For example,
she said that if people appear unreceptive to animal rights, she does not engage with that person.
Or if another person is concerned about their cholesterol, she will emphasize the health benefits
of veganism. This is an individualistic approach to activism in the sense that she is trying to
frame her messages according to the experiences, needs, and desires of potential converts. Sue
enacts an ethic of responsibility, as she believes that this personalized approach is relatable to the
public. Yet, her responsible activism still includes convictions, not toward justice for animals but
toward her proselytizing strategies.
Welfarists also evoked tolerance, a cousin of individualism, as a form of responsible
activism. Activists sometimes showed tolerance of others who violated their beliefs about animal
rights. For example, Kayla, who has been involved in animal activism since the late 1970s and
believes that “every animal should be free” and feels that eating animals is unethical, does not
think that activists should tell others that eating animals is wrong because:
If there’s a family that depends on killing an animal and using it for their food, or
they have a farm, or they use it. I mean I’m not saying... I don’t think I have the
right to tell somebody that they shouldn’t be eating meat, um, or can’t. I mean
some people are poor, some people it’s their livelihood, so I want to respect there
are farms that do that.

Kayla explains further that “food and maybe clothes too, are such an emotional thing. I mean you
grow up with foods however you’ve been raised. So if you’ve been eating meat all your life, it’s
sort of a comfort.” Kayla largely tolerates other’s meat consumption by empathizing with their
life circumstances, including, in her words, their “culture, economic abilities, class, and
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customs.” If people grew up on a farm, are poor, or feel connected to meat eating she
understands why they might eat meat even though she disagrees with the practice. Their
individual situation outweighs a larger collective morality; because of their circumstances,
certain individuals are inculpable.
Kayla also practices a modified form of an ethic of responsibility, as she is concerned
about the consequences of her activism, and therefore does not impose her moral viewpoints
onto others, yet she also views this strategy as a conviction for altering others. While Kayla
thinks that eating animals is unethical, she does struggle with imposing that viewpoint onto
others because she believes it may be difficult for some individuals to give up animal products.
Instead, she tries to inform others, asserting “I don’t want to tell people what to do, but I want to
educate people.” Her tolerance of others thus is manifested in her activism more generally, as she
does not tell others how to live but instead provides information that people can use to spark
change within themselves. Kayla’s tolerance is a strategy rooted in conviction of how to best
create change. By showing that she is understanding of others, she feels that they are more likely
to listen to her message because it “does not scare but invites others to participate.”
Welfarists also use individualism by invoking pluralism, which is the belief that
individuals, typically Americans, largely tolerate cultural or group differences. Pluralism
involves the acceptance of the lifestyles of various identity groups in a society. Not all activists
invoked pluralism, since it was not always relevant to their activism. However, like
individualism and tolerance, pluralism is a form of cultural and moral relativism. For instance,
Jane told me about an activism event called “pay-per-view” in which she and other activists pay
passersby a dollar to watch a video showing animal slaughter. Afterwards, the activists talk to
the viewers about their feelings. One viewer, who was Muslim, talked about how the video

132

showed extreme cruelty, but he did not participate in such actions because he eats halal meat. He
believed that halal was synonymous with humane. Jane looked it up and felt that it was just as
cruel as the video footage. She remarked:
He obviously doesn’t want to deal with the fact that maybe it is cruel, you know?
So we’re trying to be open minded because we didn’t want to feel like we insulted
him, or, oh it’s actually bad look at this, you know? It’s like insulting his religion
so it’s weird. It’s strange.
Jane said that she did not press his belief, because she did not want to offend him. She did not
want to dismiss his position because he could interpret it as an assault on his religion,
particularly with recent concerns about Islamophobia. However, consistent with her
individualistic approach, she is also concerned that by disagreeing with his position, she might
alienate and offend him, which, in Jane’s view, might deter him from considering animal rights.
She clearly practices an ethic of responsibility, yet she also shows how she is committed to
responsibility in and of itself.
In summary, the welfarists practice an ethic of responsibility. They thought about the
consequences of their activism. Many believed that using individualistic discourse would lead
to desirable outcomes, as the public would not feel alienated or offended by their claims.
However, while welfarists are good examples of Weber’s depiction of ethically responsible
individuals who forgo their convictions during moral chasms, welfarists did maintain beliefs
they would not compromise. This is important because the welfarists show that the division
between Weber’s ethics is not very clear in practice. While the welfarists are easily categorized
as responsible activists, they also displayed an ethic of ultimate ends—in part because they
never lost sight of their ultimate concerns with animal welfare but also because they converted
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strategic considerations themselves into ultimate values. In many cases, welfarists viewed
strategy as a non-negotiable commitment. They viewed the strategy of desirable outcomes as
the best way to alter the behavior of the public. Indeed, they largely believed that moral
absolutism would not work as a strategy. They viewed their ethic of responsibility, then, as an
ultimate end. Strategy thus involves commitments (usually to individualistic morality) that
welfarists take as non-negotiable. Overall, the activists’ responsible activism centered around a
commitment to strategy. They strategically used individualistic discourse to convince others that
they are empathetic, tolerant, and inclusive, convinced that such a strategy will advance animal
rights.
Abolitionists: Commitment to Ultimate Ends
In contrast to the welfarists, the abolitionists represent ethics as ultimate ends, as Clay, a
leader of an abolitionist group, demonstrates. Clay told me a story about how he stopped Whole
Foods Market from selling a nutrition bar. The bar was labeled vegan but contained “humane
honey.” He argued that this was false advertising, since honey is an animal product, and
pressured Whole Foods to stop selling the bar. The owner of the company that made the bar
contacted Clay, and he told Clay that “he knows vegans” and they said the bar was vegan. Clay
retorted that they were not vegans because vegans do not eat honey. The owner wanted to sell
the rest of the product, and then change the packaging so it was not advertised as vegan. Clay,
however, was still adamant that Whole Foods remove the bars from their shelves. Clay
remarked to me, “That’s what it means to be abolitionist. You put your foot down, and you
stand for your principles.” In Weber’s terms, that spirit is what it means to practice an ethic of
ultimate ends. Clay stood for his principles; he could do no other.
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The abolitionist approach is centered around the idea that the property status of animals
should be abolished because animals are sentient beings. For example, Joyce, an abolitionist
who is a civics high school teacher, argues that “because animals are living, sentient beings,
they have a right to their lives... Humans then cannot use them for their own ends.” While the
abolitionists agree with the welfarists that harming animals is wrong, they are much more likely
to link the harming of animals to their property status. They argue that if animals are legally
things, humans will treat them as objects without interests. These ideas stem from philosopher
Gary Francione’s (2000) work on animal rights, who created the abolitionist approach. The
abolitionists I interviewed all shared Francione’s ideas, and mentioned how they were
influenced by him. For example, Clay heard Francione on an animal rights podcast and was
profoundly moved by his abolitionist message. Clay said that Francione’s message was that
since animals are property, animal interests will always matter less than human interests,
perpetuating the exploitation of animals. Consequently, Clay and other abolitionists maintain
that humans need to treat similar interests similarly, and thus dismantle the property status of
animals to abolish the unnecessary harm humans cause animals.
The abolitionists are very critical of the regulation of animal use, something welfarists
often promote. The welfarists frequently advocate for making incremental changes to improve
the lives of animals. While many welfarists believe that harming animals is wrong, they tend to
take a pragmatic approach to animal rights, believing that incremental changes will serve
animals best. As mentioned above, welfarists largely believe that “extremist” frames, such as
the abolition of animal use, will alienate the public. Instead, they might promote Meatless
Mondays or larger cages for confined farm animals. The abolitionists think the welfarist
approach is problematic, as they contend it violates the rights of animals. For instance, Clay
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wants the public to understand that “animals matter,” which means “that we shouldn’t be using
them as things because that is inherently harmful to them… it doesn’t mean eating cage-free
eggs instead of battery cage eggs, it means eating no eggs.” For abolitionists, the regulation of
animal use is wrong because it maintains the property status of animals.
During activism, abolitionists were upfront about their views with the public, often
stressing that humans cannot justify animal use. The most common forms of abolitionist
activism include tabling or interpersonal/conversational activism. According to Joyce, a typical
tabling session includes a few abolitionists sitting behind a table with posters of animals with
captions about going vegan. When people approach the table, the abolitionists will try to have a
conversation about veganism as a moral imperative. Joyce notes that sometimes people want to
talk about veganism as a healthy diet, but she will usually say “That’s not what we’re about.”
The abolitionists usually try to steer the conversation by asking questions to the individuals who
approach the table. Joyce and the other abolitionists all ask, “do you think it’s wrong to harm
animals unnecessarily?” Joyce said, “Most people will say yes, not all, but most people will say
yes. And that’s really when you get to talk about how eating them or using them as items of
clothing is not necessary, it’s something you do because you like it.”
The abolitionists are important largely because they emphasize morality as a collective
commitment rather than an individual decision, at odds with how Americans often talk about
morality (Bellah et al 1985). Abolitionists do not personalize morality, but present it as a
collective obligation so that animal rights is a matter of right or wrong. Their goal is to stand up
for what they believe is right in an effort to educate others about humans’ moral commitments
to animals. This means that their central message is that animal use is wrong and therefore
individuals should become ethical vegans. For example, Clay argued “We get out there with an
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uncompromising abolitionist stance, and it’s not about being militant or fundamentalist. It’s
about saying things how they are.” For Clay, an abolitionist stance means promoting the end of
the human consumption of animals. He wants members of the public who approach him during
his activism to “understand that animal use is wrong… use is the problem, it’s not how we treat
them.” Joyce feels similarly, saying, “I think that it’s a really awful, terrible system that should
be completely dismantled. I think the amount of pain and suffering that goes on daily, it’s hard
to think about… So the whole system should be dismantled, it’s just so clear to me.” Joyce and
Clay both emphasize the abolishment of animal use, as they argue that humans should not own
and use animals, a message they try to impart to the public. Clay and other abolitionists were
adamant that the animal rights movement needs to be clear and direct about this issue so that the
public is not confused as to what is expected of them. If there is no need to use and harm
animals, abolitionists maintain that there is no justification to use and harm animals. Rather than
a choice, abolitionists see veganism as a collective obligation.
In Weberian terms, the abolitionists are clear contrasts to the welfarists. While the
welfarists enact an ethic of responsibility by promoting incremental changes and relying on
individualistic discourse that will not perturb the public in the name of effectiveness,
abolitionists enact an ethic of ultimate ends by advocating the end of animal use and
emphasizing morality as collective obligation. The abolitionists promote veganism as a moral
baseline, seemingly unconcerned if their message offends the public. For example, Joyce bluntly
remarked:
A lot of people, once you get to that step (talking about veganism as a moral
imperative), they’re just turned off and don’t want to talk anymore. Like you’ve
got them in this contradiction where they don’t want to harm animals
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unnecessarily, yet that’s what they do all the time. So I think with most people the
conversation will end around there. Some will think about it, some will, you
know, even get a little irritated. And then other people will be like, yeah well but I
could never do without my cheese and things like that.

Joyce seemingly values the integrity of her message over the negative effects it has on the public.
Abolitionists care, then, deeply about the integrity of their message, even if that message
alienates others, embodying Weber’s ethic of ultimate ends.
To stop here, however, would mean missing the larger story. The abolitionists believe in
the integrity of their message, but they do not totally ignore the consequences of their activism.
While abolitionists concede that their framing of animal rights may upset others, and this may
indicate that they are indifferent to the effects of their activism, the abolitionists, to a degree,
want to upset others, at least in terms of creating moral conflict within a person. The
abolitionists’ larger goal is to “change the paradigm” so that humans no longer regard animals as
objects without interests but as nonhuman persons. To change the paradigm, they feel they must
promote veganism as an imperative because it will create conflict within a person. That is, they
want the public to see how their beliefs about animals and themselves are at odds with their
behavior of harming animals. If individuals believe it is wrong to unnecessarily harm animals,
yet actually harm animals unnecessarily, abolitionists think that it will unsettle those individuals
to be confronted with the contradiction of their own positions. As Clay argues:
I guarantee you, when they walk away (from their table), they’ll have cognitive
dissonance in their brains, that’s how you get change. Things don’t change unless
you have two competing beliefs and you’re trying to reconcile which one you are
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trying to go with. People in the long run are going to go with the one that makes
them feel like they’re being true to their identity; the one that they feel represents
their better selves. In the short run, they may still do what feels good, but they
will probably feel bad about it.

Unlike the welfarists, who do not want to make others feel uncomfortable and therefore rely on
individualistic discourse, the abolitionists want to create moral tension within others to evoke an
awakening within them. The abolitionists, then, show how those who practice an ethic of
ultimate ends may not only stand for what’s right in and of itself, but also strategize to alter
others. That is, the abolitionists stand for what they think is right both out of principle (animal
use is wrong) and consequence (promoting veganism will create change).
Abolitionists: Ultimate Ends as Strategy
Contrary to Weber’s depiction of individuals who practice an ethic of ultimate ends, the
abolitionists do not simply value the integrity of their message, unconcerned with how it affects
the public. Rather, they also believe that their uncompromising message is the best way to create
social change that benefits animals. That is, abolitionists are motivated by ultimate ends, not
simply because these ends are right in and of themselves, but, contrary to Weber, because they
have strategic value. Practicing an ethic of ultimate ends, then, does not mean forgoing an ethic
of responsibility. Using the abolitionists, I argue that ultimate ends have strategic uses and, by
extension, that the distinction between ethics of ultimate ends and ethics as responsibility is more
complex than Weber would have had it.
The abolitionists, while deeply invested in their beliefs of the abolition of animal use,
also believed that their viewpoint of abolitionism has strategic value. They believe it is the best
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way to create large scale social change that actually benefits animals. To accomplish this,
abolitionists argue that they must have conversations with individuals about the morality of
animal use. Clay argued:
This is a long haul, and what we need to do is build a foundation. We need to
create a world in which the paradigm has shifted from one in which animals are
ours to use to one in which it is improper to use them, and people don’t see them
as things to use. And we’re not going to get there except for one brick at a time,
that means having as many fruitful conversations as possible around the world,
and if it’s not going to be a fruitful conversation, move on, we don’t have time.
There are so many other people to talk to.

Abolitionists make the point that changing the minds of others does not mean telling them what
they want to hear, such as promoting the reduction of animal use as a moral act. They believe
that to get people to go vegan, they must educate others about veganism as a moral imperative.
Their goal is to encourage the public to see animal use as unjust on the grounds that it has no
justification, especially if the best justification is human pleasure or convenience. Abolitionists
are adamant that if they are to persuade others that animal use is wrong, they must tell them it is
wrong. For example, an abolitionist pamphlet from the International Vegan Society starts with
the sentence, “Harming animals without good reason is wrong.” Overall, the pamphlet tries to
get the reader to see how harming animals unnecessarily is wrong and that humans have a moral
imperative to avoid animal consumption (in comparison, a Vegan Outreach pamphlet (2014: 14),
which emphasizes welfarism is entitled “Compassionate Choices” and encourages the reader to
“choose compassion whenever possible”). Clay argues that this approach is necessary because
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“if you don’t get people to see with really laser-like precision what’s expected of them, you’re
not going to get the desired results.”
Clay is clearly concerned about the consequences of his activism. He is focused on
achieving “desired results” through his abolitionist message, believing that it will persuade
individuals to adopt veganism and view animals as nonhuman persons. He further explained,
“you don’t get there unless you start pointing people in that direction… this is what we believe,
this is where we need to go, we’re not going to get there unless we point in that direction.” Clay,
however, understands that this is a difficult task, as the public may draw a hard line between
human and animal, and consequently is more open to reducing animal consumption than
eliminating it. He argued, however, “We’re trying to change the world. We’re trying to change
the paradigm. We’re trying to get rights for animals. If it wasn’t a little bit hard, why weren’t we
already there, you know what I mean?” Though Clay understands that converting the public is
difficult, he is adamant that the abolitionist approach is the best or most responsible way to go
about it.
Abolitionists value responsible activism, so much so that they often argue that their
approach is more effective than welfarism because it will produce measurable results. Clay
argued that dismantling institutionalized animal use will come about through an abolitionist
message, not a welfarist one:
The paradigm shift will be faster. In fact, there is no paradigm shift on a welfare
approach. There’s no challenge to the mainstream thinking that it’s wrong to use
animals in the first place, so unless a group like us and others around the world
are specifically pushing back on this idea that we can use animals and are justified
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in doing so, the movement is never going to change. Animal rights will never
come about as a legal matter much less a moral one.
Clay desires change for animals. He does not value the purity of his principles over the outcomes
of his actions. He values both.
Overall, abolitionists were critical of the welfarists’ strategy of responsible activism for a
couple of reasons. First, abolitionists argue that the welfarist approach does not dismantle animal
agriculture. Instead, many welfarists encourage individuals to consume fewer animal products,
but Clay argues that “there’s this weird idea out there that there’s other ways of helping animals
that still leaves the system completely intact.” This is perhaps the most obvious critique that
abolitionists have of welfarism. In other words, welfarism is problematic because it regulates
rather than abolishes animal use, which is antithetical to the abolitionist approach both in
principle and consequence. As Joyce remarks, “Having more room for the animals to move
around is not going to cause any sort of paradigm shift.” Abolitionists believe that their approach
is better for changing the larger paradigm.
Second, and more strategically, the abolitionists argue that the welfarists’ message is
unclear, especially when they encourage the public to consume fewer animal products as a moral
act. Both groups have different definitions of what effective activism entails. For the welfarists,
it involves asking individuals to make small changes, notably reducing their animal
consumption, that over time may help liberate animals. For the abolitionists, effective activism
involves being clear what morality demands of people, and as such they advocate ethical
veganism and nothing less. According to abolitionists, while welfarists care about and advocate
for animals, they also advocate measures that ironically harm animals, like Meatless Mondays,
larger cages for confined animals, or less animal consumption. Abolitionists maintain that this is
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ineffective activism because it sends individuals incoherent and even immoral messages,
particularly the notion that individuals can help animals while simultaneously harming them. For
example, Clay argued this about welfarists:
To them, effectiveness is getting people to do something even if it’s not the right
thing. And my feeling… if you put the ladder up on the wrong wall you can climb
up to the top, but how are you going to change the light bulb? It’s over there on
the other wall. Being effective is making steps in the right direction, so no one is
more effective than abolitionists because we’re the only ones who put one step in
front of the other towards the goal of abolition. We’re actually changing the
paradigm one conversation at a time. That is something that just does not happen
in the welfarist’s realm. And that’s why we’re effective.

Clay believes that the abolitionist approach is the more direct way to get from point A to
point B. In other words, it is the most effective way of achieving his goals. Abolitionists want a
vegan world, so they advocate for one rather than equivocate. Joyce furthermore argues that
welfarists’ responsible activism actually results in poor outcomes. She said that the welfarists
''are telling people that it’s okay to eat meat six times a week, as long as you give it up one day.
Like I don’t see how talking about meatless Monday is going to lead people to go vegan.” In
addition, Cynthia, an accountant, argues that “welfarism gives people the wrong message, that
it’s okay to harm animals. How is that effective? It does not give a clear message.” Not only do
Joyce and Cynthia question whether advocating reduced meat consumption will encourage
others to become vegan, but they importantly think it is counter-productive because, in Joyce’s
words, it will “make people comfortable about eating meat.” In other words, Joyce and other
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abolitionists believe that the welfarists' approach is problematic because it will result in
undesirable consequences. Abolitionists, then, do not simply tell others that veganism is a moral
obligation out of the integrity of their principles, but also because they believe it will yield
beneficial outcomes.
This is not to say that abolitionists think that the public is likely to go vegan overnight.
While they think their approach is effective, they also acknowledged that many individuals are
incredulous of veganism. Joyce stated, “...at a certain point you’re going to alienate people
because people do things a certain way, they’ve done it that way their whole lives, their family
does it, their friends do it.” Yet, unlike welfarists, Joyce and other abolitionists do not believe
they should frame their message with less morally charged language. Joyce, for example, does
not think the alternative is to promote less than veganism. She said, “but if at least I can have
some sort of dialogue with people where they at least see why I’m saying what I’m saying then
maybe they’ll think about it later, who knows.” Clay feels similarly, as he wants to clearly
explain to them why veganism is a moral imperative. He said, “People usually walk away from
our table and don’t feel compelled to go vegan on the spot because there’s a lot of that denial,
pushback, and other hang-ups, but they’ll often say, ‘wow, I really understand it now, I never
understood it before.’” Joyce and Clay admit that there are limitations to the effectiveness of
their approach; the public is unlikely to welcome veganism with open arms. But they both seem
hopeful that over time the abolitionist message will marinate in the minds of the public, perhaps
converting some of the public to veganism.
I have discussed how abolitionists in general practice not only an ethic of ultimate ends
but also that of responsibility. But what specific strategies do abolitionists use in their
responsible activism? To attain their desired results—individuals converting to veganism—
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abolitionists strategically connect with the plausibility structures of many Americans by
presenting morality as the avoidance of unnecessary harm. Many Americans believe that it is
wrong to cause harm to others (Bellah et al 1985), especially if that harm is unnecessary. This
moral belief, however, is not unique to Americans, as it is central to many moralities around the
world, though what is considered harm to others is socially constructed (Haidt 2012).
Abolitionists use this morality as a resource, often encouraging the public to think about how
what they already believe relates to animals. For example, in the International Vegan Society
abolitionist pamphlet, the first heading is titled “What Everyone Already Believes.” This section
claims that “the idea that it’s wrong to unnecessarily harm animals is moral common sense
(2017: 2). In other words, just about everyone feels that harming animals without reason is
wrong. Furthermore, Gary Francione (2000), abolitionist animal rights scholar, argues that so
many Americans condemned Michael Vick’s dog fighting not because he treated a pet as a thing,
but because he had no sufficient reason to harm the dogs other than it gave him some pleasure.
That is, many Americans believe that individuals need good reasons to harm animals; pleasure is
not one of those reasons. Abolitionists use this moral logic, one that many individuals already
hold, to convince others to go vegan.
Abolitionists try to frame animal rights in ways to which the public is receptive, much
like the welfarists. However, unlike the welfarists, they do not draw on the cultural resource of
individualism, but the moral resource of avoiding harm. For example, Kristen, a pediatrician,
told me a story about taking a cab in New York City. She was wearing a vegan t-shirt, and the
cab driver asked her about veganism. She used the moral logic of avoiding unnecessary harm to
talk about veganism. “I told him that humans cannot justify animal consumption because there is
no need for it. We had a really great conversation. He was pretty curious. As I was leaving, he
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told me that I convinced him to try veganism.” Kristen was very happy with this outcome, noting
that “it pays off to be direct with people.” Kristen’s beliefs are not simply unbridled stances; they
are also forms of responsible activism that she feels will convert the public. Similarly, Jessi, who
has been vegan for over twenty-five years, explained to me “We have to tell people like it is. If it
is wrong to cause unnecessary harm, we must be clear that it is wrong.” She understands that this
can turn people away from her table, but she ultimately feels that abolitionism is the most
effective approach for changing the public because “it is the most direct.”
The abolitionists not only strategize by presenting morality in terms many individuals
find agreeable, but by also creating moral discomfort within individuals, as mentioned earlier. In
other words, the abolitionists try to get others to reconcile their beliefs and behaviors,
specifically their belief that it is wrong to cause unnecessary harm to animals with their
behaviors of using animal products. The abolitionists believe that if they are to change the
property status of animals, they must convince others that their moral beliefs are consistent with
animal rights but inconsistent with their behavior. In pointing out the contradiction between
individuals’ beliefs and behaviors, they can create cognitive dissonance within a person. Unlike
welfarists, who might think of this as alienating a potential convert, abolitionists see this
dissonance as necessary for changing how humans think about the moral status of animals. As
Clay argues “People want to reconcile stuff that’s complicated and difficult.” Joyce takes this
approach, as she argued that she wants the public to come to terms with their inconsistent beliefs
and behaviors, noting that people are troubled by the slaughtering of animals yet still consume
animal products. She said, “What I guess I’m trying to do is to make people start making
connections between their behavior and their beliefs about the treatment of animals.” Clay also
provides a good explanation of this approach:
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You believe it’s wrong to harm a dog, right? You wouldn’t come home from
work and kick a dog and think that was a good thing to do, right? You’ll feel bad
because you hurt the dog, right? Not because you damaged your property. And
once you get people equipped to see things in the right way, they end up with this
cognitive dissonance where ‘well I think I’m a good person, and I thought I could
be a good person and eat animal products’, but I also believe that animals matter
and what happens matters to them, and yet what I’m doing actually harms them.
Now I have to, am I going to be vegan or am I not going to be vegan? Am I going
to be a hypocrite or be consistent?... Our job is to get people to start being
consistent as possible with what we already believe about animals.

Clay argues that “veganism is the only way to reconcile your behavior and beliefs.” Clay is not
simply standing up for what he believes in. He also believes that standing up for what he believes
in can result in beneficial demonstrable changes. Clay is motivated just as much by his moral
principles than his strategic actions. His strategy is also influenced by his views of human
personhood, specifically that humans will strive to be morally consistent in order to see
themselves in a positive light.
Conclusion
By empirically examining Weber’s distinction between ethics as responsibility and ethics
as ultimate ends, I have argued that the distinction is more nuanced than Weber acknowledges.
The welfarists and abolitionists, on the surface, appear to substantiate Weber’s ideal type.
However, upon further investigation, it is clear that both groups complicate Weber’s distinction,
as they each practice responsibility and conviction, though in different ways.
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In line with Weber, the welfarists are concerned about the consequences of their activism;
they believe that the best way to alter others is to not offend their moral sensibilities, and
consequently they often relied on individualistic language to connect with the plausibility
structures of the public. However, what Weber failed to realize is that responsible activism still
involves conviction, as “responsibility” or “concern with consequences” becomes an end in and
of itself. While the welfarists are not publicly committed to their moral convictions—they do not
stress veganism as a moral obligation—they are committed to their strategy of responsibility. In
short, they are committed to the idea that in order to alter others, they must not offend their moral
sensibilities. They must not tell others how to live.
In addition, consistent with Weber, the abolitionists clearly advocate for their moral
principles and can do no less. They stress veganism as a moral imperative because they believe it
is morally right. Yet, at odds with Weber, they also practice responsible activism. The
abolitionists are clearly concerned about the consequences of their claims. They want the public
to adopt veganism, and feel that they can achieve this by evoking common sense morality,
specifically how animal use is wrong because it is unnecessary harm. While this approach might
alienate the public, the abolitionists believe this outcome is not entirely unsatisfactory, as it will
cause the public to wrestle with beliefs and behaviors. In short, the abolitionists are committed to
the idea that they must be forthright with others if they expect them to change.
Is Weber’s distinction now meaningless? Of course not. His ideal type still has
explanatory power. For example, while the welfarists and abolitionists complicate his dichotomy,
the welfarists better represent responsibility and the abolitionists better represent conviction.
Because each group practices responsibility and conviction does not mean that each group
equally represents ethics as responsibility and ethics as ultimate ends. The welfarists, for
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example, practice more of an ethic of responsibility. In many cases, that responsibility was seen
as an unwavering commitment. Many of the welfarists, for example, claimed that activists should
not tell the public what to do because it will perturb the public. In other words, they were
committed to a particular strategy (e.g., individualism) and rejected the alternative (e.g.,
absolutism). However, a few welfarists believed that abolitionists' approaches could work with
some people, but not the majority of people. As a result, they did not personally think they
should present an abolitionist approach. These welfarists, then, were relatively negotiable about
strategy. The same, however, cannot be said about the abolitionists, who believed the welfarist
approaches were always ineffective and counterproductive. The welfarists and the abolitionists,
then, specialized in Weber’s different ethical approaches, but nevertheless they exhibited both in
their activism to different degrees. Weber’s distinction is useful here, but it is empirically more
complicated than the ideal type would suggest.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Throughout the first four chapters of this dissertation, I have aimed to demonstrate how
individuals make moral sense of (and with) animals, and the theoretical implications of such
sensemaking. I have produced three main findings. In chapter two, I examined the animal
selfhood literature in sociology. Using sociological evidence, I analyzed how animals may have
selves by specifying five criteria of selfhood including self as attribution, self-awareness,
intersubjectivity, self-concept, and narrative. I argued that animal sociologists fail to demonstrate
how animals act toward themselves in a self-reflective manner. I therefore concluded that animal
selfhood is empirically unverifiable. I also examined how animal sociologists have
conceptualized animal selfhood in relation to animal rights. These sociologists argue that
because animals have complex subjective states, animals’ lives have value and that they have
rights to moral consideration. However, because animal selfhood suffers from empirical and
epistemological problems, it is problematic to assume animals have rights on the basis of
unverifiable subjective characteristics. As an alternative, I contend that analyzing animals as
symbolic resources is a fruitful sociological enterprise.
In chapter three, I examined how vegan’s think about and present their moral beliefs to
nonvegans. I found that they use two types of individualism. Vegans who practice “strict
individualism” do not believe that veganism is a matter of right and wrong nor it is a collective
moral obligation. They do not impose their morals when interacting with nonvegans because
they believe morals are individualistic decisions. In contrast, vegans who practice “strategic
individualism” see veganism as a general moral imperative, but treat that imperative as a
personal decision when they interact with nonvegans. That is, their private morals differ from
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their public presentation of them. In particular, they strategically use liberal individualism to
avoid conflict with nonvegans. Vegans individualize their moral claims to define the situation.
Individualism, then, is not simply a cultural conviction, as sociologists so often conceptualize it,
but a strategic resource that individuals use to achieve their goals.
Lastly, in chapter four, I interviewed and observed two animal rights groups—welfarists
and abolitionists—to empirically analyze Weber’s ethic of responsibility and ethic of ultimate
ends. Weber argues that those who practice an ethic of responsibility are concerned about the
consequences of their ethical conduct and feel accountable for the results of their actions. Those
who practice an ethic of ultimate ends, in contrast, do what they think is morally right
independent of the consequences, motivated by the “flame of pure intentions” (1946: 121).
However, I argued that there is not a sharp distinction between each ethic in practice, as each
ethic involves some degree of both responsibility and conviction. For example, the welfarists are
concerned about alienating the larger public through their activism, so they focus on tactics they
think the public might endorse, like making small changes in their lives. Yet, the welfarists are
not simply concerned about the consequences of their activism, but frequently felt an unwavering
commitment to the means of their activism to achieve desirable results. The abolitionists, in
contrast, advocate for the abolishment of animal use because they believe this is a morally right
position. However, they are also motivated by consequences, since they are confident that their
framing of animal rights will yield effective outcomes. They believe that they must be clear and
direct with the public about veganism because this approach will effectively transform the
public. They believe in doing what’s right and feel responsible for their activism. In general, the
activists demonstrated both an unwavering commitment to responsible activism, but also thought
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of conviction as a means to a desirable end. In other words, in practice, activists exhibit both a
strategic deontology and a committed consequentialism.
One tension in this dissertation is the magnitude of the divide between human and
animal. I have shown that prominent animal sociologists argue that the differences between
humans and animals are a matter of degree more than kind. That is, animals are like humans.
They have complex subjective states like thoughts, emotions, self-awareness, and even culture,
though not to the same degree that humans express these traits. These subjective characteristics
not only show that animals are similar to humans, but they also carry moral implications. As
Leslie Irvine (2004) and the Algers (2003) have argued, if animals have selves and cultures,
humans at the very least must think about their moral obligations to animals, ideally adopting an
animal rights perspective. But thinking about such obligations is not enough. Irvine and the
Algers advocate for humans to change how they treat animals. Thus, the argument that humans
and animals differ quantitatively (rather than qualitatively) in social and cognitive characteristics
means that humans have moral obligations to animals. Irvine and the Algers more or less argue
that we must treat likes alike.
The perceived narrowing of the psychosocial human-animal boundary is also empirically
associated with changing moral attitudes humans have of animals. For example, Irvine (2004)
argues that by the end of the 17th century, cultural meanings of animals changed because of new
scientific knowledge that demonstrated that animals were biologically and anatomically similar
to humans in many ways. Charles Darwin argued that there was no fundamental difference
between “man and higher animals in their mental faculties” (Irvine 2004: 50). In addition, during
the 18th century, philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that
animals, like humans, were sentient beings. As the animal-human boundary became less
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significant, compassionate pet keeping also became more common. These shifting views on the
animal-human boundary were accompanied by changes in human behavior as animal protection
associations, such as The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA),
and animal welfare laws were common during the mid to late 19th century (Irvine 2004).
However, there is also evidence that the social and cognitive similarities between humans
and animals have, in practice, limited moral implications. For example, although scientific
advances played a role in changing human representations of animals to a degree, this change has
not had wide sweeping consequences. In contrast to Irvine (2004), Hobson-West (2007) has
argued that advances in human understanding of genetic connections with animals have not
mitigated “speciesism”, or discrimination directed toward animals. Humans have maintained
their superiority over animals and will continue to defend it according to Hobson-West. For
instance, animals are biologically sufficiently similar to humans to serve as good research
subjects but different enough so that humans can morally defend their sacrifice. Even dogs, who
are considered pets and companions by most Americans, are used in experiments although they
are not common subjects (Groves 1997, Elder et al 1998). Also, in research on animal cloning
and genetic modification, scholars focus on how these technologies benefit humans rather than
the effects they have on animals (Hobson-West 2007). The animals’ own experiences are ignored
in the biological sciences, perhaps indicating anthropocentric beliefs that the animals do not
matter. If speciesism is still prevalent in science, it stands to reason to question how much of an
impact science had on changing Westerners’ attitudes toward animals. It seems fair to argue that
science had a positive effect on the changing views humans had of animals, especially pets, but
scientific advances that challenged the human-animal boundary certainly remained limited in
scope.
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My research has similar implications. Western societies have changed how they have
viewed animals over time, which has influenced how individuals think about animal welfare.
However, the moral status of animals, especially farm animals, has arguably changed little. Pigs
may be as smart as a three-year-old child, but humans still eat them. The argument, then, that
perceived similarities between humans and animals has changed how humans morally think
about and act toward animals is limited. Moreover, as I demonstrate in my research, the fact that
many vegans and activists feel that they cannot talk freely about morality and animals perhaps
demonstrates that humans still draw a sharp line between themselves and animals, that humans
are thought of as subjects and animals are objects. Vegans and activists, in an effort not to
perturb co-interactants, may affirm the view that animals are objects, especially by encouraging
people to consume (fewer) animal products. While their end goal is to treat animals as moral
beings, the means do not always match that end. This dissertation, then, shows that how humans
think of animals is inconsistent. The human-animal divide is a moral enigma. On the one hand,
animal sociologists argue that animals have selves and subsequent rights. Vegans and activists
argue that animals deserve moral consideration. But on the other hand, vegan and activists’
tactics acknowledge that the larger public views animals, especially farm animals, as
instrumental objects. What is consistent in human-animal relations is paradox.
Theoretical Implications and Future Research
Conversion and Proselytizing
In the remainder of this conclusion, I go beyond my findings to speculate on their
implications for broader sociological issues. This dissertation has implications for the sociology
of conversion and what I call the sociology of proselytizing. The vegans and especially the
animal activists I interviewed desired to change individuals in various ways, such as reducing
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meat consumption, adopting vegetarianism or veganism, or avoiding events where animals are
allegedly abused. The activists want to convert, or at the very least, alter the public to adopt an
animal rights ideology and appropriate behavior. Their activism, both organized and
interpersonal, is thus an act of proselytizing. Whether they participate in an organized public
protest, such as protesting puppy stores or circuses on the streets, or in interpersonal activism,
such as tabling or convincing someone to eat less meat or go vegan, the desired outcome is to
transform individuals. While sociologists have researched conversion extensively, they have
surprisingly paid little attention to the specific proselytizing strategies individuals employ in their
attempts to convert or alter others to their ideology. After briefly reviewing the literature on
conversion, I will demonstrate how my research relates to the sociology of proselytizing.
Much sociological research has focused on conversion—broadly defined as a radical
change in one’s universe of discourse or worldview—within politics and especially religion. It is
typically through joining activist or religious groups that individuals come to “see the light”
about the errors of their ways, adopting a new self and new frameworks from which they
interpret the events in their lives (Mead [1932] 2002). One central theme in the literature is
conceptualizing conversion. Snow and Machalek (1983) in their classic review of the literature
find that most conceptualizations of conversion emphasize radical personal change, a disruption
of the self. However, as Snow and Machalek point out, sociologists do not know when radical
change has occurred in an individual or how much self-transformation is necessary for
conversion. Snow and Machalek (1983) argue that sociologists must attend to the converts’
“universe of discourse”—which are discursive frameworks individuals use to make sense of and
convey their worldviews—to understand radical change in individuals. What radically changes,
then, is the convert’s universe of discourse.
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According to Snow and Machalek (1983), a convert’s universe of discourse contains four
rhetorical indicators, which differentiate converts from non-converts, the most important of
which is biographical reconstruction. Converts use their new universe of discourse to construct a
new biography, typically one that juxtaposes a misdirected and alien past with a corrected,
promising present. Individuals use their new universe of discourse to redefine the past, and in
doing so, create a new biography in light of recent experiences (Snow and Machalek 1984;
DeGloma 2014). Non-converts, on the other hand, do not engage in biographical reconstruction
because they do not experience self-transformations to the same degree. For example, in their
study comparing Christian converts to non-converts, Staples and Mauss (1987) show that
converts, especially born-again Christians, solely engaged in biographical reconstruction by
rejecting a sinful and spurious past self, and embracing a current real self connected to Jesus.
Staples and Mauss (1987) conceptualized conversion as a process of self-transformation in which
converts create new visions of their “real selves''. Conversion results in a change in the way
individuals feel about themselves, which individuals express through language, typically
resulting in biographical reconstruction. To best identify converts, then, Staples and Mauss argue
that sociologists can simply ask individuals if they are converts. Since Staples and Mauss see
conversion as a process of self-transformation, they argue that converts, not sociologists, are best
suited to decide they are converts.
The second central theme in the literature focuses on recruitment, specifically how and
why individuals join new religious or social movements. There are a variety of reasons
individuals convert to a new ideology including both predispositional factors, such as personal
openness to change, and situational factors, such as social networks (Stark and Lofland 1965).
Social networks, especially preexisting affective bonds and intensive interaction with group
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members, are particularly important for successful conversion (Snow and Phillips 1980, Stark
and Bainbridge 1980, Klandermans and Oegema 1987, Snow et al 1980, McAdam and Paulsen
1993, Clark 2004). Individuals usually find out about religious or social movements through
close contacts, such as relatives and friends, rather than strangers. Close contacts help provide
information outside of group meetings, increase the credibility of the message and cause, and
intensify the pressure to consider the message (Snow and Phillips 1980). By interacting and
engaging in social acts with other members, individuals become members of the group. Indeed,
in his study on the Nichiren Shoshu movement in America (NSA), Snow (1993) argues that
social networks are the most important determinant in explaining conversion. For example, NSA
members encourage prospects to attend four discussion meetings per week. Junior leaders also
oversee recruits by maintaining constant contact with them, answering questions, introducing
them to others in the group, and overall guiding the newcomer. It is through group meetings and
the junior group leader that new members become socialized and converted to the group.
According to Snow, the absence of such interaction makes conversion unlikely. When existing
interpersonal bonds between members and recruits do not exist, recruits are unlikely to convert
(Stark and Bainbridge 1980).
While intragroup social networks are important for conversion, they cannot explain all
facets of conversion. For example, sometimes countervailing networks sanction individuals for
converting to new groups, thereby making it unlikely potential converts have the time, energy,
and freedom to convert (Snow et al 1980). There are also cases in which networks do not matter
for recruitment. For example, some conversion is self-directed, lacking other’s direct influences.
Some individuals actively search for religious groups, or desire change in their lives. For
example, Jindra (2014) argues that individuals who grow up in environments they experience as
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restricting their freedom demonstrate more active searching for religious membership, typically
groups that allow some self-expression and self-direction, like Unitarian Universalists. Such
individuals actively look for groups to join, or seek out new ideas to live by, usually without
network influence. Thus, while networks explain why some individuals convert to a group,
networks do not explain why other individuals convert. Other factors, such as background
experiences and educational levels, can have more causal significance than networks (Jindra
2014).
The focus on networks and recruitment also omits the role culture and ideas play in
recruiting individuals. For example, Jasper and Poulsen (1995) find that animal rights activists
rarely get involved in animal rights participation through family and friends, but through “moral
shocks,” which are events or situations that induce such outrage in people that they feel
compelled to political action. Recruits influenced by moral shocks are likely to join a group if
there is congruence between their and the group’s cultural beliefs and images, and not on the
basis of preexisting ties (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). In fact, moral shocks usually bring strangers
together to form social networks. That is, the networks are not the causes of movement
participation but the outcomes. However, Jasper and Poulsen do not dismiss the importance of
networks. They argue that networks matter in some movements, such as the anti-nuclear
movement. But other movements, like animal rights, are more likely to recruit strangers through
moral shocks. More generally, networks are significant but largely because they are the confines
in which meanings are conveyed between movement members and recruits. Thus, both networks
and ideas are mechanisms for recruitment.

A Proposed Approach: The Sociology of Proselytizing
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Most of the literature on conversion offers empirical support for the relationship between
social ties and conversion. Recruits who have strong bonds with members of religious or social
movements are more likely to convert to those movements than recruits who lack such ties.
While networks help explain why individuals convert to a particular group, sociologists have
glossed over the interactions embedded in the networks, specifically how proselytizers present
their message to recruits. In other words, I am interested in the intervening process between the
variables (Blumer 1956), specifically meanings and definitions conveyed during recruitment.
Networks are sites of “meaning making” between co-interactants. As Jasper and Poulsen (1995)
argued, networks and interactions are significant because of the meanings transferred between
co-interactants. It is therefore important to illustrate how proselytizers persuade recruits to join
their cause. In examining this process, I propose a “sociology of proselytizing,” which focuses
on the proselytizers’ recruitment strategies rather than converts’ accounts of recruitment. The
conversion literature has largely focused on converts, including why they convert, but very little
on the meanings proselytizers convey in attempts to convert others. Because social connections
matter for recruitment, especially as means of conveying reasons for joining a group, it is
important to examine how proselytizers attempt to impart such meanings to recruits.
In my dissertation, vegans and especially animal activists act as proselytizers. Whether
through group protest or individual conversions, the activists proselytize in an ultimate attempt to
convert individuals to an animal welfare or rights ideology, or at the very least, alter individuals
so they, for example, stop going to the circus, eat less meat, or are more open to animal rights
ideologies. The animal rights movement is particularly suited for the sociology of proselytizing
compared to other moments because the movement requests that the public engage in self-
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alteration or transformation, whereas other movements, such as civil rights, tend to focus on the
transformation of institutions and rules.
Based on my research on vegans and animal rights activists, I propose that proselytizing
strategies center around interaction and ideas. The vegans and activists emphasize the
importance of interactions as a means of connecting with others. For example, many activists
believe that interactional styles are important recruitment methods. Activists think of
interpersonal traits, such as friendliness and warmth, as means to allure others. They try to
appear respectful and approachable to others. Certainly not all activists subscribe to this
approach, but the activists I interviewed believed in “peaceful protests” in which activists do not
affront the moral sensibilities of others. During peaceful protests, many activists self-consciously
try to signal their moral virtue through civilized interpersonal traits. For example, many activists
simply emphasized the importance of being “nice” and “friendly” as a way to capture the
public’s attention and subsequently listen to their larger message. Many of the activists adopt this
tactic because they want to combat the image of the preachy animal rights activist, yet they also
want to appear as individuals others would want to emulate. Activists think of personality traits,
then, as self-conscious activism tactics. Activists think it matters how ideas are imparted to
others. For the peaceful protesters, this involves using personality traits that signal nonconfrontation. Activists think that non-confrontation is important since their proselytizing is an
attempt to transform the public into individuals like the activists; the activists, then, do not want
to appear as individuals who possess interpersonal flaws, such as aggressiveness and
disagreeability. As one of my interviewees, Carla, put it, “PETA is just so aggressive and so
weird so that people don’t want to be them. You’re pretty much like an advertisement for vegans,
like you want to be like oh I’m a vegan, I’m happy and I’m normal and I do normal things.”
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For many of the vegans and animal activists I interviewed, activism involves the
presentation of moral selves who mutually uphold a moral order centered around civility and
non-confrontation. The activists value non-confrontation, and its interpersonal tactics such as
friendliness and respectability, as an effective way to proselytize. They want to appear
approachable and relatable so that others will listen to their message and perhaps wish to emulate
them if persuaded. As Stephen Vaisey (2012: 451) puts in, “Morality is not just about what (not)
to do; it is also about what kind of person it is good to become.” This proselytizing strategy also
relates to Weber’s ethics of responsibility. Though Weber’s focus was on the content of ideas,
responsible activism also involves how individuals try to define the situation. The vegans and
activists I interviewed, both welfarist and abolitionists, practice an ethic of responsibility in this
regard. They both wish to present themselves as individuals of responsibility and moral
character, independent of their specific message, who use that self-image in their efforts to
proselytize before others.
While activists believe that inviting interactions are important proselytizing techniques,
they also believe that ideas matter. This is especially important for animal activists because the
movement as a whole tends to recruit strangers rather than close contacts (Groves 1992, Jasper
and Poulsen 1995). Activists thus have to rely on forging connections with others through the
cultivation of ideas, rather than relying on interpersonal histories to convince recruits. My
evidence shows that the ideas activists promote are embedded in American culture. In particular,
animal activists usually tried to connect with others by emphasizing American values recruits
may already desire. Many activists use conventional cultural resources—such as tolerance,
pluralism, and especially individualism—to convince others to convert or alter their behavior.
For example, vegans and welfarists often relied on making individualistic claims, such as
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suggesting that veganism or consuming animal products is a personal choice rather than a larger
moral obligation. In contrast, the abolitionists stress a different set of ideas, particularly that it is
wrong to cause unnecessary harm to sentient beings. While the welfarists may find such
proselytizing ineffective, the abolitionists think it is effective for the same reasons that welfarists
think their approach is best: is it consistent with what the larger public already values. In this
case, the abolitionists contend that the public believes that harm is morally impermissible if it is
unnecessary. In general, the vegans and activists try to place the person within the larger culture
to show them that what they value is consistent with animal welfare/rights. The activists’ goal is
to connect the ideology of animal rights to something the potential converts already value. As
Jasper and Poulsen remarked (1995: 494) “Strangers can be recruited because of the beliefs and
feelings they already have.” In the eyes of activists, ideas are ways to connect with others, to
recruit them to the movement.18
Putting everything together, the activists try to connect with the others using two
methods. First, their proselytizing appeals to general ideas of human goodness embodied in the
proselytizers themselves. Thus, the activists attempt to connect with the public by displaying
positive personal traits, such as being inviting, warm, and respectful. Furthermore, the vegans
and welfarists in particular wish to uphold the moral worth of others by respecting them, not
judging them, and not telling them how they should live their lives. Second, activists attempt to
connect to others through common values. The activists use conventional American values in an

18

This is the case whether the activists have strong or weak bonds with recruits. Indeed, activists note that family
and friends are not always open to their beliefs about animal rights, sometimes to the point where conflict occurs.
Thus, preexisting strong bonds are not always enough to facilitate recruitment to veganism or animal activism. The
recruit has to be convinced to join the cause. Activists, then, usually present animal rights through the prism of
American culture to connect with others.
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effort to alter or convert others. In general, their proselytizing involves the use of conventional or
orthodox cultural ideals to produce unconventional or unorthodox people.
More generally, the sociology of proselytizing could examine how proselytizers attempt
to recruit converts through various discursive strategies, specifically how they impart meaning to
potential convents. Sociologists could explore how movement members convey their beliefs to
recruits, including their strategies for getting recruits to consider their message. Sociologists
could also ask how proselytizing impacts recruitment. That is, they could study how
proselytizing is related to the outcome of successful recruitment, manifested as relevant
sociological factors or as informants’ interpretations of relevant factors.

Distinctions and Boundaries
This dissertation also has implications for the broader study of symbolic boundaries,
specifically moral boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions that social actors
make to categorize objects such as people and practices (Lamont 1992). They frequently lead to
in-group inclusion—characterized by feelings of similarity, belongingness, and group
membership—and out-group exclusion—characterized by feelings of superiority and contempt.
By distinguishing in-groups from out-groups through relational differences (vulgar/pure,
clean/unclean, high/low), boundaries give members of in-groups a sense of shared meanings and
collective identity that they utilize to reject members of out-groups. For example, Michele
Lamont (1992; 2000), influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), showed how American and French
men, both professionals and workers, utilized distinctions or symbolic boundaries to place people
in moral, cultural, and socioeconomic hierarchies.
Cultural sociologists (i.e. Lamont 1992, Edgell et al 2006) argue that in-group/out-group
boundaries are not only essential to the construction of group identities but have a fundamentally
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moral character as social actors draw boundaries to define worthy from less worthy persons. That
is, moral claims are a key aspect of boundary work. Lamont (1992: 4) defines moral boundaries
as drawn “on the basis of moral character; they are centered around such qualities as honesty,
work ethic, personal integrity, and consideration for others.” Social actors use morality to
describe who they are and who they are not. Morality helps individuals maintain a sense of
worth, reaffirm their dignity independent of their class position, and locate themselves above
others (Lamont 2000). At an interpersonal level, boundary work gives individuals a sense of
worth, dignity, and honor (Lamont 2000), while at the macro social level, boundary work is
central to the reproduction and legitimation of both symbolic and material inequality (Bourdieu
1984; Lamont 1992; Tilly 2005).
In my dissertation, animal sociologists, vegans, and animal activists all drew moral
boundaries, especially between practices and also among individuals. Each group drew moral
boundaries against certain animal practices. For example, sociologist Leslie Irvine (2004)
suggested that pet keeping is immoral because animals have the basic right not to be treated as
things. Strategic individualistic vegans and activists argued that harming animals was wrong,
though welfarists and abolitionists in particular disagree about how to correct this issue. The
welfarists believe in making small incremental changes, like larger cages, to help animals while
they work towards a world in which people do not use animal products. The abolitionists, in
contrast, argue that these small changes do more harm than good, and therefore advocate for the
abolition of animal use. Though they disagree on solutions, they often see the problem similarly:
it is wrong to harm animals.
Each group also drew boundaries among individuals, though the strength of these
boundaries is associated with the beliefs of the boundary drawers. For example, some vegans
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who evoked strict individualism did not think of animal consumption as right or wrong. Because
of their individualistic morals, they did not condemn nonvegans, arguing that nonvegans may not
know any better. One the other hand, as beliefs become stronger, the likelihood of moral
boundary drawing increases. For example, vegans who practice strategic individualism as well as
most activists believed in veganism as a moral obligation rather than personal choice. With their
stronger beliefs, they were more likely to be critical of nonvegans, believing that they were
wrong for consuming animal products. They drew moral boundaries against them, seeing them
not only as different but morally inadequate. Some vegans and activists would try to mitigate
these boundaries, however, by arguing that nonvegans may not have been exposed to veganism
as a moral outlook. In other words, they did not want to judge the moral character of nonvegans
because of their presumed ignorance. While they thought that nonvegans were morally wrong to
consume animal products, they did not disparage or reject nonvegans as evil or terrible people.
They thus drew boundaries against individuals based on their practices without making harsh
judgments of their character. This distinction serves strategic purposes as vegans and activists
want to invite nonvegans to the cause rather than condemn them. This observation demonstrates
that there is a gray area of boundary work, as people can draw boundaries based on practices but
not necessarily insist on boundaries with those who enact the practices. Lamont (1992) argues
that individuals defend boundaries through rejection, hostility, and even aggression to make sure
that the “wrong types of people” are not entering our groups (Gans 1992). However, this is not
always the case as individuals can tolerate or even feel indifferent about individuals who are the
recipient of their judgements (Zerubavel 1991). However, a small number of interviewees also
went further by evaluating the moral character of nonvegans. For example, in chapter three on

165

veganism, we saw Sherry compare nonvegans to slaveholders and say that eating animals is
“sick.”
Increasingly, some sociologists (Sherman 2005, Brown 2009, Rivera 2010) have urged
other sociologists to think about the properties of boundaries, including their durability. They
claim that interviews, Lamont’s method, cannot fully tap the transposability of boundaries;
boundaries drawn in interviews may not be very durable if individuals do not draw them across a
wide variety of situations. Keith Brown (2009) argues that interviews de-contextualize
distinctions because they cannot capture the situations in which social actors activate distinctions
in everyday life. Individuals may feel comfortable making distinctions during interviews,
especially against abstract people, but Brown argues that it is uncertain if they would make the
same distinctions in other situations. Similarly, Rachel Sherman (2005) argues that symbolic
boundaries made during interviews may not be very durable if sociologists cannot verify them in
practice. In other words, absent observational data, there is reason to think that judgments are
produced by an interview process rather than having a salient identity independent of the
interview. And absent interactional data, it is impossible to know how much distinctions matter
or for what purposes. The bottom line is that boundary work is contextual and conditional. For
example, Brown (2009) argued in his research of fair-trade coffee promoters and consumers that
an individual’s role (position in the market, such as a promoter or consumer), script (discourse
one is expected to enact based on role), and audience (individuals with whom one is interacting)
shape when agents activate their moral boundaries.
In this spirit, though I rely mostly on interview methods, I believe that my dissertation
has implications for the properties of symbolic boundaries, including what I call “boundary
salience” and “boundary negotiation.” Boundaries are salient when social actors are invested in
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them. In such cases, boundaries are likely central to agents' sense of self. In my view, the vegans
and activists in my dissertation were invested in their boundaries. They believe harming animals
is wrong, so they have either made a change in their lifestyle (i.e., not eating animals) and/or
have participated in activism. Yet, consistent with Brown and Sherman, vegans and welfarist
activists do not draw consistent boundaries across a wide variety of situations. For example, each
group draws strong moral boundaries in private, believing that it is wrong for humans to harm
animals. However, they rarely present such strong views in public out of concern for alienating
others. Does this make their moral boundaries weak, as Sherman might to argue? In other words,
does inconsistent boundary drawing mean a boundary is weak? Furthermore, compared to the
abolitionists, vegans and welfarists appear to draw weaker boundaries since the abolitionists are
consistent in their beliefs and activist actions.
I agree with Sherman that inconsistent boundary drawing may signal a weakness of the
boundary itself. For example, if Lamont’s (1992) middle class workers criticize insincere
phonies from their workplace yet hedge on their boundaries or fail to deploy them in practice,
perhaps their moral distinctions are not very important to them after all. However, I believe that
the durability or importance of boundaries is complicated in the context of activism, especially
responsible activism. For example, those who practice an ethic of responsibility frequently tone
down their message to effectively convey their beliefs to others. They may draw a strong
boundary against a practice, but strategically reconstruct their beliefs to appease others who may
disagree to reduce negative consequences. Their boundary drawing is inconsistent across
situations. However, in this context, what sociologists may interpret as weak boundaries may
really reflect differences in ethics and strategies. For example, the welfarists’ strategy is to
practice an ethic of responsibility as a way to limit conflict in their efforts to recruit others.
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Though many believe harming animals is wrong, they did not frequently express this moral
belief and often contradicted it by encouraging individuals to consume fewer animal products for
strategic purposes. The abolitionist strategy, in contrast, is to upset the morals of others, to get
them to wrestle with what is right. They believe that harming animals is wrong and express this
message during their activism. The inconsistency or consistency in private morals and public
activism may not reveal weak boundaries, then, but differences in strategies. In other words, I
submit that the welfarists are not drawing weak boundaries simply because they are inconsistent
across situations. Instead, using an ethics of responsibility, they have specific strategies of
effective activism, and adjust their discourse appropriately. Thus, the welfarists’ inconsistent
boundaries are not simply a question of boundary salience but of strategic discourse. Future
research could explore such issues, including the factors/contexts that facilitate boundary
salience.
The literature on symbolic boundaries also pays little attention to what I call boundary
negotiation. Boundary negotiation refers to how social actors negotiate the meaning of their
boundaries with others, especially ignorant or unsympathetic co-interactants. While boundary
drawing may not commonly occur during interaction since, as Goffman (1959) implied,
interactions tend to promote solidarity over differentiation, there are times when individuals
express their value judgments or are forced to account for these judgments. How do individuals
utilize moral meanings during these interactions? Do the interactants negotiate the boundaries in
moral or amoral ways? Using this dissertation, I submit that one central method of negotiating
moral boundaries is by presenting them through the prism of common cultural resources. As I
mentioned earlier, the vegans and welfarists tend to negotiate their boundaries by drawing on
variants of American individualism. Such a tactic results in negotiating moral boundaries based
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on eating animals with remarkably little moral rhetoric. By presenting morality as little more
than a matter of individual choice, vegans and animal welfarists divorce animal consumption
from morality as a collective obligation. The abolitionists take a different approach by claiming
that ‘everyone already believes that harming animals unnecessarily is wrong’ and that we should
extend this belief to animal use. In either case, both groups try to negotiate the meaning of their
boundaries with common cultural meanings.
Of Morals and Manners
Throughout this dissertation, I have consciously eschewed making moral claims. In the
last few pages, I will relax this impulse. I am an ethical vegan. My value orientation certainly
influenced the research I pursued in my dissertation. I wanted to see how sociologists have
studied animals. I also wanted to research issues in veganism and animal rights, mostly how
vegans and activists engage with those who are unfamiliar with or even hostile toward animal
welfare/rights. I certainly find it difficult to talk about veganism at times, even among open
minded sociologists. However, while I am an ethical vegan, my goal was to describe and explain
how animals have selves, and how vegans and activists engage in moral work. In other words, I
do not see my research as a form of activism aimed to convince others, mostly sociologists, to
become vegan. Unlike many animal sociologists, I have not written a conclusion criticizing how
humans treat animals. Moreover, I have tried to avoid making value judgments from my
evidence. I have not argued that humans should or should not be vegan. I have not argued that
animals have or do not have rights. While I have moral convictions about animals, I have tried
not to express them in this dissertation. I have, however, made moral claims about doing
sociology. For example, I have argued that animal sociologists are not in the best position to
verify animal selfhood, so they are better off (a nice way of saying “should”) to study animals as
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symbolic resources. In what follows, I would like to conclude by examining the validity of
sociological moral claimsmaking regarding intra and extra-sociological affairs.
In my view, sociologists have little justification to make moral claims, especially from
their evidence. I take a Weberian position on ethics and sociology in the sense that I believe
sociologists should practice value-free research. This simply means that sociologists should not
make value judgments, meaning we should not make normative claims about what is desirable or
undesirable, unless it is within the process of doing sociology. In other words, value judgements
internal to sociology are necessary. For example, our values influence the topics, theories,
methods, etc. that we use. It is impossible to avoid internal value judgments. For sociologists
who study morality, what we think as moral issues involves a value judgment because our
thinking is influenced by our moral views or standards.
However, sociologists have little justification to argue that extra-sociological phenomena
are right or wrong because this is not where our expertise lies. We are trained in empiricism. We
are trained to collect data to describe and explain aspects of society. We have authority, then, to
account for what the world is like. For example, in the sociological study of morality, we should
describe how groups think of right and wrong and explain their beliefs. Our training in
empiricism, however, does not give us expertise on how to make value judgments. Such
judgments do not come our sociological expertise or through the sociological research process
(Campbell 2014) but through our values. For example, my sociological toolkit does not give me
any insight on whether the abolitionists or welfarists have the "correct" moral position. I
certainly can describe and explain their moral positions, but my sociological perspective does not
help me evaluate the morality of their positions and therefore advocate one over the other.
Sociologists, then, have little authority to make moral statements, as such statements are not a
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reflection of sociological authority but ideology. Sociologists who make such claims are not
acting as sociologists, but public or moral philosophers (Abend 2008). In other words,
sociologists should not make moral claims because they are not trained in moral philosophy and
reasoning. When we make moral claims, they are often disconnected from moral reasoning, as if
they speak for themselves. This is because we are not trained to make judgments about what is
right or wrong. We are not experts in deontology. Roughly speaking, sociologists are better off
treating morality as an empirical exploration, not a philosophical deliberation or moral
intuitionally derived condemnation.
Sociologists sometimes confuse value neutrality with objectivity, but value-neutrality and
objectivity are distinct (Campbell 2014). Value freedom does not mean that sociologists should
be “objective” or free from bias. Objectivity is not attainable, as our subjectivity will affect how
we do our research, including interpreting our evidence. Still, we should still try to prevent our
subjectivity from influencing results as much as possible through reflexivity and peer review. We
can, however, avoid making value judgements as this is a conscious action. For instance, we
could avoid making a claim that something is wrong. Just because sociologists cannot be totally
objective or unbiased does not mean sociologists should make value judgments. They are
different issues.
I realize I am swimming upstream, especially with the popularity of public and critical
sociology. Many sociologists feel compelled to make moral claims about inequality and forms of
injustice. These issues are worth making moral claims about. Though, I do not think sociologists
are in the best position to make them, not because they are not experts on the issues but because
they are not experts on morality. Instead, knowing that sociologists are unlikely to shy away
from moral claims, I believe sociologists should practice a minimalist morality. Here,
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sociologists limit value judgments, and through their research demonstrate the consequences of
problems, such as how social inequality affects outcomes in education or health or any other
number of issues. The focus is how issues are related to outcomes rather than evaluating the
outcomes. For example, the evidence that lower class individuals have less access to quality
healthcare is not a moral claim, but it certainly has moral implications. Our evidence can help us
inform the public and importantly politicians, who then can draw their own moral conclusions
and perhaps mobilize to address the issue.
Though I contend that sociologists are ill-equipped to make moral claims, I still believe
that sociology should have practical applications, but mostly independent of moral
claimsmaking. In other words, sociology should inform public policy. Sociologists are well
versed in social problems, like inequality, and could offer means to achieve goals of various
forms of equality. However, this is not something to take lightly. We must offer the most
effective means to achieving specific goals through empirical investigation. Sociology, then, can
give us a sense of empirically effective ways of changing aspects of society. However, while
sociology might inform us what is effective for achieving a goal, this does not mean that
sociology can tell us what our means and goals should be (Black 2013). Still, such policy
sociology is not without limitations. First, expertise on a social problem does not necessarily
translate to expertise on how to fix or, more likely, mitigate the problem. Social problems are
multifaceted, intricate processes so devising solutions is no easy task. Second, policy sociology
could have negative consequences. Howard Becker (2003) argues that sociologists often want to
make their research “relevant to society” by engaging in important issues and proposing policy
recommendations. However, in doing so, they may make their research irrelevant because what
is relevant is relative. For example, if we view a problem as someone else has defined it, others
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who disagree with our position will disapprove of our construction of the problem and proposed
solutions, making sociology irrelevant to them. Plus, sociological theories and methods do not
help us decide who to help and what to fix. These again are driven by our values. Furthermore,
the solutions we advocate may be impractical. They could be too expensive or result in
unintended consequences, again making our solutions irrelevant to others. However, even with
these problems, policy sociology is more desirable compared to overt moral claimsmaking in the
sense that it is not simply making moral claims about problems but seeking and proposing
solutions to problems.
In closing, sociologists are best to morally tread lightly because of our lack of expertise in
morality and consequences for making moral claims. Sociology simply does not provide the
tools to make convincing moral claims. In addition, the consequences of making moral claims
may do more harm than good, especially by alienating the larger public who are a couple of
standard deviations away from the political orthodoxy of sociologists. Still, it is difficult to
divorce morality from sociology since much sociological data has moral implications, even if
people interpret those implications differently. Yet, there is little justification for sociologists to
argue that something is wrong and act as if that judgement is based on expertise.
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